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PRELUDE 
 Sy Burr-Naughton knew he was in Heaven: Suspended a few cen-
timeters above the warm sands of Bora Bora. Shaded by gently 
swaying boojum trees. To the far right, a slow-motion sunset behind 
the rugged Pamirs. The latest release of the Leyden Jar Lids (this 
hour’s hottest music) vibrating everything at 121 dB. Watching his 
bank balance swell on the video hanging over the waves as hun-
dreds of music lovers simultaneously downloaded digital tracks 
from his Web site in Ulaan Batur. 
                                                                                                                  
 * Assistant Professor, Indiana University-Purdue University, Fort Wayne. J.D., 
University of Oregon; LL.M. in Taxation, George Washington University. This Article is 
published as edited by Edward Comey and Katherine Walker. 
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 Heaven departed abruptly when the bank-balance screen went 
black, expanded to block out the ocean, then came back to life with 
a vision of Tax Farmer Aiya Havya in her favorite persona—shiny 
black body with bright red figure-eight spots and eight long green 
legs. Her virtual authorization document scrolled down a side 
screen in seven languages. Very quietly, but with finality, the sur-
round-sound speakers conveyed her message: “You’re busted. The 
Icecap County consumption tax for seventeen of the last 21,354 
downloads was not transferred within the required 73.6 seconds. 
You’re down as of NOW.” 
 A jabba subroutine shot out a virtual white sticky line that 
grabbed Sy’s leg and pulled him into—Tax Court. The collection 
clerks chatted in a language he did not recognize as the ALJ sent 
the command to subtract the tax and a quintuple fine from Sy’s ac-
count. 
 Within seconds, Sy was asking the nonvirtual blank basement 
wall in Brasilia: “Where the h*** is Icecap County?” 
Reality? No. Probability? Maybe. Possibility? Definitely. 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The evolution of “The Internet” is engendering debates in a multi-
tude of realms—economic, intellectual, moral, political, legal, tangi-
ble, virtual, and others. Many, if not most, of these debates are based 
on the premise that the Internet is something sui generis, totally new 
in the universe.1 As they do with any person, event, or thing, political 
governments seek to impose their authority on the Internet and per-
sons interacting with and through it.  
 Even while contending that the Internet is a new thing, those 
governments (not often prone to innovation) are refurbishing old 
rules and arguments.2 In significant ways, those efforts must fail due 
to inherent characteristics of the Internet, principally its diffuse na-
ture and the functional irrelevance of political boundaries. Regulat-
ing the Internet presents governments with a unique dilemma. Any 
measure that might effectively limit access and flexibility affects eve-
ryone, even governments—and governments may be more dependent 
on the communications infrastructure than any other person, entity, 
or group. Unfortunately, this internal conflict of interest has not fos-
tered entirely rational responses. 
                                                                                                                  
 1. See, e.g., Marcelo Halpern & Ajay K. Mehrotra, From International Treaties to 
Internet Norms: The Evolution of International Trademark Disputes in the Internet Age, 21 
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 523, 534 (2000) (discussing the debate that exists about whether to 
apply traditional legal concepts or new legal analysis in light of the new technology). 
 2. See generally Yocahi Benkler, How (If at All) to Regulate the Internet: Net Regula-
tion: Taking Stock and Looking Forward, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1203 (2000) (discussing con-
gressional attempt to regulate the internet).  
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 Collecting taxes is a traditional government activity. Tax revenue 
is a subject near and dear to every politician, government official, 
and bureaucrat. With few exceptions, taxation is the means whereby 
governments confiscate desired resources. Tax proceeds pay elected 
officials’ and bureaucrats’ salaries, build edifices and monuments, 
fund government programs and, in general, make government func-
tions possible. This extraction of wealth, quite naturally, tends to ir-
ritate those who create the wealth that is extracted, that is, the tax-
payers. Thus governments (and particularly elected officials) con-
stantly seek new and better3 means of extracting the maximum 
amount of wealth with the minimum amount of taxpayer irritation. 
As any basic text teaches, any thing or event can be used as a basis 
for taxation. Therefore, it should be no surprise that the evolution of 
the Internet has drawn the attention of those who benefit from in-
creased tax collections. 
 Debates concerning taxation and the Internet may not be as gen-
erally publicized as debates concerning Internet pornography and 
censorship (publicity is not something tax collectors generally seek), 
but the tax issues are perhaps more serious and may have greater 
long-term impacts. Despite the potential for long-term effects, to date 
the controversies over taxes and the Internet have exponentially 
produced more heat than light.  
 This Article reviews the legal background and milieu of the cur-
rent debates in the United States in relation to taxation and Inter-
net-mediated transactions. 4 Part II provides a brief, nontechnical 
overview of the Internet and Internet-mediated activities. Part III 
discusses the history and current status of legal restraints on tax col-
lecting within the United States. 5 Part IV discusses the application of 
the state use-tax rules to Internet-mediated transactions. Internet-
related tax issues may have far-reaching results, not because of any 
inherent importance, but because of the perceived impact of Internet 
commercial transactions on state tax revenues and the precedent 
that might be established for other types of Internet regulation. Part 
V concludes that there is more than one potential solution, each with 
negative aspects. 
                                                                                                                  
 3. “Better” in this context means less frequently noticed by voters. 
 4. The term “Internet-mediated” activities is used here to describe all activities that 
persons carry on, in whole or in part, using the Internet as a communications medium. 
“Internet transactions” or “Internet-related transactions” seems to emphasize the medium 
over the message. It is the actions of persons and entities that are at the center of contro-
versy. 
 5. The current U.S. tax debate essentially ignores the fact that the Internet is a 
global phenomenon. Any U.S.-based solution will eventually have to take that reality into 
account. Acknowledging that this narrow focus is a shortcoming, no matter what proposals 
may be made on an international scale, they must be acceptable under U.S. law before they 
can be implemented in the United States. Therefore, the international scene is generally 
left for discussion in other articles. 
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 No matter which potential solution or combination of solutions is 
chosen, it will have impacts far beyond use-tax collections. The par-
ticipants in the current political debate, particularly state tax offi-
cials, must look beyond their narrow, short-term agendas. If they do 
not, the result will have a negative, long-term impact that will soon 
eliminate any short-term gains and may cause the revenue losses 
they are trying to prevent. 
II.   THE CONTEXT 
A.   The Communication Web—Reality and Virtual Reality 
 The evolving communications medium commonly known as the 
Internet has been described in many places. 6 It is beyond the scope of 
this Article (and its author’s competence) to provide a technical de-
scription of the Internet’s components and system. However, a lay-
person-level description is necessary for the following discussion. 
Some of the terms (jargon) used in the Internet context are casually 
defined in Appendix A. However, it is important to note that the term 
“browser” has two meanings, one being a computer program that al-
lows a person to access the Web and the other being the person using 
the program.7 This discussion concerns interactions by persons 
rather than computer programs, so “browser” will be used in the sec-
ond sense. 
 The history of the Internet is relatively short and well docu-
mented.8 The Internet evolved from a U.S. Defense Department pro-
ject, which had as one purpose the protection of government com-
puter systems and communications in the event of nuclear war.9 One 
of the essential characteristics of the desired system was survivabil-
ity, that is, that the loss or destruction of any particular part or parts 
of the system would not disable the entire system. 10 At least in retro-
spect, a highly decentralized system was the most obvious and logical 
choice. Thus, the system that evolved into the Internet does not have 
a central control point, or even a limited number of major control 
points. 11 
                                                                                                                  
 6. See, e.g., JANE ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET (1999); J.P. CHRISTOS 
MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., HISTORY OF THE INTERNET: A CHRONOLOGY, 1843 TO THE PRESENT 
151-236 (1999). See generally CHARLES JONSCHER, THE EVOLUTION OF WIRED LIFE : FROM 
THE ALPHABET TO THE SOUL-CATCHER CHIP—HOW INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES CHANGE 
OUR WORLD (1999) (providing a broader history of communication and related technology); 
see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-53 (1997). 
 7. See infra Appendix A. 
 8. See sources cited supra note 6. 
 9. See ABBATE, supra note 6, at 8-9. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 853; see also ABBATE, supra note 6, at 113, 127-30, 
156-61. 
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 Instead, it is a “system of systems” through which a communica-
tion from one point to any other point may take an essentially infi-
nite number of paths, bypassing any disruptions or roadblocks. 12 In 
fact, a single communication is divided into a number of discrete por-
tions (“packets”), each of which may take a different route from ori-
gin to destination.13 This is really the heart and genius of the system. 
A message traversing the Internet goes through a number of switch-
ing points. 14 At each point, the message is passed on toward its desti-
nation via one of the routes available from that particular point. 15 If 
one route is unavailable or overloaded, another route is automati-
cally chosen.16 Since the Internet operates at near-light speed and 
very high information-content levels, a route unavailable one mo-
ment may be available the next.17  
 There are a number of potential analogies to the Internet net-
work. One that should be readily comprehensible to a majority of 
persons is a city street grid. Assume for the moment that there is a 
city that has a total of forty two-way streets, twenty that run north 
and south, parallel to each other, and twenty that run east and west, 
parallel to each other and perpendicular to the other twenty streets. 
The outermost streets in each direction (numbers one and twenty) 
form a closed square. Each of the twenty north-south streets inter-
sect with each of the twenty east-west streets, creating 400 intersec-
tions, most with four potential entrance and exit routes.  
 Now assume that there is a traveler at the far northeast corner of 
the street grid who wishes to travel to the far southwest corner. 
There are no restrictions on which streets our hypothetical traveler 
can take to reach the goal. At each intersection, the traveler can 
choose to go straight through, turn right, turn left, or reverse direc-
                                                                                                                  
 12. See ABBATE, supra note 6, at 127-30. 
 13. See id. at 26-27. 
 14. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831-32 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. Another aspect of the system may not be so innovative, but is equally necessary. 
That is the ability of computers connected with the system to communicate, without regard 
to the make, model, or operating system of any particular computer. As different compa-
nies developed computers, their basic programming and operational aspects differed, so in-
teraction between computers was limited or impossible. See ABBATE, supra note 6, at 48. 
Since the military and educational establishments used a wide variety of computers, a 
common “protocol” or language had to be developed to make the system operational. See id. 
at 49. The most well known version of that common language is known as “hypertext 
mark-up language,” or “HTML.” See MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 126-27. The ex-
istence of HTML, together with some visionary ideas about the system’s potential, led to 
the “browser” programs that made the “World Wide Web” not only feasible, but popular. 
See id. As the Internet has become more widely used, newer and more sophisticated soft-
ware has been, and will continue to be, developed. See id. at 165-67 (describing Java). The 
Internet’s popularity and new programming is mutually reinforcing. See generally id. at ch. 
8. As the Internet becomes easier to use, and thus more used, the incentive to provide more 
advanced programs is increased, which triggers even greater popularity. 
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tion (but must wait for the traffic signal). Our hypothetical traveler 
moves at near-light speed between intersections but must sometimes 
wait for subjective years at busy intersections. It should be rather 
obvious that the number of potential routes is effectively infinite. 
While it may often be desirable for the traveler to take the most di-
rect route, assume that time and distance traveled are not significant 
factors. 18 The hypothetical traveler could go back and forth between 
two intersections or around a single block as often and as long as de-
sired, though that would not be very efficient. 
 The Internet system is similar to the hypothetical street grid. The 
differences are that the Internet system is not closed, there are hun-
dreds of thousands of intersections, and a communication may have 
many more than four potential exit routes from any intersection. For 
all practical purposes, there is an infinite number of potential routes 
between any two Internet terminals. 
 A second defining characteristic of the Internet is that communi-
cations between any two computers with access is effectively instan-
taneous,19 and the near-light-speed travel makes distance an insig-
nificant consideration.20 The communication may be text-only (e-mail 
and usegroups), vocal (similar to standard telephone), or vocal and 
visual (“teleconferencing”).21 In addition, it may be one-way, two-way, 
or multiple-way (“chat rooms”).22 As transmission and computer ca-
pacities increase, it is probable that teleconferencing will soon emu-
late in-person, arms-length (no touch or smell yet) communication. 
All of these communications are mediated by computers—at least 
one at each end of the communication.23 The direct transmissions are 
actually between computers. 
 In the Internet, and elsewhere, computers can and do exchange 
meaningful information without the participation of a human opera-
tor.24 This point is important because a significant portion of Internet 
communications involve exchanges between a person at her or his 
computer and a distant computer that is not directly attended by a 
                                                                                                                  
 18. At over 186,000 miles per second, light can travel around the globe more than 
seven times in a second. The difference in travel time between an electronic signal travel-
ing 15,000 miles and one traveling 15 miles is probably not perceptible by unaided human 
senses. 
 19. See ABBATE, supra note 6, at 1. 
 20. This assumes that there are no delays in transmissions through the Internet. 
That assumption may not be realistic, due to the maximum possible speeds with which 
various components can handle messages and the ever-increasing number of users clogging 
switching points. 
 21. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997). 
 22. See id. 
 23. There are router-computers at each of the switching and transmission points, but 
their function is normally directory, totally independent of the message’s content and the 
parties’ physical location, and completely transparent—the user(s) neither knows nor cares 
how many routers are involved or where they are. 
 24. See Reno, 521 U.S. at  852. 
2001]  PREYING ON THE WEB 655 
 
human.25 The physical location to which communications are trans-
mitted is functionally irrelevant and normally unrecorded.26 The ex-
tent to which the distant computer “interacts” (sends information to, 
and accepts information from, the computer user) varies substan-
tially. That variation has become significant for jurisdictional pur-
poses. 
 As anyone familiar with commercial activities might surmise, the 
Internet’s potential for commercial activities was quickly recognized 
and exploited. Low-cost transmission of information is “natural” for 
the Internet, and “e-mail” remains one of the most used Internet 
functions. The development of Internet Web sites exponentially ex-
panded the commercial potential of electronic communications. Using 
the Web, digital information (computer programs, digitalized text, 
graphics, audio, and video) can be marketed, sold, and delivered to 
multiple purchasers—regardless of date, time, or place—without em-
ploying any sales or delivery staff. The computer does it all, with ap-
propriate programming of course. Instead of the traditional sales 
employees, a Web site owner employs computer-programming and 
maintenance personnel.  
 The commercial use of the Internet caused the Internet’s rapid 
growth.27 It is likely that if its subject matter had been limited to re-
search and intellectual pursuits, the Internet would still exist but the 
number of sites and users would be a small fraction of what it is to-
day. Commercial use has also caused most of the Internet-related le-
gal controversies. 28 
 Despite the Internet’s relatively recent advent, there has been 
significant discussion concerning it. Much of the discussion deals 
with a hypothetical realm frequently referred to as “Cyberspace.”29 
                                                                                                                  
 25. For example, a person doing legal research contacts a computer containing legal 
information, such as statutes or court decisions, “searches” that computer’s data for the de-
sired information and retains a copy of selected information on his or her personal com-
puter. There are, no doubt, persons controlling or attending the distant computer, but none 
of them participate in the legal researcher’s activities. 
 26. Some Internet-related transactions require that the information recipient identify 
his or her physical location. For example, the sale of a physical item requires that the 
seller obtain a physical address for the item’s delivery. However, that is not an inherent 
requirement of the communicatio n itself but is necessary for other purposes. For the sale of 
digitalized information (such as a computer program), the physical location of the buyer is 
totally irrelevant; the digital information is transmitted directly to the computer and the 
buyer pays via a credit card whose issuer need not be, and probably is not, in the same po-
litical jurisdiction as the buyer. See, e.g., E-Data Corp. v. Micropatent Corp., 989 F. Supp. 
173, 177 (D. Conn. 1997). 
 27. See ABBATE, supra note 6, at 197-200. 
 28. See, e.g., Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (involving a claim of trademark infringement in the use of a domain 
name). 
 29. See, e.g., William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World 
Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197, 198 (1995); Howard B. 
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“Cyberspace” is a term coined and popular in science fiction.30 It is an 
intangible, but perceptually real, “place” where electronic communi-
cations take place, one that has no physical existence, and therefore 
no physical boundaries. In popular thought, Cyberspace is perceptu-
ally separate from the physical reality in which human bodies exist 
and in which nations and states have physical (and jurisdictional) 
boundaries. Because of that conceptualization, there has been sig-
nificant discussion on how, and indeed if, traditional physical-reality 
governments can control or influence Cyberspace-related events.31 In 
significant respects, this Article is a part of that discussion. 
 However, Cyberspace as envisioned and discussed does not exist 
on the Internet. In science fiction’s Cyberspace, a corporeal person 
has sensory inputs solely from Cyberspace, that is, he or she subjec-
tively appears to enter a totally different reality (sometimes called 
“virtual reality”) where electronic data is perceived though all that 
person’s senses (sight, touch, taste, feel, sound, and so forth). Discus-
sions, particularly political ones, based on this unrealized, subjective 
Cyberspace tend to lose touch with the actual physical reality that 
still exists, the one in which Internet users still physically exist and 
interact. 32 
 Regardless of how it may be perceived by a participant or imag-
ined by a tax official, today (and for the foreseeable future) the Inter-
net does not exist detached from mundane physical reality. Internet 
                                                                                                                  
Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More Is Required on the Elec-
tronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 925, 926 n.9 (1998). 
 30. See, e.g., WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 5 (Ace ed. 1984) (“[The hero] . . . jacked 
into a custom cyberspace deck that projected his disembodied consciousness into the con-
sensual hallucination that was the matrix.”). And in the same source “quoted” from a “kid‘s 
show”: 
“Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legiti-
mate operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical con-
cepts . . . A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every 
computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged 
in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights, 
receding . . . .” 
Id. at 51. For a “more advanced” version, see ALEXANDER BESHER,  RIM (Harper Pape r-
backs ed. 1996), in which the “virtual” world is intermingled with the “real” world and both 
become surreal. Cyberspace novels are so popular that they have become their own sub-
genre. See also Cybermania, University of Illinois English Dep’t, at http://128.174.194.59/ 
cybermania (visited Mar. 27, 2000) (describing movies about Cyberspace and related con-
cepts). 
 31. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (arguing that Cyberspace should have its own 
distinct law separate from “physical geographically-defined territories”). 
 32. Some science fiction novels are based on the proposition that a human personality 
(soul?) can be converted to digital information and exist totally independent of the human 
body, whether the physical body continues to exist or not. A variation, or companion, 
theme with similar results is the existence of a self-aware computer (“artificial intelli-
gence” or “AI”) that exists solely in cyberspace. See, e.g., GREG EGAN, DIASPORA (1998). So 
far as the author is aware, no one has yet succeeded in transferring a human personality to 
digital format or in creating a self-aware computer. 
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transactions involve communication between two computers that 
physically exist at some identifiable, geographic locations. The per-
sons directing the transmissions and owning the computers also 
physically exist at identifiable locations. The government where the 
computer and/or participants exist has the ability to enact and at-
tempt enforcement of rules concerning those persons’ actions. The 
real question is whether governments can reach through Cyberspace 
to regulate the actions of persons. 
 There is an additional way in which the Cyberspace construct is 
misleading, but it nevertheless seems to be a foundational premise of 
some court decisions. 33 In science-fiction Cyberspace, a “cyber-
voyager” perpetually physically travels to cyber-locations and inter-
acts with data, computers, and other cyber-voyagers.34 Some com-
mercial Web sites are referred to as “malls,”35 invoking the image of a 
typical suburban mall where physical persons physically go to view, 
touch, and smell physical items and to interact with physical sales 
persons to purchase those items. In the image, sellers and purchas-
ers engage in meaningful interaction, consciously and intentionally 
dealing with known persons. That analogy is based on the still sci-
ence-fictional Cyberspace. Except perhaps in a very limited manner 
in chat rooms, the cyber-mall is not consistent with what really hap-
pens on the Internet. 
 A more accurate analogy would be a vending-machine site (or a 
public library’s rack of mail-order catalogs). Return to the hypotheti-
cal driver in the hypothetical forty-street village. As he is driving, he 
observes a billboard advertising goods or services he might wish to 
purchase. The driver changes routes to arrive at the advertised loca-
tion.36 Arriving at the location, the driver observes hundreds or thou-
sands of vending machines with pictures or descriptions of wares for 
sale. The driver-now-shopper moves around viewing the displays, 
comparing prices and descriptions (but not touching, tasting, or 
smelling), and he decides to purchase an item. He enters a credit 
card number into the vending machine’s data-processing program 
and indicates the desired product. After confirming the validity of the 
entered data, the machine delivers the requested product either di-
rectly or starts the process through which a physical-reality product 
                                                                                                                  
 33. See, e.g., Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 
1996); discussion infra notes 203-229 and accompanying text. But compare Cybersell, Inc. 
[Ariz.] v. Cybersell, Inc. [Fla.], 130 F.3d 414, 415 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the notion that a 
corporation could be subject to personal jurisdiction because “cyberspace is without bo r-
ders”). 
 34. See, e.g., GIBSON, supra note 30, passim. 
 35. See, e.g., skymall.com, at http://www.skymall.com/1-800-SKYMALL/WebObjects/ 
Store (visited May 15, 2001). 
 36. The driver may have started the trip with this destination in mind. That would 
not alter the usefulness of the analogy. 
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is delivered to a location chosen by the shopper. The shopper returns 
to being a driver and goes somewhere else. 
 Notice that in all of this, the driver-shopper was the only person 
“present.” The only interaction was with automated machinery. The 
machine does not care nor need to know the true identity or location 
of the person pushing the buttons. The seller and its employees do 
exist, but they are all on the other side of the machines—wiring 
vending machines, changing descriptions and prices, and manipulat-
ing digital and physical products—not interacting directly with the 
shopper. The seller’s purposeful acts are limited to opening the site, 
programming it to accept information (which may include product 
orders and how to collect payment for products sold), and arranging 
delivery in accordance with instructions given to the machine. 
 Some might object to this analogy as being too impersonal, that 
the seller really does have and need particular information about the 
buyer and her or his physical location. But those objections are easily 
met. Without mutual physical presence, the seller can never know 
who the physical purchaser really is and even in a physical shopping 
mall, the purchaser’s identity is really irrelevant, so long as the 
seller has adequate assurance of payment before delivering the 
goods. A seller is also indifferent about the delivery of physical goods, 
so long as delivery costs are paid. The delivery location, which may 
be only a reshipment point (and the final destination somewhere else 
entirely), is totally immaterial to the seller.37 
 It is true that information about Internet users is obtained (fre-
quently without the user’s knowledge or permission) and collated 
with information from other sources, enabling Internet sellers to 
identify the user and his or her physical location. But some Internet 
sellers do not collect customer information (and they should be 
praised).38 In addition, users can provide misleading information, and 
programs exist that can totally frustrate efforts to track and identify 
Internet users.39 For example, Internet users who purchase by credit 
card can be identified through the card number, but “e-cash” pur-
chasers cannot.40 With respect to the need for identity information, 
                                                                                                                  
 37. The destination location is contractually insignificant as well. The standard legal 
rule is that title, risk of loss, etc., pass to the buyer when the seller delivers goods to the 
carrier, and thus, the sale is complete at the seller’s location. See, e.g., Butler v. Beer 
Across America, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1264 n.6 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (discussing Internet-
mediated sale of beer to a minor). 
 38. See, e.g.,  E-Data Corp. v. Micropatent Corp., 989 F. Supp. 173, 175 (D. Conn. 
1997). 
 39. See, e.g., Mike Bunker, Privacy Tools Usher in Era of Net Anonymity, MSNBC, at 
http://www.msnbc.com/news/347298.asp (visited Dec 2, 1999) (describing the “Freedom” 
system developed by Zero-Knowledge Systems, which reportedly creates an impenetrable 
online anonymity for the Internet user). 
 40. “E-cash” is similar to the widespread long-distance telephone card that “stores” 
prepaid funds and deducts the cost of calls. There is no need to identify the user because 
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the Internet marketplace is more like a Central Asian cash bazaar 
than it is like a mid-American suburban mall. 
 But despite all that, Cyberspace is not an unusable concept. Geo-
graphic location is not relevant to Internet communications—even 
transmissions between physical computers located in the same politi-
cal jurisdiction may be routed across political boundaries or circum-
vent them via satellite. The geographic location of other computers 
involved in an Internet-mediated transaction is not relevant to the 
persons involved.41 The technical “address” of any particular Inter-
net-connected computer is frequently not known to, or of any concern 
to, an Internet user.42 Thus, to the extent that Internet-mediated 
transactions transcend traditional political and geographic bounda-
ries, traditional legal concepts such as jurisdiction and venue may 
appear unfair or unreasonable, and may ultimately prove unwork-
able. 
B.   Taxes—Confiscation in Many Guises 
 The means governments have devised to obtain funds may seem 
infinite, but there are recognized categories of types of taxes. A full 
description of all types of taxes is beyond the scope of this Article. 
                                                                                                                  
payment is assured without that information. While the first ventures in e-cash may not 
have been great successes, more recent ventures may fare better. Mondex International 
Ltd. is a subsidiary of MasterCard International. It provides credit cards, debit cards, and 
e-cash cards that can be used on the Internet. See Mondex on the Internet, at 
http://www.mondex.com/mondex (last visited Feb. 16, 2000). The on-line advertising states: 
“On the Internet, no-one need know who you are when using Mondex. When goods and 
services are purchased using Mondex there is no record held of the transaction, allowing 
the user the privacy normally only afforded with physical cash.” Id. Tax officials are wor-
ried by e-cash because it provides no information useful in auditing taxpayers or tracing 
purchasers’ locations. See INLAND REVENUE , H.M. CUSTOMS & EXCISE, ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE:  THE UK’S TAXATION AGENDA,  CHALLENGES TO TAX COMPLIANCE 53 (Nov. 
1999) (U.K.) [hereinafter UK’S TAXATION AGENDA], http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/ 
taxagenda/ecom.pdf (visited Mar. 28, 2000). 
 41. Even if a person wishes to communicate with a particular person or company that 
is at a specific geographic location, that does not mean the computer which holds that per-
son’s or company’s data (Web site program) is at the same geographic location. The server 
containing a San Diego, California, company’s Web site could be in Texas, Tijuana, or 
Transylvania—and the person accessing that Web site would neither know nor care. 
 42. Internet IP addresses, see Appendix A, are a series of numbers and periods with-
out any obvious geographic reference. Those addresses are associated with “domain 
names,” which are “normal” words and periods. A person wishing to “visit” a particular 
computer via the World Wide Web enters a domain name, which is converted to an IP ad-
dress. Domain names may give some indication of the nature of the organization that op-
erates a particular Web site. Many domain names end in “.com” [commercial], “.gov” [gov-
ernment], “.org” [nongovernmental organization], or “.edu” [educational organization]. 
Many non-U.S. domain names now include a two-letter abbreviation of the domain’s physi-
cal (political) location, e.g., “.vz” [Venezuela], “.cn” [China], “.ru” [Russia], and “.kz” [Ka-
zakhstan]. However, despite the potential for some identification of the site’s location or 
character, the Internet user is indifferent to that identification; the actual location of the 
Web site computer need not coincide with the domain name. See MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., su-
pra note 6, at 189-90, 194-96. 
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However, a general description of tax types and their operation is a 
necessary foundation for the following discussions. For that purpose, 
a consistent terminology is helpful. all taxes can be basically de-
scribed using four terms or concepts: (1) taxable event,43 (2) meas-
ure,44 (3) rate,45 and (4) incidence.46 One should keep in mind that all 
taxes, regardless of category or character, are involuntary transfers 
of wealth from the taxpayer to the government which cannot be en-
forced beyond the taxing authority’s jurisdiction or in violation of its 
own laws.47 
 The taxable event is the identified objective happening or condi-
tion that triggers a legal duty to pay taxes.48 It may be a transfer of 
property (including money), the creation of a tangible item, or merely 
the existence of an item or condition at a specified time and place.49 
The incidence of the tax determines who is legally responsible to pay 
the tax amount to the government.50 Note that the incidence of the 
tax is not necessarily on the person who bears the economic burden 
of the tax.51 Also, significantly for some taxes, the person who actu-
ally submits the taxes to the government may not be the one on 
whom the tax is incident.52 The measure of a tax is a number associ-
                                                                                                                  
 43. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc, 514 U.S. 175, 190 (1995) 
(describing the taxable event of sales tax). 
 44. See, e.g., id. at 200 (describing measure of tax as “value of the service pu rchased”). 
 45. See, e.g., id. at 178 (describing the rate). 
 46. See, e.g., American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451, 455-57 (1965) (discussing the in-
cidence of motor fuel tax). 
 47. See, e.g., Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 347 (1954). 
 48. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc, 514 U.S. 175, 190 (1995) 
(describing the taxable event of sales tax as “compris[ing] agreement, payment, and deliv-
ery of some of the services in the taxing State”). 
 49. See id. 
 50. See, e.g., American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451, 455-57 (1965) (discussing the 
incidence of motor fuel tax). 
 51. See id. Frequently, it is difficult to determine who ultimately bears the economic 
burden of a particular tax. A corporate income tax is legally incident on the corporation 
earning income. See I.R.C. § 11 (1994). However, the paying corporation will take that tax 
into account when establishing a price for its products. If all the tax costs are passed on as 
part of the sales price, the economic burden is actually on the person buying things from 
the corporation. Of course, if the immediate buyer is not a consumer, that cost may be 
passed further along to the buyer’s customers. However, if a corporation cannot increase 
its prices for competitive reasons, the economic burden of the tax may be passed on to the 
corporation’s shareholders via a lower dividend. If the corporation does not have a net in-
come, part of the economic burden may be effectively passed to the government imposing 
income taxes, via a “net operating loss” deduction. In that event, the ultimate economic 
burden is borne by taxpayers, who have to cover the shortfall. Tracing the economic burden 
can be much more complicated. Consider, for example, a situation in which the economic 
burden of a sales or VAT tax is imposed on building materials used in the construction of a 
commercial building. 
 52. In many situations, the person having the legal obligation to transmit tax funds to 
the government is not the person upon whom the tax is incident. A frequent example is the 
“withholding” of income tax payments from employees’ pay. See I.R.C. § 3402 (1994). In the 
United States, sales taxes are imposed on the retail purchaser (customer), but the retail 
seller is required to collect the sales tax from the purchaser and remit the funds to the gov-
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ated with the taxable event that is one component of the tax-amount 
calculation.53 The number may be units of production, number of 
items, number of dollars (or other currency), or determined by any 
other means as a measure related to the taxable event.54 The rate of a 
tax is the second component of the tax-amount calculation.55 
 In the United States, the primary transaction or “consumption” 
tax, the “sales and use tax,” is treated separately from other transac-
tion-measured excise taxes. 56 “Value added taxes” (“VAT”) are also 
generally treated as a distinct category.57 However, sales, use, and 
VAT taxes should be considered a single category here because most 
of their respective attributes are similar if not identical. 
 Almost all U.S. states impose a retail sales tax.58 Most fre-
quently, the sales tax is imposed on all retail sales of tangible prop-
                                                                                                                  
ernment. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 175 
(1995). The obligation to submit exists even if the seller does not collect the funds from the 
purchaser-taxpayer. See id. 
 It is easy to see why a government might prefer that the person having the burden of 
submitting the tax funds not be the person on whom the tax is incident. For example, in 
the employer-employee situation, the employer is obligated to pay the employee a particu-
lar amount. The requirement that the employer pay a portion of that amount to the gov-
ernment does not increase the amount the employer pays out, so there is no particular rea-
son for the employer to be reluctant to pay. The employer’s net cost is the same either way. 
However, an employee who receives 100% of her earnings would presumably have a much 
greater resistance to paying some of those funds to the government. Another incentive to-
ward “third-party” payment is the number of remitters with whom the government must 
deal. If consumers were required to pay sales taxes directly to the government, the gov-
ernment would have to deal with all consumers on an individual-transaction basis, which 
would be an accounting and enforcement nightmare. When the retail seller is required to 
remit the taxes, the number of responsible remitters is significantly reduced, and the 
amount to be paid can be calculated from the retailer’s total sales, rather than by individ-
ual transactions. 
 53. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc, 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995) 
(describing measure of tax as “value of the service purchased”). 
 54. See, e.g., id. 
 55. If the measure of the tax is not a currency amount, the rate is a currency amount. 
See, e.g., National Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 360 (1869) (describing a tax on 
corporate shares with a rate of 50¢ per share). For example, if there is a tax based on the 
number of widgets produced per year, the tax rate would be a currency amount, perhaps 
$0.005 per unit. The taxpayer (or government) would multiply the number of units pro-
duced (e.g., 1,000,000) by the tax rate to determine the amount of tax due (1,000,000 ? 
$0.005 = $5,000). If the measure of the tax is a currency amount, the rate is normally a 
percentage. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 178 (describing sales tax measured by gross re-
ceipts and having rate of 4%). 
 56. See, e.g., II JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION, 
at pt. V. 
 57. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 12.01. 
 58. See id., supra note 56, at ¶ 12.01, tbls. 12.1-12.9 (3d ed. 1998). In many states, lo-
cal governments or government agencies have the option of imposing an additional sales 
tax either for general revenue purposes, or to support particular government activities. See 
id. Sales tax rules and rates vary from state to state, and rates may vary substantially 
from location to location within a single state, causing problems for everyone, but espe-
cially for out-of-area sellers (discussed in Part IV, infra). The complexity of sales taxes is 
only partially revealed by the fact that it takes Hellerstein nine multi-page tables, each 
with tens of footnotes, to describe their characteristics. 
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erty.59 It is common, however, for retail sales of food and medication 
to be exempt from the sales tax.60 The measure of a transaction tax is 
the price paid and the rate is generally expressed as a percentage, for 
example, four percent of the price. One common characteristic of 
sales taxes that has created significant controversy with respect to 
Internet-mediated sales is the distinction between incidence and the 
responsibility to submit. 
 Typically, since the buyer has the legal obligation to pay a sales 
tax, it is “incident” on the buyer. However, for rather obvious admin-
istrative purposes, the seller is required to collect the sales tax (on 
the state’s behalf) and pay the collected amount to tax authorities. 61 
Thus, actions to collect unpaid sales taxes are against the seller, not 
the responsible taxpayer.62 As discussed further below, this separa-
tion between responsible taxpayer and responsible tax remitter can 
create significant problems, particularly when the two parties are 
from (or in) different jurisdictions. 
 A typical VAT tax is like sales taxes, with one significant distinc-
tion. A VAT tax is generally imposed on all sales, not just retail sales 
to consumers. If Country A has a 5% VAT tax and Country B has a 
5% sales tax, the total tax collected would be equal. However, Coun-
try A’s VAT tax would produce tax revenues at an earlier time.63 
                                                                                                                  
 59. See id. at ¶ 12.04[1]. 
 60. See id. at ¶ 12.04[7]. The exemption of food and medicine sales is usually justified 
on a “tax equity” basis, that is, that persons with lower income spend a greater proportion 
of their incomes on “necessary” food and medicine, therefore exempting those sales shifts 
the tax burden more to persons who have the wherewithal to pay. Sales taxes in general 
are frequently criticized as being “regressive,” meaning that persons with lower incomes 
spend a greater percentage of that income on sales taxes than those with higher incomes. 
See id. at ¶ 12.03. Exempting food and medicine reduces the “regressive” character of the 
tax. A similar argument has been made to justify the imposition of sales taxes on services, 
that is, that persons with higher incomes spend a greater proportion of their income for 
services, therefore taxing sales of services reduces the regressive nature of sales taxes and 
may even make them progressive. See id. (discussing the progressive/regressive nature of 
sales tax). 
 61. See id. at ¶ 12.01. 
 62. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 175 (1995). 
 63. See, e.g., Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Concerning Taxes and Other Obliga-
tory Payments to the Budget, Edict N 2235, arts. 53-73 (QSE trans. Aug. 1999) (as 
amended) (Kaz.). Suppose that the item ultimately sold to a retail purchaser is a $200 
leather jacket, produced in the jurisdiction where the final sale takes place. In Country B, 
the purchaser would pay $10 in sales tax. The full amount would be received by the gov-
ernment after the retail sale. However, in Country A, there would typically be many VAT-
taxable transfers before the retail sale. When the cow is sold, VAT tax is paid (on the part 
of the price attributable to its hide). When the meat-processing company sells the hide to 
the leather-making company, VAT tax is paid. When the leather is sold to the garment 
maker, VAT tax is paid. At each step between raw material production and final retail 
sale, VAT tax is paid and the government receives tax revenue. VAT taxes are usually pre-
vented from becoming a tax on a tax on a tax by allowing a deduction for VAT taxes previ-
ously paid. Cumulatively, Country A receives VAT tax revenues equal to five percent of the 
jacket’s retail sales price, but most of those revenues are received be fore the retail sale 
takes place. And, of course, the earlier tax revenues are received, the better the govern-
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 With respect to submission of VAT tax revenues, the obligation 
probably could, with equal administrative burden, be placed on ei-
ther the purchaser or seller, except for the final retail sale. A VAT 
tax carries a higher administrative cost to taxpayers: The credit for 
prior VAT payments requires that all purchasers track the VAT-tax 
portion of each purchase price, allocate the VAT tax paid to the vari-
ous components of items purchased,64 and pass the information on to 
its customers. 65 In contrast, a sales tax only requires the final seller 
to determine the tax due, which is a single-step multiplication calcu-
lation. 
 “Use” taxes are companions for sales taxes. Use tax is due when-
ever a consumer possesses or uses an item in a taxing jurisdiction if 
(a) the item would have been subject to sales tax if sold in that juris-
diction, and (b) no such sales tax was paid.66 A credit is given for 
sales tax paid to other jurisdictions to eliminate double taxation.67 
Use taxes are due from, and payable by, the in-jurisdiction user.68 
With respect to every significant factor, except taxable event, sales 
taxes and use taxes are identical. That includes use-tax rules that 
impose on the seller a collection and remission obligation. Those use-
tax collection rules are at the center of the current controversy (and 
this discussion). Most sellers on whom these duties might be imposed 
do not operate or reside in the taxing jurisdiction. Thus arises the 
question of jurisdiction to impose or enforce those rules. 
III.   LIMITS ON STATE ACTION—ONLY THE PROPER PREY 
A.   Fundamental Principles 
 Internet-mediated activities emphatically present one very fun-
damental question: Over whom and what can a government legiti-
mately exercise power? The Internet’s nature limits solving legal is-
sues in a solely domestic context for at least two reasons. The first is 
technical. Closing or restricting a transmission route is automatically 
treated as an error and alternate, unrestricted routes are chosen. 
Even if all current transmission routes could be restricted, in the 
                                                                                                                  
ment likes it. VAT taxes are frequently much higher than retail sales taxes, but they can 
be completely hidden by not imposing VAT on retail sales to consumers, or requiring the 
retail seller to include the VAT in its sales price (that is, not separately stated). 
 64. What portion of a cow’s purchase price is allocable to its hide? What portion of 
1000 pounds of refined copper is in an electric motor? 
 65. See generally James M. Bickley, The Value-Added Tax: Concepts, Issues and 
Experience, 47 TAX NOTES 447 (1990). 
 66. See, e.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason, 300 U.S. 577, 581-85 (1937). 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
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near future satellite systems reaching every part of the globe will be 
operational. 69  
 The second reason is inherent in the Internet’s functionality. All 
Internet sites are functionally equidistant from all other sites. Any 
attempt to regulate one site, or one category of sites, must apply to 
all sites or it will be of no effect. 70 Thus, an attempt to impose rules 
on Internet communications, or persons using the Internet, auto-
matically involves persons and events wherever (geographically) the 
Internet can be accessed. Action by even the smallest local govern-
ment can have world-wide repercussions. 
 Since the mid-1600s, European countries have accepted the prin-
ciple that each country has objectively identifiable geographic 
boundaries and exercises sole sovereignty within those boundaries. 71 
During the twentieth century, that principle became a foundational 
rule of international relations.72 A corollary of that principle is that 
no country can legitimately “interfere” in the internal affairs of an-
other country, that is, internal sovereignty necessarily limits a coun-
try’s power outside its borders. 73  
 These principles would be easier to apply if no event or person 
ever crossed national boundaries. Unfortunately for easy realization 
of political theory, electronic communications can easily cross geo-
graphic boundaries, regardless of the wishes and regulations of geog-
raphy-bound governments. One of the Internet’s most fundamental 
and powerful features is its ability to transmit information almost 
instantaneously to any location in the world, totally disregarding po-
litical geography and ideology. 
 When these principles of international law were initially devel-
oped, high-speed communications meant fast horses and sailing 
ships. With a modicum of diligence, a government could detect any 
                                                                                                                  
 69. Low orbit satellite (LOS) systems currently being developed will have that capa-
bility. No radically new technology is required. See About Teledesic: Fast Facts, at 
http://www.teledesic.com/about/about.htm (visited Mar. 28, 2001) (indicating that Internet-
in-the-Sky network services are scheduled to begin in 2005). 
 70. Regulating an individual browser’s actions automatically applies to all sites he or 
she can access. Any geographically limited regulation can be avoided by moving a Web site 
to a physical computer in another geographic area. 
 71. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years War is generally cited as 
the initial formal expression of the “new” regime of absolute internal state sovereignty 
within fixed geographic boundaries. See, e.g., THOMAS R. VAN DERVORT, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND ORGANIZATION 10-13 (1998).  
 72. See, e.g., id. at ch. 3. 
 73. See, e.g., DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING 
FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 
25th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). The U.N. Charter states: 
“[S]tates shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.” U.N. CHARTER art. 
2, para. 4. That limitation also applies to states of the United States with respect to other 
states. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). 
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meaningful penetration of national boundaries in either direction. 
Today, electronic communications cross political boundaries unde-
tected, or can avoid them entirely via satellite. Obviously, technology 
did not leap from sail to satellites in one bound. As international 
communications and transportation technology advanced, many legal 
controversies were raised and resolved. Some of those resolutions are 
embodied in generally accepted rules for when a government can le-
gitimately exercise its authority, even though that may have an im-
pact (intended or unintended) beyond the country’s geographic bor-
ders. 74 
 Some of those rules are set forth in agreements between countries 
concerning matters of mutual interest, such as taxation, exchange of 
ambassadors, extradition of criminals, and so on.75 Other rules are 
solely “domestic” in a legal sense but are “international” in the sense 
that the domestic rules apply to transborder situations or events. 76 
Many rules are based on enlightened self-interest. An example from 
the legal context: Assume a court of Country A has entered a judg-
ment in favor of one of its nationals against a national of Country B, 
but there is no way to enforce the judgment in Country A. To obtain 
satisfaction, the judgment creditor must go to Country B. If Country 
B recognizes and enforces the Country A judgment, it will be much 
easier for the judgment creditor to obtain satisfaction.77 It is more 
likely that Country B officials and courts will recognize the Country 
A judgment if Country A officials recognize Country B judgments, 
that is, there is reciprocity. Thus, it is in each country’s self-interest 
for its domestic law to recognize other countries’ official acts. 78 
 Another situation in which the domestic law may impact “interna-
tional” situations is where some act or event, which takes place out-
side the country’s boundaries has an impact within the country’s 
                                                                                                                  
 74. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 404 (1987) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT]. Section 404 identi-
fies crimes such as piracy, slave trading, hijacking aircraft, genocide, and war crimes as be-
ing subject to “universal jurisdiction.” Id. 
 75. See generally id. § 111. 
 76. The principle of “comity” is an example of how this type of rule operates. See, e.g., 
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (“[Comity] is the recognition which one nation 
allows [to] another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, 
and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its 
laws.”). 
 77. If there is no such recognition, the judgment creditor may be required to go 
through the entire legal process of Country B, with the possibility of losing and becoming a 
judgment debtor rather than a judgment creditor, not to mention the additional time, ef-
fort, and cost. 
 78. Of course, there are limits to this type of comity recognition. It is highly unlikely 
that a judgment based on testimony induced by overt physical torture would be enforced in 
a country where such means of obtaining testimony were considered inherently unreliable. 
In Hilton, the Court refused to enforce a French judgment under comity principles because 
the proven law of France was that U.S. judgments did not receive reciprocal treatment in 
French courts. See 159 U.S. at 228. 
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boundaries. A classic example: A person standing in Country X 
shoots an arrow that comes down in Country Y, striking Zerba, a lo-
cal resident. Country Y clearly has geographic jurisdiction over the 
arrow-landing event and, in most cases, would claim jurisdiction over 
the person who loosed the arrow, even though that person was never 
in Country Y.79 
 In addition to the geographic component, it is generally recognized 
that any country has jurisdiction over its nationals, wherever the na-
tional may be in the world.80 That is the usual rationalization for the 
privilege of expatriates to pay tax in their “home” country on income 
earned in another country.81 Of course, that does not preclude the 
country where the national is physically present from also exercising 
jurisdiction. 
B.   Due Process Restraints on Government Action 
 These international law principles are inherent in the legal rela-
tionships between states within the United States. 82 They are rein-
forced by constitutional obligations to satisfy due process require-
ments, not to unduly interfere with interstate commerce, to recognize 
other states’ acts, and so forth. While thus acknowledging the rele-
vance of fundamental international law principles, due to space con-
                                                                                                                  
 79. In most situations, a claim of jurisdiction would require that the archer have some 
intent to at least let loose the arrow in the direction of the international border under con-
ditions where a reasonable person might foresee the arrow crossing the boundary. See 
FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 74, at § 402. Most U.S. states exercise long-
arm jurisdiction over persons who commit a tort outside the state which has an impact 
within the state. See id. In the criminal law context, the U.S. Supreme Court has gone 
even further, allowing the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident alien for a crime 
committed in the defendant’s home country, despite the fact that the defendant had been 
forcibly taken in his home country and unwillingly transported to the United States in vio-
lation of general international law principles. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 
U.S. 655, 663 (1992). 
 80. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1994); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i).  
 81. See, e.g., FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 74, at § 412. That is, in 
turn, the reason for many treaties dealing with “double taxation” and for domestic rules 
that allow some adjustment for foreign taxes paid. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 164, 901 (1999) 
(addressing deduction and credit, respectively). 
 82. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977). Shaffer reviewed the water-
shed decision of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), in relation to state court in rem juris-
diction and found that the strictly territorial aspects of Pennoyer were inconsistent with 
contemporary due process theory. While Shaffer held that Pennoyer had become outmoded 
with respect to state court personal jurisdiction, it did not even hint that the mutually ex-
clusive sovereignty of states aspect of Pennoyer was changed. The state sovereignty princi-
ples there enunciated include: “The first of those principles was that ‘every State possesses 
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.’ The 
second was ‘that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or 
property without its territory.’” Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 197 (quoting Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722). 
Those principles remain fundamental to the U.S. federal system. However, as will be dis-
cussed later, they are often applied in a Commerce Clause context rather than as due proc-
ess principles. 
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siderations if nothing else, addressing international Internet-related 
issues must be deferred. This discussion will concentrate on domestic 
legal rules. 
 The U.S. Constitution prohibits federal and state governments 
from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property” without due 
process of law.83 One aspect of due process is the internal sovereignty 
principle and its corollary of external impotence. Entering a judg-
ment against a person over whom the court has no jurisdiction does 
not fulfill the Constitution’s due process requirement. 84 Consistent 
with international law traditions, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled very 
early that a court can render judgment against a person present 
within the territorial boundaries of that court. 85 The more difficult 
question, and the one relevant to this discussion, concerns persons 
who are not, and have never been, present within the acting govern-
ment’s territory.86 
 As a preliminary matter, it must be noted that there are two types 
of jurisdiction over nonresidents: “specific” and “general.” In brief, a 
state court exercises “specific” jurisdiction when the subject matter of 
the suit relates to (“arises out of”) the nonresident defendant’s con-
tact with the forum state.87 A state court must have “general” juris-
diction over a nonresident when the action does not relate to the non-
resident defendant’s contacts with the forum state.88 The exercise of 
general jurisdiction requires “continuous and systematic general 
business contacts” between the nonresident and the forum state.89 
This distinction was alluded to in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton,90 but it was discussed in more detail in Helicopteros Nacionales 
de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall.91 
1.   Judicial General Jurisdiction 
 Helicopteros is normally considered the “landmark” case on judi-
cial general jurisdiction. In that case, the defendant was a corpora-
                                                                                                                  
 83. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV (applicable to federal and state governments, respe c-
tively). 
 84. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 198-99; Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734-35. 
 85. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 724. 
 86. These persons and entities are usually labeled “nonresidents,” although this is 
somewhat misleading because jurisdiction over persons within the territory is not limited 
to those who reside there. See id. 
 87. The plaintiff’s contact with the forum state is only incidentally related to the in-
quiry because by commencing the action, the plaintiff has consented to the court’s jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984). 
 88. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 
(1984). 
 89. Id. at 416. 
 90. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 91. 466 U.S. at 414. 
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tion organized and having its principal office in Columbia.92 Its busi-
ness was contract helicopter transportation in South America.93 The 
cause of action arose from a helicopter crash in Peru in which U.S. 
citizens died.94 The helicopter crashed during a flight under a con-
tract with a Peruvian “consortium” that was the “alter ego” of a 
Houston, Texas, joint venture.95 The plaintiffs, none being Texas 
residents, filed a wrongful death action in Texas, naming Helicop-
teros as a defendant.96 The plaintiffs contended that Helicopteros had 
sufficient contacts with the state to allow Texas courts to exercise ju-
risdiction, which the Court understood as contending that “general” 
jurisdiction existed.97 
 Helicopteros’ acts in Texas consisted of negotiating (not signing) a 
general transportation contract related to the fatal flight, purchasing 
(over about seven years) a number of helicopters from a Texas manu-
facturer, and sending some employees to Texas for training or orien-
tation.98 Over the years, the Texas purchases exceeded $4 million, 
and Helicopteros received from Texas banks payments of over $5 mil-
lion on the transportation contract. 99 The Court held that Helicop-
teros did not have sufficient contacts with Texas to support general 
jurisdiction.100 
 To illustrate the type of situation in which general jurisdiction 
could be exercised, the Court turned to Perkins v. Benguet Consoli-
dated Mining Co.101 In Perkins, the president and general manager of 
the defendant Philippine corporation effectively operated the corpo-
ration out of an office in Ohio during the Japanese occupation of the 
Philippine Islands. 102 The corporation’s records were kept in the Ohio 
office, directors’ meetings were held there, general bank accounts 
were in Ohio, and salary and other payments were made from 
there.103 It was rather obvious that the corporation conducted essen-
tially all of its business (curtailed as it was by the war situation) 
                                                                                                                  
 92. See id. at 409.  
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. at 410. 
 95. See id. at 409-10. 
 96. See id. at 412. 
 97. See id. at 415-16. The single -justice dissent in Helicopteros argues that the Court 
should have considered the possibility of exercising specific jurisdiction because the cause 
of action “[arose] out of” or “related to” Helicopteros’ activities in Texas. Id. at 424-28 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The plaintiffs’ allegations with respect to Helicopteros, however, 
seem to be limited to an allegation that its pilot was negligent, see id. at 426 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting), which could only have very tenuous and indirect connections with his em-
ployer’s Texas contacts. 
 98. See id. at 410-11. 
 99. See id. at 411. 
 100. See id. at 418-19. 
 101. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 102. See id. at 438-39. 
 103. See id. at 447-48. 
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from the Ohio office.104 Under those circumstances, the Court found 
that the exercise of general jurisdiction did not violate due process 
principles. 105 To reach that conclusion, the Court found that the cor-
poration had “continuous[ly] and systematic[ally]” carried on its gen-
eral business activities in Ohio.106 In contrast, the in-state activities 
in Helicopteros were all related to purchasing helicopters, which was 
part of its business operations only in the sense that it had to have 
helicopters to provide helicopter transportation.107 The Court held 
that those were not the kind of systematic general business contacts 
that would satisfy due process requirements with respect to general 
jurisdiction.108 
 If a clear distinction can be drawn between Perkins and Helicop-
teros, it is that in Perkins, the corporation’s in-state activities were as 
broad and continuous as they would have been if the corporation had 
been a legal resident of the state, that is, the forum-based activities 
related to the whole of the company’s commercial operations. But in 
Helicopteros, the corporation’s activities were limited to one contract 
negotiation and some equipment acquisitions; its general manage-
ment and business operations were somewhere else.109 The key to 
general jurisdiction is, therefore, “continuous and systematic” activi-
ties within the forum state that are not objectively different from the 
activities of a resident corporation. 
2.   Judicial Specific Jurisdiction 
 The requirements for exercising specific jurisdiction are less de-
manding, principally because there is a direct connection between 
the subject matter of the litigation and the forum state, that is, the 
act or its effect occurs within the forum’s geographic jurisdiction even 
if the defendant was not personally there. Whether due process re-
quirements are satisfied is determined on a case-by-case basis. 
 The modern line of cases dealing with specific jurisdiction over 
nonresidents starts with the Supreme Court’s 1945 decision in Inter-
national Shoe.110 That case involved the State of Washington’s at-
tempt to collect its unemployment tax from International Shoe in 
state courts. 111 International Shoe contended that the Due Process 
Clause precluded Washington from exercising jurisdiction because 
                                                                                                                  
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. at 438. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.  
 108. See id. 
 109. Since both corporations were alien corporations, it is unlikely that any distinction 
could be made if the defendant in a similar case were a U.S. corporation not resident in the 
forum state.  
 110. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 111. See id. at 311. 
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the company was not legally “present” in Washington.112 That conten-
tion first raised somewhat of a philosophical problem: since a corpo-
ration has no physical existence, how can it be said to be present 
anywhere? The Court answered in the only realistic manner, stating 
that a corporation’s presence (in its home state or elsewhere) could 
only be established through the activities carried on for it by corpo-
real persons acting on its behalf.113 In that context, what was Inter-
national Shoe’s presence in Washington State? It had no offices in 
the state, no contracts were entered into in the state, no goods were 
legally delivered in the state, and no purchase contracts were legally 
created in the state. However, during the years in question, Interna-
tional Shoe had eleven to thirteen salesmen who operated solely 
within the state; who resided there; who solicited orders there; who 
rented motel, hotel, and display rooms there; and who were compen-
sated by commission based on their in-state sales.114 The continuing 
and active presence of physical persons in Washington State working 
on International Shoe’s behalf was obvious, and the tax the State 
was attempting to collect was directly related to those persons’ pres-
ence and actions in the State. Specifically addressing the due process 
issue, the Court stated: 
[Due process] demands may be met by such contacts of the corpo-
ration with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the 
context of our federal system of government, to require the corpo-
ration to defend the particular suit which is brought there. An “es-
timate of the inconveniences” which would result to the corpora-
tion from a trial away from its “home” or principal place of busi-
ness is relevant in this connection. 
 “Presence” in the state in this sense has never been doubted 
when the activities of the corporation there have not only been con-
tinuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, 
even though no consent to be sued has been given. . . . 
 . . . . 
 It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary 
line between those activities which justify the subjection of a cor-
poration to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply me-
chanical or quantitative. The test is not merely, as has sometimes 
been suggested, whether the activity, which the corporation has 
seen fit to procure through its agents in another state, is a little 
more or a little less. Whether due process is satisfied must depend 
rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the 
                                                                                                                  
 112. See id. at 315-16. International Shoe also contended that the tax was an unconsti-
tutional burden on interstate commerce, but that contention was easily overcome due to 
federal legislation that expressly required employers to pay state unemployment taxes, 
even if they were engaged solely in interstate commerce. See id. at 315; see also I.R.C. § 
3305(a) (1994). 
 113. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17. 
 114. See id. at 313. 
2001]  PREYING ON THE WEB 671 
 
fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the pur-
pose of the due process clause to insure.115 
The Court summarized its holding: 
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to 
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory 
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.”116 
 Dissenting, Justice Black was of the opinion that International 
Shoe’s contentions had so little merit that the appeal should be dis-
missed as unsubstantial. 117 Black contended that the Due Process 
Clause was not intended to preclude a state from being able to tax 
and sue the persons or entities that deal with its citizens within its 
borders and that the Court should adopt that as a “workable stan-
dard.”118 Black went on to state: 
The Court has not . . . [adopted a workable standard], but instead 
has engaged in an unnecessary discussion in the course of which it 
has announced vague Constitutional criteria applied for the first 
time to the issue before us. It has thus introduced uncertain ele-
ments confusing the simple pattern and tending to curtail the ex-
ercise of State powers to an extent not justified by the Constitu-
tion.119 
Based on subsequent cases, Justice Black’s criticism about vagueness 
and uncertainty have proven true. However, his prediction that those 
problems would curtail state powers has not yet proven true.120 
 Since 1945, there have been numerous court decisions discussing 
due process and judicial specific jurisdiction over nonresidents. A 
relatively small number are consistently cited in Internet-related 
cases and deserve brief mention here. One that requires only a men-
tion is the Court’s recognition that technological “progress” has in-
creased the flow of commerce between states, increasing the call for 
broader jurisdiction over nonresidents while at the same time mak-
ing defense of actions in foreign tribunals less burdensome.121  
                                                                                                                  
 115. Id. at 316-19 (citations omitted). 
 116. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 117. See id. at 322 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 323. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Justice Black’s comments concerning the vagueness implicit in such terms as “fair 
play” and “contrary to natural justice” have significant merit. It is still possible that some 
future composition of the Court could result in very restricted interpretation of those 
terms. As everyone knows, what is “fair” is a matter of opinion depending more on who is 
asked than on any discernable objective reality. 
 121. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); see also McGee v. International 
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). Most court decisions expounding on that theme, 
particularly the “burden” part, seem to ignore the cost in time and effort involved in out-of-
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 In 1985, the Court made it clear that a nonresident could be sub-
ject to a state’s jurisdiction even though the nonresident was never, 
personally or through agents, physically present in the forum state. 
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz122 the parties negotiated a con-
tract for the franchise of a Burger King restaurant located in Michi-
gan.123 The defendants were Michigan residents. 124 The negotiations 
leading to the contract and the operation of the restaurant occurred 
over a two- to three-year period.125 The significant in-person contacts 
took place in Michigan at Burger King’s district office.126 However, 
the principal Burger King agents involved were always at Burger 
King’s international headquarters in Florida and, according to the 
company, these Florida-based agents made all of the significant deci-
sions and contacts. 127 Burger King commenced a breach of contract 
action in Florida.128 
 The defendants initiated contact with the knowledge that Burger 
King’s principal offices were in Florida and that detailed control of 
the restaurant’s operations would issue from Florida.129 The Court 
emphasized that the defendants chose not to deal with a strictly local 
operation, instead, they “’reach[ed] out beyond’ Michigan and negoti-
ated with a Florida corporation for the purchase of a long-term fran-
chise and the manifold benefits that would derive from affiliation 
with a nationwide organization.”130 For a forum’s court to exercise 
specific jurisdiction, “it is essential . . . that there be some act by 
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws.”131 And “[s]o long as a commercial actor’s 
efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, 
we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical 
contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.”132 
                                                                                                                  
town litigation. Even though it is possible to travel almost anywhere in the world in a mat-
ter of hours, and communicate around the world in a matter of seconds, that does not mean 
transportation, lodging, and communications costs are zero. Those costs can be thousands 
of dollars, which may be minuscule for a multinational conglomerate, but extremely sig-
nificant to a small business with a Web site. 
 122. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 123. See id. at 466-67. 
 124. See id. at 466. 
 125. See id. at 466-67.  
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. at 464-67. One of the defendants attended a brief training course in Flor-
ida, but that was given little significance in the Court’s decision. See id. at 479 & n.22. 
 128. See id. at 468. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Id. at 479-80 (quoting Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 
(1950)). 
 131. Id. at 474-75 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
 132. Id. at 476 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-90 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774-75 (1984); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 
220, 222-23 (1957)). In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 306-08 
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 Thus, the most important factor for judicial specific jurisdiction is 
that the nonresident’s voluntary action was taken with the knowl-
edge that it may have an impact on persons or events in a particular 
state. In that context, a 1958 statement by the Court is significant: 
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a 
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact 
[between the nonresident defendant] and the forum state]. . . . [I]t 
is essential in each case that there be some act by which the de-
fendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and pro-
tections of its laws.133 
It is, therefore, not sufficient if the defendant’s “contact” with the fo-
rum is the plaintiff’s (or third party’s) volitional act which relates to 
the defendant. The defendant must take some volitional act that 
could have some effect in the forum state. Merely making informa-
tion available to a forum resident would not appear to satisfy this re-
quirement,134 but entering into a contract might. 
 One of the questions raised by this requirement (that is, that the 
in-state contacts be due to the defendant’s acts, not acts of others) 
concerns acts by one person (the defendant) which might result in 
events or acts by others at some other location. In World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,135 Seaway Volkswagen, Inc., operated 
only in New York, where it sold a vehicle to the Robinsons, who re-
sided in New York at the time.136 The Robinsons left their New York 
home for a new home in Arizona and, on the way, were involved in an 
accident in Oklahoma.137 A products liability action was filed in 
Oklahoma against everyone involved in the manufacture and sale of 
the vehicle, including the retailer (Seaway) and the regional distribu-
tor (World-Wide).138 Seaway and World-Wide challenged the Okla-
homa court’s jurisdiction on due process grounds.139 The plaintiffs 
contended, in essence, that jurisdiction was proper because, inter 
alia, by its nature the product involved (a motor vehicle) is inherently 
mobile and any vehicle-seller could foresee at the time of sale that 
                                                                                                                  
(1992), a decision very relevant to Internet-mediated commercial sales, the Court held that 
sending hundreds of catalogs and fliers to state residents, making millions of dollars worth 
of sales to those residents, and shipping the sold goods to that state was sufficient for due 
process purposes to allow the state’s courts to exercise jurisdiction over the seller. 
 133. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citations omitted); see also World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); McGee v. International Life 
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
 134. This would be emphatically true if the defendant was not aware of the other 
party’s geographic location at the time the information is provided. 
 135. 444 U.S. 286. 
 136. Id. at 288. 
 137. See id.  
 138. See id.  
 139. See id. at 288-89. 
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any particular vehicle could cause injury to persons in Oklahoma, re-
gardless of where the original sale took place.140 The Court made it 
quite clear that foreseeability alone is not sufficient to allow a state 
to exercise jurisdiction.141 But foreseeability is not totally irrelevant: 
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not 
the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum 
State. Rather, it is that the defendant’s conduct and connection 
with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court there. The Due Process Clause, by ensuring 
the “orderly administration of the laws,” gives a degree of predict-
ability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to struc-
ture their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to 
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit .142 
Further: 
Hence, if the sale of a product . . . is not simply an isolated occur-
rence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distribu-
tor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its product in 
other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of 
those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been 
the source of injury to its owner or to others. The forum State does 
not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts 
personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products 
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be 
purchased by consumers in the forum State.143 
Due process requires that the defendant take some purposeful, fo-
rum-related action before jurisdiction can be exercised. If foreseeabil-
ity of possible injury were the key criterion, “[e]very seller of chattels 
would in effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of process. 
His amenability to suit would travel with the chattel.”144 
                                                                                                                  
 140. See id. at 295.  
 141. See id. The Court elaborated: 
 If foreseeability were the [only] criterion, a local California tire retailer could 
be forced to defend in Pennsylvania when a blowout occurs there, see Erlanger 
Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956); a Wis-
consin seller of a defective automobile jack could be hauled before a distant 
court for damage caused in New Jersey, see Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 
372 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (D.N.J. 1974); or a Florida soft-drink concessionaire 
could be summoned to Alaska to account for injuries happening there, see 
Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 170-71 (D. 
Minn. 1969). Every seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his 
agent for service of process. His amenability to suit would travel with the chat-
tel. 
Id. at 295-96. 
 142. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 143. Id. at 297-98 (citing, for comparison, Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961)) (emphasis added). 
 144. Id. at 296. 
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 The dissents in World-Wide Volkswagen raise an issue that may 
be crucial with respect to Internet-mediated transactions. Justice 
Marshall’s dissent emphasizes the fact that the defendants (an 
automobile wholesaler and an automobile dealer) were part of a na-
tionwide distribution organization and derived substantial benefit 
from that membership, both in increased sales and in repair reve-
nues.145 With respect to the Court’s statement that a person should 
be able to structure his activities to avoid particular jurisdictions, 
Justice Marshall’s dissent states: 
I sympathize with the majority’s concern that the persons ought to 
be able to structure their conduct so as not to be subject to suit in 
distant forums. But that may not always be possible. Some activi-
ties by their very nature may foreclose the option of conducting 
them in such a way as to avoid subjecting oneself to jurisdiction in 
multiple forums.146 
 Manifestly, the “quality and nature” of commercial activity is dif-
ferent, for purposes of the International Shoe test, from actions from 
which the defendant obtains no economic advantage: commercial ac-
tivity is more likely to cause effects in a larger sphere, and the actor 
derives an economic benefit from the activity. That makes it fair to 
require him to answer for his conduct where its effects are felt. The 
profits may be used to pay the costs of suit and, knowing that the ac-
tivity is likely to have effects in other states, the defendant can read-
ily insure against the costs of those effects, thereby sparing himself 
much of the inconvenience of defending in a distant forum.147 
 Based on Justice Marshall’s reasoning, a person who is somehow 
commercially associated with a group that has other associates in 
other areas would be subject to jurisdiction wherever those other as-
sociates are. Becoming part of a global manufacturing and distribu-
tion network, according to this logic, would support jurisdiction 
wherever that network reached, that is, throughout the globe. That 
particular issue soon came to the forefront. 
 In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,148 Asahi Metal In-
dustry Company, a Japanese corporation, manufactured valve as-
semblies in Japan that were used in motor vehicle tires.149 It sold a 
very small portion of its production to Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial 
Company, a Taiwanese company which incorporated the assemblies 
into motorcycle tires. 150 Some of those motorcycle tires were sold in 
                                                                                                                  
 145. See id. at 313-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun joined Justice Mar-
shall’s dissent and wrote one of his own. See id. at 317-19. 
 146. Id. at 316.  
 147. See id. at 316-17. 
 148. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 149. Id. at 106. 
 150. See id. 
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the United States (separately or as part of a new motorcycle).151 One 
of those tires allegedly failed, and the injured parties brought suit. 152 
Cheng Shin cross-claimed against Asahi, seeking indemnification.153 
There was no question that Asahi had not done business with any 
U.S.-based company (with respect to the particular accident or oth-
erwise).154 From the evidence, however, it was possible that Asahi 
could have foreseen that some of its product might eventually be pre-
sent in the United States. 155 Cheng Shin’s contention was that Asahi 
knowingly placed its product in “the stream of commerce”; therefore, 
Asahi was subject to suit wherever that stream may carry those 
products. 156 
 Asahi produced a complicated group of opinions. Eight Justices 
agreed with Part II-B of Justice O’Connor’s opinion, which held that 
subjecting Asahi to this cross-claim in California would “offend tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice”157 and, therefore, 
violate due process requirements. 158 Thus, regardless of any other 
conclusion, the California court’s judgment against Asahi was re-
versed.159  
 Part II-A of Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion dealt with the 
“stream of commerce” theory.160 The point of contention was the 
statement in World-Wide Volkswagen that “[t]he forum State does 
not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts per-
sonal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into 
the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be pur-
chased by consumers in the forum State.”161 Justice O’Connor’s opin-
ion states that something more is required than placing an item in 
                                                                                                                  
 151. See id. at 105-06. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. at 106. Since the primary action had been settled, the only remaining 
question was Asahi’s liability to Cheng Shin, which may have influenced the Court’s deci-
sion concerning the “fairness” of the litigation in California. 
 154. See id. at 108. 
 155. See id. at 107. 
 156. See id. 
 157. Id. at 113. 
 158. See id. at 113-16.  
 159. See id. at 116. 
 160. See id. at 108-13. Four Justices joined Part II-A (Rehnquist, O’Connor, Powell, 
and Scalia). See id. at 105. Four other Justices agreed that placing an item in the stream of 
commerce is sufficient for due process purposes as long as that person knows the item is 
marketed in the forum state. See id. at 116-21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, concurring 
in judgment) (Blackmun, Marshall, and White, JJ., joining). The latter opinion argues that 
even if the O’Connor opinion correctly states the law, it misapplies the facts. See id. Justice 
Stevens wrote a separate opinion, also joined by Justices Blackman and White, taking the 
position that the “stream of commerce” discussion was unnecessary to the decision and 
that the O’Connor opinion misapplied the facts. See id. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part, concurring in judgment). 
 161. Id. at 109 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-
98 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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the stream of commerce with the awareness that the stream may 
carry it to a forum state.162 The defendant must take some purposeful 
action directed at a particular forum state: 
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or pur-
pose to serve the market in the forum State, for example, design-
ing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising in 
the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice 
to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through 
a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the fo-
rum State.163 
The substance of Justice O’Connor’s “something more” is knowing ac-
tion intending to derive benefit from the market in a particular area 
or state, something more geographically directed than merely selling 
something to a distributor who, in turn, sells the item to someone 
else, who then sells to someone else, and so on. 
 Justice Brennan’s opinion argues that Justice O’Connor’s opinion 
misconstrues World-Wide Volkswagen.164 It contends that World-
Wide Volkswagen only distinguishes between situations in which the 
preconsumer distribution system takes a product to a particular 
state and situations in which the postdistribution consumer takes 
that action.165 Thus, according to Brennan’s interpretation, if the de-
fendant places an item into a commercial distribution system that 
distributes things in known locales, the defendant is amenable to 
suit in any forum that system reaches: the act of inserting an item 
into the stream is considered to be purposefully directed toward eve-
rywhere the stream (knowable to the actor) reaches.166 This logic 
would appear to support jurisdiction even when the particular of-
fending item could have only been brought into the forum State by a 
consumer, which is inconsistent with World-Wide Volkswagen . 
 Another incarnation of the action-directed-toward-the-forum ra-
tionale was originally applied in a contract setting,167 but it has more 
                                                                                                                  
 162. See id. at 112. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. at 116.  
 165. See id. at 118-20. 
 166. See id. This reading of World-Wide Volkswagen seems inconsistent with that deci-
sion, however, because the defendants in that case did participate in a stream of commerce 
that did include the forum state. The Brennan opinion is consistent with World-Wide 
Volkswagen only if the “stream of commerce” considered is that which exists downstream 
from the actor’s location. 
 167. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221-22 (1957). That case 
involved an insurance contract that had been sold to a California resident and later as-
signed to an insurance company that had no other contact with California. See id. at 222. 
When the beneficiary filed suit in Texas to enforce a judgment previously obtained in Cali-
fornia, the insurance company contended that the California court had not had jurisdiction 
to issue the judgment, because the company had not done business in California; the Texas 
court refused to enforce the judgment. See id. The Court on appeal held that the Due Proc-
ess Clause did not preclude jurisdiction because, while the policyholder lived in California, 
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often been applied more often in intentional tort cases. For example, 
in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,168 the action was commenced in 
New Hampshire by a New York resident. 169 The allegedly defamatory 
article was in a magazine that had a substantial distribution in New 
Hampshire, and the Court found that the plaintiff would suffer at 
least some of the resulting damages in that state.170 The defendant 
had a monthly circulation of thousands of magazines over a number 
of years in New Hampshire.171 The Court held that by so distributing 
the offending publication in New Hampshire, the defendant had 
committed the tort in that state, which was, with respect to the al-
leged tort, sufficient purposeful contact with the state to allow its 
courts to exercise jurisdiction without violating due process princi-
ples. 172  
 Calder v. Jones173 presented the obverse situation. Actress Shirley 
Jones commenced a defamation action in California against a re-
porter and the editor/owner of the National Enquirer based on an ar-
ticle in that publication.174 The defendants contended that the Cali-
fornia courts could not exercise jurisdiction over them because they 
had not acted in California and had not taken any relevant actions in 
that state.175 The Court disagreed. A plaintiff’s contacts with a forum 
may be “so manifold” that they might permit jurisdiction where it 
might not otherwise exist. 176 Specifically, the Court noted that the 
plaintiff was a resident of California, that her work and the industry 
in which she worked were centered in California, and that the al-
leged tort, if proven, would have its primary impact in California.177 
The defendant’s alleged actions were “expressly aimed at California” 
where the plaintiff lived and worked, and when the defendants acted, 
they knew that any damages that might be caused would be suffered 
in California.178 Since the publication had its largest circulation in 
California, the Court held that the defendants knowingly caused in-
jury there and, therefore, could reasonably anticipate being haled 
into a California court. 179 
                                                                                                                  
the insurance company corresponded with the policyholder and collected premium pay-
ments from her. See id. at 221-23. 
 168. 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
 169. Id. at 772. 
 170. See id. at 776. 
 171. See id. at 772.  
 172. See id. at 779. 
 173. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 174. See id. at 784-85.  
 175. See id. at 789. 
 176. Id. at 788. 
 177. See id. at 788-89. 
 178. Id. at 789. 
 179. See id. at 790. 
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C.   Due Process and Internet-Mediated Activities 
1.   Judicial Specific Jurisdiction and Internet Sites 
 There are a number of court decisions discussing personal juris-
diction, and thus due process requirements, in litigation involving 
Internet-mediated communications or transactions. Though these 
decisions are not tax cases, they are relevant because a tax-
enforcement action is subject to the same due process rules concern-
ing jurisdiction over the defendant. Most of the reported decisions 
are from trial courts, but a few appellate courts have issued opinions. 
With respect to persons who cannot be served in the forum state, 
trial court jurisdiction must be authorized by the state’s long-arm 
statute. However, many, if not most, states’ statutes authorize, either 
expressly or by court interpretation, for long-arm jurisdiction over 
nonresidents to the fullest extent possible under the Due Process 
Clause.180 Thus, the Supreme Court decisions in the preceding sec-
tion provide the benchmarks for the decisions in this section. 
 The fact-dependent nature of due process considerations and the 
wide variety of Internet sites make it difficult to establish clear cate-
gories of cases. To the extent that categories are beginning to appear, 
the distinctions are principally based on the level of Web site “inter-
activity.” As discussed in Part II, a principal functional feature of the 
Web is that information can be obtained from, and transmitted to, a 
Web site.181 The Web site program regulates the degree to which a 
browser can submit information. If a browser can submit informa-
                                                                                                                  
 180. See, e.g., Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co. v. CFMT, Inc., 142 F.3d 1266, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (California law); Genetic Implant Sys., Inc. v. Core-Vent Corp., 123 F.3d 1455, 1458 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (Washington law); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (Ohio law); Butler v. Beer Across America, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1266 (N.D. Ala. 
2000); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, L.L.C., 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 328 (D.S.C. 1999); Mil-
lennium Enter., Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 909 (D. Or. 1999); Su-
perguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F. Supp. 481, 486 (W.D.N.C. 1997); SF Hotel Co., L.P. v. En-
ergy Invest., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1032, 1033 (D. Kan. 1997); Telco Communs. Group, Inc. v. 
An Apple a Day, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 404, 405 (E.D. Va. 1997); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. 
Supp. 327, 330 (D.N.J. 1997); CD Solutions, Inc. v. Tooker, 965 F. Supp. 17, 19-20 (N.D. 
Tex. 1997); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1997); 
Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1997 WL 733905, at 
*2 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1330-31 (E.D. Mo. 
1996); EDIAS Soft. Int’l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int’l, Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 416 (D. Ariz. 1996); 
Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 620 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Inset Sys., Inc. v. 
Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996); Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, 
Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351, 1352 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); State v. Granite Gate Re-
sorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Minn. App. 1997), aff’d by an evenly divided court, 576 
N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998) (addressing state complaint alleging deceptive trade practices, 
false advertising). But see Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (AJP), 1997 
WL 97097, at *9 (S.D. N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (holding that the New York statute does not ex-
tend jurisdiction to the full extent of the Due Process Clause); Cortlandt Racquet Club, Inc. 
v. O Saunatec, Ltd., 978 F. Supp. 520, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same). 
 181. See discussion supra Part II.  
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tion, the Web site program may take some action based on what is 
submitted. A Web site that allows a two-way exchange of information 
is generally called “interactive.”182 
 With respect to state jurisdiction based on Internet-mediated ac-
tivities, a growing number of court decisions183 have used the analyti-
cal structure articulated in 1997 by the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. 
Zippo Dot Com, Inc.184 Zippo Manufacturing alleged that its trade-
mark had been infringed by Zippo Dot Com by using “zippo” in its 
Internet domain names.185 Zippo Dot Com challenged the court’s per-
sonal jurisdiction, alleging that it had insufficient contacts with 
Pennsylvania to satisfy either Pennsylvania statutory requirements 
or the Due Process Clause.186 
 Zippo Dot Com operated an Internet-based subscription news ser-
vice; subscribing required payment by credit card, arranged either 
through the Internet or telephone.187 Of Zippo Dot Com’s 140,000 cus-
tomers, approximately 3000 were Pennsylvania residents.188 In addi-
tion, Zippo Dot Com had service contracts with seven ISPs that were 
physically in Pennsylvania.189 Zippo Dot Com had no offices, employ-
ees, or agents in Pennsylvania at any time; however, its California-
based Web site was accessible from Pennsylvania.190 
 In its reference to Supreme Court decisions on the subject, the 
district court emphasized the point that the actions of the defendant 
to “reach out” to the forum state must be such as to make the defen-
dant “reasonably expect to be haled into court there.”191 The court 
said that its review of the then-few decisions on point indicated that 
the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be exercised is “directly 
proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that 
an entity conducts over the Internet.”192 The court then set out the 
three categories that later decisions have used: 
                                                                                                                  
 182. See, e.g., Techencyclopedia (searchable dictionary), at http://www.techweb.com/ 
encyclopedia (visited May 13, 2001). 
 183. See, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Dev., LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999); Cy-
bersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997). See generally Search Force, Inc. 
v. DataForce Int’l, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 771, 776-78 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
 184. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 185. Zippo Dot Com had, through the normal Internet domain name registration proc-
ess, exclusive rights to domain names “zippo.com,” “zippo.net,” and “zipponews.com”. See 
id. at 1121 & n.3. 
 186. See id. at 1119. 
 187. See id. at 1121. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See id.  
 190. See id. 
 191. Id. at 1123 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 
(1980)). 
 192. Id. at 1124. 
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 1. Entering into contracts with forum state residents that in-
volve knowing and repeated Internet transmission of files to that 
state. 
 2. Passive websites that do no more than make information 
available. 
 3. Websites that are interactive, where the Internet user can 
exchange information with the website’s host computer.193 
With respect to the first category, the court indicated that there was 
a clear basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.194 With respect to the 
second category, the court said there was not sufficient grounds for 
the exercise of jurisdiction outside the Web site owner’s state.195 With 
respect to the third category, the court said the propriety of exercis-
ing jurisdiction “is determined by examining the level of interactivity 
and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on 
the Web site.”196  
 The court reviewed a number of cases with these categories in 
mind.197 It concluded that Zippo Dot Com’s relationship with Penn-
sylvania fell into the first category, that is, knowingly doing business 
with state residents via the Internet. 198 The court expressly rejected 
Zippo Dot Com’s argument that its contacts with the state were “for-
tuitous” (because it did not actively solicit business in the state but, 
instead, Pennsylvania residents found its Web site and initiated con-
tacts).199 The court held that who initiated a particular contact was 
not important because Zippo Dot Com consciously chose to do busi-
ness with state residents by processing the Pennsylvania residents’ 
applications and assigning them passwords. 200 
 The simplicity of the Zippo decision’s three categories is appeal-
ing, its format familiar to lawyers and judges. Unfortunately, it 
really does not help very much. With respect to the first, there are 
obviously situations in which a person or company “does business” 
across state lines via communication media rather than personal 
presence. But the fact that one communication medium (for example, 
the Internet) is used rather than another (for example, the telephone, 
U.S. mail, or Airborne Express) is not particularly relevant. As for 
the second category, it is equally as obvious that there are Web sites 
                                                                                                                  
 193. Id.  
 194. See id. (citing CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
 195. See id. (citing Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996)). 
 196. Id. (citing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)).  
 197. See id. at 1124-25. 
 198. See id. at 1125-27. 
 199. See id. at 1126. 
 200. See id. at 1126. The court observed that if Zippo Dot Com had wanted not to be 
subject to Pennsylvania jurisdiction, all it had to do was not sell services to Pennsylvania 
residents. See id. 
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that are just “there.” Those Web sites may contain information, but 
two-way communication (or communication directed to a particular 
person) does not exist. Those sites might be equated with a roadside 
billboard in the owner’s state. The fact that some person from an-
other state looks at a photograph of the billboard is not sufficient to 
support jurisdiction over the billboard owner in the photo-viewer’s 
home state. 
 With those two rather obvious categories out of the way, the third 
category includes all Web sites which have some level of interactiv-
ity. Zippo’s third category includes the vast majority of Web sites, 
probably approaching 100% of commercial Web sites. The variation 
among Web sites is great and the degrees of interactivity are so 
many that establishing a limited number of categories is risky; using 
only three, as Zippo does, seems to be an excessive oversimplifica-
tion. 
 When trying to categorize the cases, there is one group that 
stands somewhat apart from all the others. These decisions expressly 
or implicitly conclude that a Web site: (a) is, per se, a powerful and 
continuing business solicitation, purposefully directed at every per-
son with access to the Internet; and therefore, (b) is purposefully di-
rected at each jurisdiction in which persons with Internet access re-
side.201 Those conclusions are used to support a decision that the 
court has jurisdiction over the nonresident Web site owner.202 While 
these decisions also find, or assume, that the Web site has resulted in 
some commercial contact with forum residents, the decisions state or 
imply that commercial contact is not critical. 
 The decision effectively leading the pack of cases extending juris-
diction to wherever the Internet reaches is Inset Systems, Inc. v. In-
struction Set, Inc.203 Both corporations involved in the case were 
computer-related businesses. 204 Inset Systems, Inc., registered 
                                                                                                                  
 201. See, e.g., Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 743 (W.D. Tex. 1998) 
(discussing a gambling Web site having actual interaction with a forum resident); Hasbro, 
Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 44 (D. Mass. 1997) (discussing how a com-
pany must take action to avoid Web site interaction with a specific jurisdiction if it is to 
avoid being subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts there); IA, Inc. v. Thermacell Tech., 
Inc., 983 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 
1332 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (using minimal interaction with forum residents to support a prior 
conclusion that jurisdiction was proper based solely on the existence of indiscriminately in-
teractive Web site); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 
1996). But cf. Gary Scott Int’l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714, 716-17 (D. Mass. 1997) 
(discussing additional evidence of some sales and intention to sell to forum businesses); 
Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (declining to find jurisdic-
tion solely based on Web site, but treating a general informational site as directed toward 
forum residents). 
 202. See cases cited supra note 201. 
 203. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). 
 204. See id. at 162-63. 
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“INSET” under the Federal Trademark Act.205 Later, Instruction Set, 
Inc. (“ISI”) obtained “INSET.COM” as its Internet domain address. 206 
ISI also published its telephone number as “1-800-US-INSET.”207 In-
set sued ISI alleging wrongful infringement of its trademark.208  
 The relevant portion of the Connecticut long-arm statute allows 
the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations in actions aris-
ing from business solicited in that state “if the corporation had re-
peatedly so solicited business.”209 The Inset Systems Court found the 
statute’s requirements met Conneticut’s long-arm statute because 
the Internet, and thus ISI’s domain name and Web site, could be ac-
cessed from Connecticut: 
[S]ince March, 1995, ISI has been continuously advertising over 
the Internet, which includes at least 10,000 access sites in Con-
necticut. Further, unlike hard-copy advertisements . . . which are 
often quickly disposed of and reach a limited number of potential 
consumers, Internet advertisements are in electronic printed form 
so that they can be accessed again and again by many more poten-
tial customers.210 
The district court relied on two of its prior decisions dealing with 
print advertisements placed in newspapers or other print publica-
tions known to be circulated in the state.211 The district court equated 
an Internet Web site with advertising in a publication having a 
known circulation. In effect, if not expressly, the court held that es-
tablishing an Internet Web site constitutes “purposefully availing” 
oneself of the privilege of doing business wherever there are others 
who can access the Internet. 212 Despite the obvious possibilities, the 
district court did not rely on Calder. 
                                                                                                                  
 205. See id. at 163.  
 206. See id.  
 207. See id.  
 208. See id. at 162. 
 209. Id. at 163 n.2 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-411(c)(2)). 
 210. Id. at 164. 
 211. See id. (citing Whelen Eng’g Co. v. Tomar Elecs., 672 F. Supp. 659 (D. Conn. 
1987); McFaddin v. National Exec. Search, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Conn. 1973)). 
 212. See id. at 165. The court stated: 
In the present case, Instruction [ISI] has directed its advertising activities via 
the Internet and its [ISI’s] toll-free number toward not only the state of Con-
necticut, but to all states. The Internet as well as toll-free numbers are de-
signed to communicate with people and their businesses in every state. Adver-
tisement on the Internet can reach as many as 10,000 Internet users within 
Connecticut alone. Further, once posted on the Internet, unlike television and 
radio advertising, the advertisement is available continuously to any Internet 
user. ISI has therefore, purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing 
business within Connecticut. 
Id. Sort of like the man who says he loves all of the women in the world and is thereby le-
gally engaged to marry each of them! 
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 A few subsequent cases have reached a similar result. In Maritz, 
Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.,213 the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Missouri concluded that jurisdiction was proper 
under the “commission of a tortious act” provision of the Missouri 
long-arm statute.214 An additional factor in Maritz favored jurisdic-
tion: the defendant’s Web site was interactive and was programmed 
to automatically respond to all inquiries. 215 The district court equated 
the failure to restrict the Web site’s response with a conscious deci-
sion to purposefully transact business in every jurisdiction reached 
by the Internet.216 
 Likewise, in Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc.,217 the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for Massachusettes held it had that jurisdiction under the 
Massachusetts long-arm statute218 in an action alleging trademark 
infringement.219 Hasbro, owner of the registered trademark “Clue®,” 
alleged that its rights were infringed by Clue Computing’s use of the 
web address “clue.com,” which Clue Computing had registered with 
appropriate authorities. 220 To support its holding that jurisdiction 
was proper, the Hasbro Court relied on the Web site; eight telephone 
calls made over three years time from Clue Computing to Massachu-
setts telephone numbers; Clue Computing’s purchase of software 
from a Massachusetts vendor (amount and cost unstated), and Clue 
Computing’s provision of training services (not in Massachusetts) to 
employees of Digital Equipment (headquarters in Massachusetts) 
under a subcontract with another nonresident company, Professional 
Training Services. 221 The Web site advertised Clue Computing’s ser-
vices; listed the company’s address, telephone number, and e-mail 
address; and allowed a site visitor to “instantly” send e-mail by 
“clicking” a location on the web page.222 The Hasbro Court empha-
sized advertising text on Clue Computing’s Web site that described 
Clue Computing as a “virtual company” able to provide services 
“anywhere on the planet.”223 
                                                                                                                  
 213. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
 214. See id. at 1331 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 506.500.1(3)). 
 215. See id. at 1333. 
 216. See id.; see also Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 3-5 (D.D.C. 1996) 
(discussing a company’s Internet site plus advertisement in a local newspaper as activities 
designed to purposefully avail itself of the forum’s privileges). 
 217. 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997). 
 218. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3 (West 1997). 
 219. See Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 43-44. 
 220. See id. at 38. 
 221. See id. at 37. 
 222. See id. at 38. 
 223. Id. The advertising apparently listed Digital Equipment as one of Clue Comput-
ing’s clients, see id. at 44, though that is somewhat inconsistent with the desription of the 
indirect relationship between the two companies. See also Gary Scott Int’l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 
981 F. Supp. 714, 716 (D. Mass. 1997) (basing jurisdiction on general Web site advertising, 
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 The district court provides a long discussion of cases concerning 
Web sites, due process in general, and the Massachusetts long-arm 
statute.224 However, the basis for its conclusions can be stated rather 
simply: connecting a Web site to the Internet is “placing a product 
into the ‘stream of commerce.’”225 But the Asahi plurality opinion re-
quires “something more” than that as a basis for jurisdiction; that 
“something more” can be advertising in the forum state, which “indi-
cate[s] an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum 
State.”226 The district court found that Clue Computing “purposefully 
directed” its advertising to Massachusetts because it directed its ad-
vertising at all states without expressly excluding Massachusetts. 227 
After expressing “concern” about cases holding that jurisdiction can 
be based on the mere existence of a Web site,228 it went on to hold ju-
risdiction proper because, supposedly, here there were additional 
facts: “soliciting business” in Massachusetts and “injury” in Massa-
chusetts. 229  
 The district court’s attempt to justify its conclusion is at best, 
weak. The Hasbro decision is, in effect, the same as the others: the 
existence of a Web site constitutes purposeful advertising in every 
jurisdiction from which it can be accessed, unless that jurisdiction is 
somehow purposefully excluded. How a Web site owner might pur-
posefully exclude a jurisdiction, however, is unclear. Equally prob-
lematic is the court’s reliance on the location of the injury. Any plain-
tiff that can allege an injury would suffer that injury wherever the 
plaintiff was located. 
 A second theory used in cases finding Due Process satisfied with 
even minor forum-state contact is that the defendant was (or proba-
bly was) aware of the plaintiff’s location before the alleged inten-
tional tort was committed.230 Some of these cases deal with trade-
mark infringement, while others deal with defemation, but they all 
generally rely on Supreme Court defamation cases such as Calder v. 
Jones.231 
                                                                                                                  
plus one sale to a forum resident and an expressed intent to sell to a client that did busi-
ness in the forum state (and many other states)). 
 224. See Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 40-46. 
 225. Id. at 41 (citing Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996)). 
 226. Id. at 42 (quoting Asahi Metals Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 
(1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion)). 
 227. Id. at 44.  
 228. Id. at 46 (citing Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 
1996); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybe r-
gold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)). 
 229. Id. 
 230. See, e.g., Telco Communs. v. An Apple a Day, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 
1997). 
 231. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
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 In Calder, the Court noted that the defendant’s connection with 
the forum state is the key consideration, but that, under some cir-
cumstances, the plaintiff’s connections with the state are relevant. 232 
In Calder, the plaintiff was the special, intended focus of the defen-
dants’ alleged tortious activities233 and the defendants were very 
aware of where the plaintiff resided.234 Nevertheless, the Calder 
Court still emphasized the defendant’s conduct and the defendant’s 
knowledge of the plaintiff’s situation.235 
 In Telco Communications v. An Apple a Day, Inc.,236 the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia relied on Calder to ex-
tend tort jurisdiction to persons who merely cause comments to be 
posted on Internet sites that may be accessible from the forum state. 
In Telco, the defendant posted press releases with Business Wire re-
questing distribution in three states, not including Virginia.237 Evi-
dence indicated, however, that Business Wire advertisements (which 
the court apparently assumed the defendant had read) indicated that 
it was distributed to a wide audience, including Internet sites such as 
America Online (AOL), as well as other Virginia locations. 238 The dis-
trict court expressly agreed with the Inset Systems conclusion that 
posting an advertisement, even indirectly, on the Internet constitutes 
purposefully doing business wherever the Internet reaches.239 
 In Bochan v. LaFontaine,240 the same court held that posting al-
legedly defamatory comments on Internet newsgroup sites consti-
tuted the commission of a tort in Virginia because the acting person 
used AOL services and AOL is a Virginia-based company.241 A second 
defendant, who did not have an AOL account but did have an Inter-
net Web site (albeit unrelated to the alleged defamation), was held on 
the authority of Telco to be subject to jurisdiction with respect to the 
alleged defamation.242 While the Bochan Court did mention Calder 
                                                                                                                  
 232. See id. at 788. 
 233. See id. at 789. 
 234. See id. 
 235. See id. at 788. 
 236. 977 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
 237. See id. at 407. 
 238. See id. 
 239. See id. at 406. Since the defendant posted two or three press releases, that satis-
fied the “regularly” soliciting business or “persistent course of conduct” requirements of the 
Virginia long-arm statute. Id. at 405-07 (quoting VA. CODE ANN § 8.01-328.1(A)(4)). 
 240. 68 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 1999). 
 241. Id. at 699 (citing VA. CODE ANN § 8.01-328.1(A)(3)). 
 242. See id. at 700-02; see also Telco Communs. v. An Apple a Day, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 
404 (E.D. Va. 1997); Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43, 45 (D. Conn. 1997) (discussing stock 
fraud via postings to Prodigy “discussion group,” including personalized messages to plain-
tiff); EDIAS Software Int’l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int’l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 418 (D. Ariz. 1996) 
(discussing how the defendant posted allegedly damaging statements on Internet sites, 
knowing that the plaintiff’s forum-based business would be damaged); Panavision Int’l, 
L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (explaining how “cybersitter” pu r-
posefully registered the plaintiff’s name as domain name solely for the purpose of coercing 
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in a footnote, it did not expressly place much reliance on that 
case.243 
 The decisions finding due process satisfied by the mere existence 
of information available through the Internet and accessible from the 
forum state have been criticized as contrary to logic and inconsistent 
with well-established rules to the effect that national advertising is 
not sufficiently focused to support jurisdiction in any particular fo-
rum.244 In the Internet context, those decisions are particularly objec-
tionable because their logical result would be that all established 
rules limiting personal jurisdiction would be instantly eliminated by 
connecting even the least interactive Web site with the Internet; all 
Web site owners would be subject to worldwide jurisdiction. 
 It should come as no surprise that other courts have reached a dif-
ferent conclusion. In Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,245 the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York held that a Web site’s 
existence was not sufficient to bring the out-of-state Web site owner 
within the scope of New York’s “doing business” long-arm statute. 246 
While the Web site had been established to promote future business 
activities, no business had been conducted through the site by the 
time litigation had started.247 The parties did admit, though, that 
New York residents both could and had visited the site.248 The dis-
trict court likened the Web site to an advertisement in a national 
publication not targeted at a particular state, which does not satisfy 
the statutory requirement for doing business in New York.249 In a 
                                                                                                                  
the plaintiff to buy him off). But see Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 728 
(E.D. Pa. 1999) (determining that listserv and USENET postings are no different from 
passive Web site and do not support a conclusion that a plaintiff directed its efforts toward 
a forum). 
 243. See Bochan , 68 F. Supp. 2d at 698 n.16. In Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F. 
Supp. 481 (W.D.N.C. 1997), the court went even further, first assuming that significant 
numbers of forum residents had visited the defendant’s Web site, then holding that the de-
fendant purposefully directed his business activities toward the forum. See id. at 487. 
 244. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. [Ariz.] v. Cybersell, Inc. [Fla.], 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 
1997); S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540 n.3 (E.D. 
Pa. 1999) (characterizing Inset Systems as “ancient”); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, 
L.L.C., 34 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D.S.C. 1999); Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. 
Conn. 1998); Osteotech, Inc. v. Gensci Regeneration Sciences, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 349 
(D.N.J. 1998); CFOs 2 Go, Inc. v. CFO 2 Go, Inc., No. C97-4676 SI, 1998 WL 320821 (N.D. 
Cal. June 5, 1998); E-Data Corp. v. Micropatent Corp., 989 F. Supp. 173 (D. Conn. 1997); 
Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (AJP.), 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
26, 1997); Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (N.D. Ill. 
1997); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997). 
 245. No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (AJP), 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).  
 246. Id. at *12 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1)). The district court also held that the 
Web site, even if it infringed the plaintiff’s trademark, constituted neither the commission 
of a tort in New York nor the commission of a tort outside New York by a person who regu-
larly does business in New York. See id. at *13 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2)-(3)). 
 247. See id. at *1. 
 248. See id. 
 249. See id. at *9-*12. 
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footnote, the district court also noted that national advertisements 
had been found not to meet the minimum contacts requirements of 
the Due Process Clause.250 
 A significant majority of Internet-related decisions refer to, or are 
similar to, Zippo and use its three-category approach. Zippo category 
one, represented by Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,251 includes 
information-only sites not aimed at a large geographic area. The site 
information content is of interest only in a limited geographic area 
and there is little, if any, interactivity.252 A number of cases relying 
on Zippo have held that the relevant Web site was passive, merely 
providing information, and insufficient to support jurisdiction.253 
 The second Zippo category, represented by CompuServe, Inc. v. 
Patterson,254 includes full-service Web sites that are highly interac-
tive, are capable of completing all “normal” business transactions via 
                                                                                                                  
 250. See id. at *11 n.13; see also Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356, 
1364-65 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (agreeing that establishing a Web site does not support a conclu-
sion that a Web site owner has placed its products in the stream of commerce sufficiently 
to justify jurisdiction in a forum, where there are no other contacts). 
 251. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d , 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997). A New York 
jazz club sued a Missouri jazz club alleging trademark infringement. See id. at 297. The 
latter’s Web site was purely informational, with a calendar of events and an explanation of 
how to obtain tickets, which could not be done through the Web site. See id. The defendant 
night club’s market was obviously local. 
 252. See id. Such sites are similar to an advertisement in a Midwest U.S. local shop-
ping circular that was inadvertently left in an airplane seat pocket and later read by a 
bored Argentine passenger sitting in an airplane presently number 17 in line for takeoff 
from JFK International on its way to Helsinki. 
 253. See, e.g., S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537, 
541 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding Web site was essentially passive, even though one could send 
e-mail and order advertising video through the site); Patriot Sys., Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 
F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1324 (D. Utah 1998) (concluding that since no details of Web site were 
given, it was “passive advertisement” merely providing information); American Homecare 
Fed’n, Inc. v. Paragon Scientific Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114 (D. Conn. 1998) (holding 
Web site passive because it did not list any products for sale, nor did it provide any process 
for ordering products, downloading files, or visiting other sites); Barrett v. Catacombs 
Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 727 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding Web site was informational, con-
tained no contracts to sell or solicitation, and was apparently not interactive). The Barrett 
case also held that posting messages to USENET discussion groups and listservers is in-
sufficient to support jurisdiction in a particular state because such postings are merely 
available to anyone who wishes to read them and the person posting a message has no con-
trol over where it goes. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 728; cf. Graphic Controls Corp. v. 
Utah Med. Prods., Inc., No. 96-CV-0459E(F), 1997 WL 276232, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 
1997), aff’d on other grounds, 149 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that simply making 
information available nationwide via Internet does not demonstrate purposeful availment 
of any particular state’s benefits; therefore, Internet site and toll-free telephone number 
were treated equally). 
 254. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). CompuServe involved a multi-year series of business 
dealings between a Texas resident (defendant) and an Ohio-based Internet service pro-
vider, which included a series of messages going both ways, files uploaded from Texas, and 
the defendant selling his software programs through the plaintiff’s service. See id. at 1260-
61. This was not a situation in which the plaintiff stumbled onto the defendant’s Web site; 
rather, it was an on-going business relationship not significantly different than many non-
Internet-mediated relationships. See id. 
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the Internet, and have in fact mediated a number of commercial con-
tacts with residents of a forum state.255 One case using this analysis 
concluded that the defendant’s Web site fell in the second category 
comprising highly interactive commercial sites. 256 In GTE New Media 
Services, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp.,257 the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia found that the relevant Web sites encouraged 
Internet users to submit data (that is, information requests) and re-
sponded by providing the information.258 The Web sites involved were 
Internet-based “Yellow Pages,” which are essentially identical with 
the traditional paper “Yellow Pages.”259 The court found that the sites 
were commercial in nature because the price the defendants could 
charge for advertising was directly related to the number of persons 
who used the sites. 260 Despite the court’s language, this decision 
should not be read as holding that the Web site alone was sufficient 
to justify exercising jurisdiction. What the court held was that the 
defendants made money from forum-based advertisers because the 
Web site was successful in attracting nonpaying users; therefore, the 
Web site’s role was merely a factor in establishing contract prices. 261 
 Zippo’s third and final category includes Web sites falling in be-
tween the other two categories, that is, having some interactive fea-
tures but not constituting a full-service, on-line business location. It 
should be of little surprise that most cases fall into this third cate-
gory, requiring further analysis. For example, in ESAB Group, Inc. v. 
Centricut, L.L.C.,262 [ESAB Group II] the U.S. District Court for the 
District of South Carolina held there was not a sufficient basis for 
exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a patent in-
fringement case.263 In that case, the Web site was interactive to the 
point that it allowed customers to place orders, but only after the 
                                                                                                                  
 255. Such sites might be compared with a software development company’s combined 
development center and retail store. A customer can wander in, try out software, and pur-
chase a copy, then go to the development center and submit his own software for evalua-
tion, signing the related contracts and communicating with company experts. 
 256. See GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 
1998).  
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 38. 
 259. See id. at 32-33. 
 260. See id. at 39. 
 261. See id. at 38-39. The court said that the Web sites were “highly interactive” and 
had a significantly commercial quality and nature. See id. at 38. That may, on the surface, 
be correct. However, the interactivity is limited to allowing site visitors to choose the in-
formation they receive, just as a library patron might choose the hard-copy Yellow Pages 
for a particular city, consult its index, and then turn to a specific page. The interactivity 
did not involve any commercial-type transaction between the site visitor and the site owner 
and there was no need for the site to obtain or retain the site visitor’s location. 
 262. 34 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D.S.C. 1999). 
 263. Id. at 334. In addition to having an interactive Web site, the defendant had actu-
ally sold a product directly to a forum resident. See id. at 329-30. 
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customer called a toll free number and established an account.264 
Evidence indicated that this method was established specifically to 
avoid doing business in the forum state.265 The court, referring to 
Zippo and other cases, held that merely categorizing a Web site as 
interactive is not determinative; instead, the important issue is 
whether the commercial activity relates to the forum state, whether 
conducted via the Internet or otherwise.266 
 In Millennium Enterprises, Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P.,267 the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon considered whether the 
defendant’s interactive Web site (plus one plaintiff-arranged sale to 
Oregon) was sufficient to support jurisdiction over the South Caro-
lina defendant.268 The district court’s opinion contains an exhaustive 
review of the Internet-related court decisions up to that time and 
reached the well-reasoned conclusion that jurisdiction could not be 
exercised in Oregon.269 In the process, the district court held that for 
due process purposes “doing business” in a jurisdiction requires 
knowing and repeated contacts over time, and that publishing an 
Internet Web site does not alone constitute knowing contact with any 
particular state.270 While establishing a Web site might make it fore-
seeable that persons in other jurisdictions might purchase products 
through the Web site, foreseeability alone does not confer jurisdic-
tion.271 
 Nor, the court held, does the fact that someone who accesses a 
Web site can purchase a compact disc render the Web site owner’s 
actions “purposefully directed” at the forum from which access was 
made.272 It is the conduct of the defendants, rather than the medium 
utilized by them, to which the parameters of specific jurisdiction ap-
ply.273 The district court’s opinion is clearly consistent with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s due process decisions, particularly in respect to the 
                                                                                                                  
 264. See id. at 327. 
 265. See id. 
 266. Id. at 330-31. The court noted that basing jurisdiction solely on the existence of a 
Web site would subject any Web site owner to worldwide jurisdiction and would “eviscer-
ate” existing personal jurisdiction requirements. See id. at 331 n.4 (citing Edberg v. Neo-
gen Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 104, 115 (D. Conn. 1998)). 
 267. 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or. 1999). 
 268. Id. at 913-14. 
 269. See id. at 923-24. 
 270. See id. at 920-21. 
 271. See id. at 921 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 
(1980)). 
 272. Id. at 922. 
 273. See id. After reviewing the content of the Web site, the district court concluded 
that if the site targeted any particular area, it was the area around the defendants’ retail 
outlets in South Carolina. See id.; see also Scherr v. Abrahams, No. 97C 5433, 1998 WL 
299678, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 1998) (holding that the ability of Web site viewers to add 
their e-mail address to Web site’s electronic mailing list, without action by Web site owner, 
is insufficient to support a conclusion that the owner targeted the viewer’s state of resi-
dence). 
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observation that what is required is some conscious choice by the de-
fendant to act within (or act in a way that may have an impact in) 
the forum jurisdiction. 
 There is apparently some comfort in “following” Zippo’s lead and 
assuming it provides some structure. However, as noted above, the 
almost infinite variability of interactivity places all but the clearest 
cases in the third, middle category and Zippo’s substance is reduced 
to a recognition that there are clear cases on either end of a broad 
spectrum with an erratic progression from one end to the other. Per-
haps the most one can say about how the decisions sort out along the 
spectrum is that as a site’s interactive capability increases, the pos-
sibility of a court’s finding jurisdictional requirements satisfied also 
increases. However, there is a parallel and, perhaps, more important 
trend for the evidence of actual contacts by forum residents to in-
crease as a Web site’s interactivity increases. Thus, in cases where 
the court has found due process requirements satisfied, it is highly 
likely that evidence of successful commercial contacts with the fo-
rum’s residents exists. 274 
 Given the relatively low level of interaction required to satisfy ju-
dicial specific jurisdiction due process, one might wonder at the sig-
nificant percentage of cases that result in a “no jurisdiction” conclu-
sion. Upon some reflection, however, one should realize that Internet 
connections become an issue only when the evidence of “real world” 
contacts with the forum is weak or nonexistent. If there are numer-
ous and obvious real world contacts, the issue of jurisdiction will 
probably not arise or, if it does, there is no need to resort to evidence 
of cyberspace contacts. As the real world evidence gets weaker, cy-
berspace contacts are presented to reinforce the weak spots. The de-
sired end is proving that the defendant has had relevant, knowing 
contacts with the forum state. While that can be accomplished with 
evidence of communications only (clearly demonstrated by Burger 
King),275 it takes a significant level of communication to equal the 
weight of even a temporary physical presence. 
 With those qualifications in mind, some generalizations are possi-
ble. It is unlikely that a court will determine it can exercise personal 
                                                                                                                  
 274. See, e.g., Westcode, Inc. v. RBE Elec., Inc., No. CIV.A.99-3004, 2000 WL 124566 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2000); Stomp, Inc. v. NeatO, L.L.C., 61 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (C.D. Cal. 1999); 
Park Inns Int’l, Inc. v. Pacific Plaza Hotels, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 762 (D. Ariz. 1998); Ameri-
can Network, Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997). But see Millennium Enter., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 907 (finding that the defendant’s 
interactive site allowed customer purchases but the only forum-connected sale was ar-
ranged by plaintiff’s attorneys); E-Data Corp. v. Micropatent Corp., 989 F. Supp. 173, 176-
77 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding that the defendant’s site was a full-service “store” selling li-
censes to use its photographs and that it did not need or record identifying information of 
customers; and finding, therefore, no evidence of forum-state contact). 
 275. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (rejecting notion 
that physical presence is necessary). 
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jurisdiction over a Web site owner if the Web site just provides in-
formation,276 even if that information includes a toll-free number to 
contact the site owner277 or the ability to contact the site owner via an 
e-mail link.278 If the subject Web site has low interactivity or there is 
little evidence of actual forum contacts, a significant factor appears 
to be how the “advertising” aspect of a Web site is viewed by the 
court. In Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,279 the court went 
to significant lengths to emphasize the power and persistence of web-
based advertising, as compared to other types of national advertising 
(for example telephone “yellow pages,” television, radio, and newspa-
pers, all which have limited availability), attempting to justify the 
conclusion that the Web site purposefully targeted each jurisdic-
tion.280 On the other hand, most courts that have held they could not 
exercise jurisdiction equated Web site advertising with other types of 
nationwide advertising that has consistently been held not to “target” 
any particular jurisdiction.281 
                                                                                                                  
 276. See, e.g., American Homecare Fed’n, Inc. v. Paragon Scientific Corp., 27 F. Supp. 
2d 109 (D. Conn. 1998); Patriot Sys., Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (D. Utah 
1998); No Mayo—San Francisco v. Memminger, No. C-98-1392 (DJH), 1998 WL 544974 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1998); SF Hotel Co., v. Energy Inv., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Kan. 
1997); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 
No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (AJP), 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1977). But see, e.g., GTE 
New Media Servs., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 27, 38 (D.D.C. 1998) (explaining 
that the site in question was “interactive” only in the sense that browsers could “search” 
for information from a relatively large database). 
 277. See, e.g., Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Conn. 1998); Graphic 
Controls Corp. v. Utah Med. Prods., Inc., No. 96-CV-0457E(F), 1997 WL 276232 (W.D.N.Y. 
May 27, 1997), aff’d, 149 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998). But see, e.g., IA, Inc. v. Thermacell 
Techs., Inc., 983 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Gary Scott, Int’l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. 
Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1997). 
 278. See, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Dev’t, L.L.C., 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); 3D Systems, 
Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Cybersell, Inc. [Ariz.] v. Cy-
bersell, Inc. [Fla.], 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997); Brown v. Geha-Werke GmbH, 69 F. Supp. 
2d 770 (D.S.C. 1999); Osteotech, Inc. v. Gensci Regeneration Sciences, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 
349 (D.N.J. 1998). In Butler v. Beer Across America, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1268 (N.D. Ala. 
2000), the district court concluded that even though the Web site allowed the purchase of 
products, there were insufficient forum contacts because the number of actual orders from 
forum residents were so minuscule. 
 279. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). 
 280. Id. at 165; see also Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 
1996); State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. App. 1997), aff’d by an 
evenly divided court, 576 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998) (emphasizing the 24-hour, long-term 
availability of Web site advertising). 
 281. See, e.g., ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, L.L.C., 34 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D.S.C. 1999); 
VP Intellectual Properties, L.L.C. v. Imtec Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269 (D.N.J. 1999); 
Edberg v. Neogen Corp. 17 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Conn. 1998); Osteotech, Inc. v. Gensci Re-
generation Sciences, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D.N.J. 1998); CFOs 2 Go, Inc. v. CFO 2 Go, 
Inc., No. C97-4676 SI, 1998 WL 320821 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 1998); E-Data Corp. v. Mi-
cropatent Corp., 989 F. Supp. 173 (D. Conn. 1997); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 
(D.N.J. 1997); Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) (N.D. Ill. 
1997); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (AJP), 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 26, 1997). But see Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 45 (D. Mass. 
1997) (holding that establishing a Web site injected the contested trademark “into the 
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 If there is evidence of actual contact with forum residents, the 
possibility of a positive jurisdictional finding increases, 282 but if those 
contacts are sporadic or not economically significant a negative find-
ing is still possible.283 In Maritz, for example, one of the cases where 
the court found jurisdiction existed, the court placed significant 
weight on the fact that the Web site computer was programmed to 
respond “indiscriminately” to browsers’ requests.284 
 In situations of high interactivity, courts are more likely to find 
jurisdiction exists, both because evidence of actual forum contacts is 
more likely to exist and because the Web site is designed to transact 
business without regard to customer location. The importance of evi-
dence of actual contacts was demonstrated in E-Data Corp. v. Mi-
cropatent Corp.285 In that case, the Web site was highly interactive; 
browsers could chose, order, pay for, and receive the company’s prin-
ciple product, digitalized photographs.286 However, the Web site did 
not require or retain customers’ location; the only retained record 
was the charge-card transaction number.287 The court held that ju-
risdiction had not been established despite the site’s interactivity 
level.288 
 Conversely, Web site limitations can reduce the potential for ju-
risdiction. JB Oxford Holdings, Inc. v. Net Trade, Inc.,289 a recent 
case decided by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
                                                                                                                  
stream of commerce” and only slight additional forum contacts were sufficient to establish 
jurisdiction; some active measure must be taken to “avoid” forum state). 
 282. See, e.g., Vitullo v. Velocity Powerboats, Inc., No. 97 C 8745, 1998 WL 246152 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 1998); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. 
Pa. 1997); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997); Gary 
Scott Int’l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1997); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Alta-
vista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc. 947 F. 
Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). In Superguide Corp. v. Kegan , 987 F. Supp. 481 (W.D.N.C. 
1997), the district court based its finding that jurisdiction existed on the assumptions that 
a significant number of forum residents had accessed the Web site and that they then in-
teracted with it. See id. at 487 (“While the number of hits to defendant’s website originat-
ing in North Carolina is not now before the court, a reasonable inference which arises is 
that such are numerous inasmuch as North Carolina is one of the populated states . . . .”). 
If one makes an unfounded assumption that the court’s assumptions are supportable, the 
court’s decision is not unusual. 
 283. See, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Dev., L.L.C., 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); JB Oxford 
Holdings, Inc. v. Net Trade, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (S.D. Fla. 1999); CFOs 2 Go, Inc. v. 
CFO 2 Go, Inc., No. C97-4676 SI, 1998 WL 320821 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 1998); Transcraft 
Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (N.D. Ill. 1997); cf. Pres-Kap, 
Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (holding regu-
larly accessing Florida database does not support jurisdiction when enabling lease contract 
and all other contacts centered in New York and the location of the database computer was 
unimportant and may not have been known to the defendant). 
 284. See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc. 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
 285. 989 F. Supp. 173 (D. Conn. 1997). 
 286. See id. at 174-75. 
 287. See id. at 175. 
 288. See id. at 177. 
 289. 76 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (S.D. Fla. 1999). 
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Florida is a good example. In that case the Web site expressly identi-
fied the states in which the site owner did business, and Florida was 
not included.290 The court held there was no jurisdiction.291 
 It is difficult to draw an overall conclusion from these cases, but 
here is perhaps one. Plaintiffs must still prove that the defendant did 
something that could reasonably be expected to engender legal prob-
lems in the jurisdiction where the litigation was commenced. No case 
eliminates this fundamental requirement for judicial jurisdiction im-
posed by the Due Process Clause. 
2.   Judicial General Jurisdiction and Internet Sites 
 As discussed in Part III.B, there is a constitutionally significant 
distinction between judicial “general” jurisdiction and judicial “spe-
cific” jurisdiction. Due process requirements for the latter may be 
satisfied with a few acts directly connected with the subject matter of 
the action and the forum.292 In contrast, judicial general jurisdiction 
must be based on evidence that shows a regular, significant, ongoing 
relationship with the forum, a relationship much the same as a resi-
dent’s, such that it is reasonable for the forum to exercise jurisdiction 
with respect to any and all matters. 293 Only a few decisions discuss 
general jurisdiction in an Internet context. 
 In cases where a Web site only provided information about the 
site owner and its products, the best-reasoned decisions have treated 
it as “mere” advertising which does not begin to meet the “continuous 
and systematic” type of forum activities necessary to establish gen-
eral jurisdiction.294 The result has been the same when the Web site 
allows preparation and printout of an order form for mailing, fax, or 
direct e-mail. 295 Even in cases involving highly interactive Web sites, 
the usual conclusion has been that general jurisdiction is not estab-
                                                                                                                  
 290. See id. at 1365, 1367. 
 291. See id. at 1368. 
 292. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
 293. See discussion supra Part III.B.1; see also, e.g., Atlantech Distribution, Inc. v. 
Credit Gen. Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 534, 536 (D. Md. 1998) (citing ESAB Group, Inc. v. 
Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 623 (4th Cir. 1997)). 
 294. See, e.g., Westcode, Inc. v. RBE Elec., Inc., No. CIV.A.99-3004, 2000 WL 124566 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2000); Atlantech Distribution, 30 F. Supp. 2d 534; Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 
977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997). In Atlantech Distribution, the court stated: 
To subject [defendant] Colonial Mechanical to general personal jurisdiction 
based on its Internet presence would mean that it would presumably be subject 
to general personal jurisdiction in every jurisdiction in the country, thereby al-
lowing a plaintiff to sue it for any matter anywhere in the nation. This the con-
stitution does not permit. 
Atlantech Distribution, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 537. 
 295. See, e.g., Mink v. AAAA Dev., L.L.C., 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); VP Intellectual 
Properties, L.L.C. v. Imtech Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 1999). Cf. 
McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826, 1996 WL 753991 (S.D. 
Cal. Aug. 5, 1999). 
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lished. For example, in Coastal Video Communications Corp. v. 
Staywell Corp.296 the court characterized the Web site as the effective 
equivalent of having in-state salesmen or a physical store, but it still 
found general jurisdiction had not been proven because “there must 
be proof that the website is actually reaching a portion of the state’s 
population.”297 
 In ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, L.L.C.,298 the Web site provided 
product and ordering information, and a customer could submit or-
ders through the Web site if it had previously established an account 
by non-Internet contact.299 In addition, there was evidence of actual 
mail-order sales to forum residents, but those represented less than 
one-tenth of a percent of the defendant’s sales.300 The district court 
stated: 
This court finds . . . that merely categorizing a web site as interac-
tive or passive is not conclusive of the jurisdictional issue. General 
in personam jurisdiction must be based on more than a defendant’s 
mere presence on the Internet even if it is an “Interactive” pres-
ence.301 
 Only one case has been found in which the court found general ju-
risdiction existed based, in part, on the defendant’s Web site. In 
Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp.,302 the U.S. District Court for the East-
                                                                                                                  
 296. 59 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D. Va. 1999). In describing the Web site, the district court 
stated that the defendant: 
[H]as established an on-line storefront that is readily accessible to every person 
in Virginia with a computer, a modem, and access to the World Wide Web. 
Thus, instead of using physical assets such as sample-bearing salesmen, or tra-
ditional business offices . . . [defendant] Krames is able to provide the same 
level of service via the Internet’s instant connections. 
Id. at 569. 
 297. Id. at 571 (citing Loumar v. Smith, 698 F.2d 759, 763 (1983)). The court granted a 
motion to engage in discovery to learn if there had been actual contacts with forum resi-
dents. See Coastal Video, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 572; see also, e.g., Origin Instruments Corp. v. 
Adaptive Computer Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 397 CV2595-L, 1999 WL 76794 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 
3, 1999) (holding a Web site highly interactive because it provided the ability to purchase 
and download software). In Westcode, Inc. v. RBE Electronics, Inc., No. CIV.A.99-3004, 
2000 WL 124566 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2000), the court bluntly stated: “A corporation or indi-
vidual is not subject to general jurisdiction in a foreign forum simply by virtue of an Inte r-
net presence.” Id. at *5 (dicta). Note that being “effectively equivalent to a physical store” 
for Due Process Clause purposes is not the same thing as establishing a nexus for Com-
merce Clause purposes. 
 298. 34 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D.S.C. 1999). 
 299. See id. at 327. 
 300. See id. at 326. In a previous decision involving the same parties, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had held that no general jurisdiction had been established 
based on the defendant’s in-forum activities, but in that case the existence of the Web site 
had not been included in the evidence. See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, L.L.C., 126 F. 3d 
617 (4th  Cir. 1997). 
 301. ESAB Group, 34 F. Supp. at 330 (citations omitted); see also Origin Instruments, 
1999 WL 76794, at *2 (discussing highly interactive Web site that allowed purchase and 
download of software products). 
 302. 997 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Tex. 1998). 
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ern District of Texas considered a product liability action very simi-
lar to World-Wide Volkswagen. A Virginia couple purchased a bunk 
bed from a Washington, D.C., retailer.303 The product had been 
manufactured by defendant Rose Furniture, a North Carolina com-
pany.304 Twelve years later, in North Carolina, the couple sold the 
bed to another North Carolina couple, who moved to Texas a year 
later.305 There, fourteen years after the bed was originally sold, the 
second couple’s son died when he became entangled between the bed 
railings. 306 The action against Rose Furniture (and others) alleged 
that the death was caused by defective product design.307 The North 
Carolina defendant contended that the Texas courts (and, therefore, 
the federal court sitting in diversity) did not have jurisdiction.308 The 
district court first discussed whether “specific jurisdiction” existed 
and concluded it did not because there was no evidence that it was 
foreseeable that this bed would be taken to Texas. 309 
 The district court went on to consider whether there were suffi-
cient contacts between the defendant and Texas to support general 
jurisdiction. The defendant had no offices, employees, agents, or 
property in Texas and was not licensed to do business there.310 How-
ever, the defendant had had business dealings with Texas residents, 
including the following: (1) selling $5.7 million worth of products over 
six years; (2) consummating over 250 transactions worth $717,000 in 
1997 (apparently the year of filing); (3) receiving 3.2% of its gross in-
come from Texas sales over a four-year period; (4) mailings to previ-
ous Texas-resident customers twice a year; (5) purchasing 0.2% of its 
furniture from a Texas manufacturer during the preceding three 
years; and (6) maintaining a Web site accessible to approximately 2.2 
million Texas residents. 311 
 With regard to the Web site, the court found that it was much 
more than a “traditional” advertisement. 312 At the Web site, persons 
could browse through the furniture selections, obtain information 
about specific items (construction, materials, price), print out (but 
not electronically submit) an order form, check prior orders’ status, 
                                                                                                                  
 303. See id. at 783. 
 304. See id. 
 305. See id. 
 306. See id. 
 307. See id. 
 308. See id. 
 309. Id. at 785. The similarity between this case and World-Wide Volkswagen was too 
obvious to allow a different conclusion concerning special jurisdiction. 
 310. See id. 
 311. See id. 
 312. See id. at 787. 
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and communicate with sales representatives by e-mail. 313 In addition, 
the defendant responded to all inquiries through the Web site.314  
 In considering its conclusion, the district court reviewed a number 
of prior decisions dealing with Web sites and jurisdiction. It found 
Rose Furniture’s Web site akin to the one involved in Maritz, in that 
both sites were interactive, soliciting business generally (without dis-
crimination based on location), and promoting the owners’ busi-
ness.315 In its conclusion, the district court stated: 
The Court need not decide today whether standing alone the Web 
site maintained by the defendant is sufficient to satisfy a finding of 
general jurisdiction. Nor must it look only to the traditional busi-
ness contacts that the defendant has with the State of Texas. 
Rather, it is the combination of the two that leads the Court to the 
conclusion that the defendant maintains substantial, continuous 
and systematic contacts with Texas sufficient to subject it to [gen-
eral] personal jurisdiction.316 
The court’s reasoning would have been more convincing if there had 
been evidence of Internet-mediated sales to Texas residents, or even 
that a number of Texas residents had actually communicated via the 
Web site.317 
 It is not obvious that the defendant’s non-Internet contacts with 
Texas would satisfy the general jurisdiction requirements discussed 
in Helicopteros.318 Rose Furniture did have continuing “traditional” 
contacts with Texas over a period of time and those were part of its 
regular business activity, selling furniture.319 It is also true that the 
defendant’s forum contacts in Helicopteros were less regular and 
were auxiliary to its regular business of flying helicopters in South 
America.320 On the other hand, Rose Furniture did not have any of-
fices or other physical presence in the forum state, which contrasts 
with the defendant in Perkins,321 where the defendant had its princi-
pal officer, office, and management operations in the forum state. 322 
                                                                                                                  
 313. See id. 
 314. See id. 
 315. See id. at 788 (discussing Inset Sys. Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 
(D. Conn. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)). 
 316. Mieczkowski, 997 F. Supp. at 788. 
 317. See Coastal Video Communs., Corp. v. Staywell Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D. 
Va. 1999). In Coastal, a customer could complete a purchase transaction; thus, the court 
said the site was the effective equivalent of a “brick and mortar” store in the forum. See id. 
at 569. However, there was no evidence concerning the extent of the defendant’s actual 
contacts with forum residents, through the Web site or otherwise, and the court held that 
it did not have sufficient information to rule on the issue of general jurisdiction. Id. at 572. 
 318. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 319. See Mieczkowski, 997 F. Supp. at 787. 
 320. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 410-11. 
 321. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 322. See id. at 447-48. 
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If the allegedly defective product had been sold in Texas (either via 
the Web site or the “traditional” distribution process), there is no 
question that Rose Furniture’s actions would support specific juris-
diction. But there is little to suggest that combining two routes to 
specific jurisdiction can create a sufficient basis for general jurisdic-
tion. 
 Mieczkowski illustrates one problem with finding a Web site’s ex-
istence as a sufficient basis for specific jurisdiction; this same prob-
lem was discussed by the U.S. District Court for Oregon in Millen-
nium Enterprises, Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P.323 The Web site in 
Millennium was slightly more interactive than the one in 
Mieczkowski because a browser could complete a purchase through 
the Web site.324 The district court held that it did not have general 
jurisdiction over the defendant, which was clearly supported by the 
fact that there had been only one sale to a forum resident, and that 
was “arranged” by the plaintiff.325 The court concluded that a Web 
site, per se, was insufficient to support judicial specific jurisdiction; 
because is no deliberate action by the Web site owner within the fo-
rum.326 In the process the district court astutely observed: 
[A] Web site is not automatically projected to a user’s computer 
without invitation as are advertisements in a newspaper or on the 
television and radio. Rather, the user must take affirmative action 
to access either a passive or interactive Web Site. . . . Thus, con-
trary to the scenario described in Inset, information published on 
Web sites is not thrust upon users indiscriminately. 
 . . . . 
 Absent actual exchanges or transactions with residents of the fo-
rum or evidence that local residents were [purposefully] targeted, 
the distinctions between specific and general jurisdiction become 
blurred. . . . Web sites are accessible day and night to all who pos-
sess the necessary technological know-how and equipment. Thus, 
if an interactive Web site can constitute “purposeful availment” of a 
forum [for specific jurisdiction purposes] simply by being continu-
ously accessible to residents of that forum, surely that contact can 
be considered as “continuous and systematic” for purposes of gen-
eral jurisdiction. Taking this reasoning to its logical conclusion, a 
plaintiff could sue a foreign defendant in any forum and claim ju-
risdiction based on the defendant’s interactive Web site, even if the 
cause of action is unrelated to the Web site. Such results hardly 
conform with notions of “fair play and substantial justice.” The 
                                                                                                                  
 323. 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or. 1999). 
 324. Id. at 908-09. During the period from March through September, 1998, 0.01% of 
the defendant’s sales were through the Web site. See id. 
 325. See id. at 909-10; see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 326. See Millennium, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 922. 
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grasp of personal jurisdiction was never intended to reach so far 
and so wide.327 
 The district court clearly identified the most significant objection 
to determining that the existence of a Web site, by itself, is a suffi-
cient basis for permitting general jurisdiction in a particular forum: 
there is no rational way to limit the logic to one forum. Any logic 
supporting the conclusion would apply equally to any forum from 
which the Internet can be accessed, that is, the entire world. Such a 
conclusion is contrary to the theories that underlie both due process 
requirements and generally accepted international law principles. 
D.   Commerce Clause Limitations 
 Justice Frankfurter penned some lines that need to be kept firmly 
in mind when reviewing court decisions concerning constitutional is-
sues in general, and Commerce Clause-related state tax issues in 
particular: 
 Constitutional provisions are often so glossed over with commen-
tary that imperceptibly we tend to construe the commentary 
rather than the text. We cannot, however, be too often reminded 
that the limits on the otherwise autonomous powers of the states 
are those in the Constitution and not verbal weapons imported 
into it. “Taxable event,” “jurisdiction to tax,” “business situs,” “ex-
traterritoriality,” are all compendious ways of implying the impo-
tence of state power because state power has nothing on which to 
operate. These tags are not instruments of adjudication but state-
ments of result. . . .  
 . . . Ambiguous intimations of general phrases in opinions torn 
from the significance of concrete circumstances, or even occasional 
deviations over a long course of years, not unnatural in view of the 
confusing complexities of tax problems, do not alter the limited na-
ture of the function of this Court when state taxes come before it. 
. . . We must be on guard against . . . [relying on] formulas that are 
not compelled by the Constitution but merely represent judicial 
generalizations exceeding the concrete circumstances which they 
profess to summarize.328 
As can be seen in the following discussion, what started (and re-
mains) a jurisdictional (due process) issue has “imperceptibly” con-
                                                                                                                  
 327. Id. at 922-23 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). To the same effect regarding 
“global” jurisdiction, see Cybersell, Inc. [Ariz.] v. Cybersell, Inc. [Fla.], 130 F.3d 414 (9th 
Cir. 1997); Atlantech Distrib. Inc. v. Credit Gen. Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (D. Md. 
1998); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Playboy Enter., Inc. v. 
Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See also McDonough v. 
Fallon McElligott, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826, 1996 WL 753991 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 
1996) (general jurisdiction based only on Web site would “eviscerate” personal jurisdiction 
requirements). 
 328. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940). 
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verted to a Commerce Clause issue by reference to formulae and 
“magic words.” 
1.   In General 
 As noted earlier, resolving due process issues does not exhaust the 
constitutional limitations on taxing Internet-mediated activities. Ar-
ticle I, section 8, of the United States Constitution grants to Con-
gress the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.329 As 
long ago as 1824, Supreme Court opinions noted the “negative” or 
“dormant” aspects of the Commerce Clause, that is, the fact that this 
delegation of power to Congress precludes states from enforcing rules 
that interfere with interstate commerce.330 The limitations apply to 
all types of state rules, including tax rules.331 
 Legal theory concerning how to determine if a state act is invalid 
due to Commerce Clause limitations has undergone somewhat er-
ratic changes, similar to theories relating to other aspects of the rela-
tionship between state and federal regulation of commercial activi-
ties.332 The narrow definition of “interstate commerce” that prevailed 
before the 1930s fixed a definite line between intrastate and inter-
state activities and rather inflexible rules concerning state taxation. 
In 1888, the Supreme Court held that “no State has the right to lay a 
tax on interstate commerce in any form.”333 The sea-change reinter-
pretation of “interstate commerce” in the 1930s required a reevalu-
ation of the relationship between state regulation and interstate 
commerce.334 As will be seen, however, the changes have not resulted 
in a revision of all pre-1930s rules. 
 Current Commerce Clause theory allows state regulation of per-
sons and things involved in interstate commerce so long as the regu-
lation does not discriminate against or “unduly burden” interstate 
                                                                                                                  
 329. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 330. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 231-32, 239 (1824) (Johnson, J., 
concurring). 
 331. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995). 
 332. See generally I JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE 
TAXATION ch. 4 (3d ed. 1998) (offering a detailed discussion of historical and modern appli-
cation of the Commerce Clause to state tax issues) [hereinafter STATE TAXATION]. 
 333. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888). A few years later that state-
ment was somewhat modified to preclude only direct burdens on interstate commerce. See 
Sanford v. Poe, 165 U.S. 194 (1897). 
 334. If there had been no revision of the rules concerning state regulation, the adoption 
of the “affectation” doctrine concerning federal jurisdiction with respect to interstate com-
merce would have virtually eliminated state regulation of any commerce-related activity. A 
seminal statement of that reevaluation in the state tax arena is Justice Rutledge’s opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part in three companion cases: McLeod v. J.E. Dil-
worth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335 
(1944); and International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944). 
That opinion is published following the International Harvester decision at 322 U.S. at 349. 
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commerce.335 The watershed case for current state taxation theory is 
the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. 
Brady.336 In that case, the Court articulated a four-part test to de-
termine if a state tax runs afoul of the Commerce Clause. Under that 
test, a state tax is not invalid “when [1] the tax is applied to an activ-
ity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly appor-
tioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] 
is fairly related to the services provided by the State.”337 The applica-
tion of this test has not been easy or straightforward. 
 The fourth factor is rarely a problem because there is no require-
ment of economic parity between taxes paid and services provided,338 
and the existence of general government functions (police, courts, 
roads, and so on) has been found adequate justification for almost 
any level of taxation.339 With respect to the third factor (discrimina-
tion) the pre- and post-Complete Auto cases have been fairly consis-
tent. State taxation unconstitutionally discriminates when it imposes 
greater burdens on interstate activities than it does on in-state ac-
tivities. 340 Thus a tax on the value of corporate shares that imposes a 
significantly higher tax with respect to foreign corporations is inva-
lid.341 It is possible to impose one tax on domestic taxpayers and a dif-
ferent tax on out-of-state taxpayers, but the state must show eco-
nomic equivalence, which has proven very difficult in practice.342 The 
combination of sales and use taxes has survived scrutiny even 
though use taxes, taken alone, would clearly discriminate against in-
terstate commerce.343 Use taxes are imposed on goods used in a tax-
ing jurisdiction if the state’s sales taxes were not paid when those 
goods were purchased.344 The most frequent reason for not paying lo-
cal sales taxes is purchase outside the jurisdiction. Use taxes are 
saved from invalidation by allowing a credit for sales taxes paid to 
other jurisdictions.345 
 A tax that does not discriminate may still place an undue burden 
on interstate commerce, principally through multiple taxation. The 
                                                                                                                  
 335. See generally Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 
(1983); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’nr of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Complete Auto Transit, 
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 336. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 337. Id. at 279. 
 338. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 199 (1995). 
 339. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626, 629 (1981). 
 340. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 341 (1992). 
 341. See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 333 (1996). 
 342. See, e.g., South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999); Oregon Waste 
Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994). 
 343. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937). 
 344. See, e.g., id. at 580-81. 
 345. See id. at 583-84; see also Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 
199 (1995). 
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multiple-taxation issue is directly addressed under the second Com-
plete Auto factor (“fairly apportioned”), by determining if the tax is 
“internally consistent” and, if so, whether it is “externally consis-
tent.”346 (One must take these two terms as “words of art” and not 
seek a close definitional relationship between the terms and the in-
quiries they label.) For the “internal consistency” test, one assumes 
that every state adopts an identically worded tax.347 The tax is ac-
ceptable if no double taxation would result. 348 For example, in Okla-
homa Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.,349 the state imposed a 
sales tax on bus transportation tickets sold in the state for transpor-
tation originating in the state.350 This passes the internal consistency 
test because those combined events can only happen in one state.351 
 The “external consistency” test is not so straightforward. Its ex-
pressed purpose is to transcend formal names and designations to 
determine if the value being taxed, or part of it, might also be taxed 
in another state.352 If potential double taxation exists, the tax is inva-
lid. Failing the external consistency test can be avoided by appor-
tionment, credits, or some other method.353 However, problems arise 
when formalities and labels are completely cast aside for economic ef-
fects. 
 In Jefferson Lines, the tax was imposed on the buyer, measured by 
the ticket’s gross price.354 Labels aside, the passenger’s transporta-
tion expense is the transportation company’s gross income, an 
equivalence too obvious to ignore. Before Jefferson Lines, the Court 
had considered a New York gross income tax, as applied to bus 
transportation companies, in Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. 
Mealey.355 The Court invalidated the tax in Central Greyhound be-
cause it was not apportioned; the transportation company’s gross in-
come was earned as its buses traveled through various states. 356 The 
place where the income was received (ticket purchased) was not 
where the income was earned (moving passengers).357 States other 
than New York could justifiably tax gross income earned in that 
                                                                                                                  
 346. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 199; see also Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989); 
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983). 
 347. See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185. 
 348. See id. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. at 177-78. 
 351. See id. at 185. 
 352. See id.  
 353. See id.; see also, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 
(1994) (formula allocation of worldwide income); Container Corp. of America, 463 U.S. 159 
(same); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937) (facially discriminatory use tax 
saved by credit for out-of-state sales tax paid). 
 354. See Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 177-78. 
 355. 334 U.S. 653 (1948). 
 356. See id. at 663. 
 357. See id. at 660-61. 
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state, thereby duplicating the New York tax.358 While the “external 
consistency” test had not then been articulated, the Court invali-
dated the tax on Commerce Clause grounds due to the potential for 
multiple taxation.359 The Court noted that apportioning the gross in-
come based on passenger miles within the state could avoid the prob-
lem. 360 
 The dissent in Jefferson Lines, logically, points out that the Okla-
homa tax and the New York tax were both on the gross ticket price. 361 
The dissent states: “[A]s a practical matter, in respect to both taxes, 
the State will calculate the tax bill by multiplying the rate times 
gross receipts from sales; the bus company will pay the tax bill; and, 
the company will pass the tax along to the customer.”362 In other 
words, under the external consistency test, as articulated in theory, 
the tax in Jefferson Lines is not distinguishable from the tax in Cen-
tral Greyhound. One difference the dissent did not note was that in 
one (Jefferson Lines—sales tax) the tax is separately stated in the 
customer’s bill, while in the other (Central Greyhound—gross re-
ceipts) the tax is hidden in the ticket price. 
 The Jefferson Lines majority distinguished the two taxes on for-
malities, the taxable event (purchasing a ticket versus providing ser-
vices) and the taxpayer (ticket purchaser versus service provider).363 
The majority supported that distinction and stated: 
[O]ur cases are implicit with the understanding that the Com-
merce Clause does not forbid the actual assessment of a succession 
of taxes by different States on distinct events as the same tangible 
object flows along. . . . In light of this settled treatment of taxes on 
sales of goods and other successive taxes related through the 
stream of commerce, it is fair to say that because the taxable event 
of the consummated sale of goods has been found to be properly 
treated as unique, and internally consistent, conventional sales tax 
has long been held to be externally consistent as well.364 
The Court went on to justify similar treatment for sales taxes on ser-
vices, even when some portion of those services may be performed 
outside the taxing state.365 Perhaps the key point in the majority’s 
distinction of Central Greyhound is that in Central Greyhound the 
Court understood the New York gross receipts tax to be “simply a va-
riety of tax on income, which was required to be apportioned to re-
flect the location of the various interstate activities by which it [is] 
                                                                                                                  
 358. See id. at 662. 
 359. See id. at 661-63. 
 360. See id. at 663.  
 361. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 203-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 362. Id. at 204. 
 363. See id. at 186-87. 
 364. Id. at 187-88 (citations omitted). 
 365. See id. at 192. 
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earned.”366 In other words, an “income tax” is distinct from a “sales 
tax” for Commerce Clause external consistency purposes, even if the 
two are economically equivalent.367 
 This extended discussion of Jefferson Lines is not intended as 
criticism. Rather, it demonstrates that despite the theory of the 
Commerce Clause “external consistency” test, traditional distinctions 
between various types of taxes (income, property, excise, sales, and 
so forth) will not be ignored. Reading between the lines of the major-
ity’s opinion in Jefferson Lines reveals why that is so. If all labels are 
ignored, there could be only one tax along the stream of commerce 
from the raw materials producer to the final consumer. That, obvi-
ously, would invalidate entire tax structures through which state and 
federal governments obtain operating funds. 
2.   Commerce Clause and Consumption Taxes 
 The most controversial aspect of taxing Internet-mediated activi-
ties relates to consumption taxes. In the United States, that cur-
rently means sales and use taxes. It appears that use taxes will 
provide the battleground and baseline for Internet-related tax con-
troversies, and perhaps for jurisdictional issues in general. Solu-
tions reached with respect to consumption taxes fixing where Inter-
net-mediated transactions and activities occur can be applied to 
other taxes and regulations. 368 Perhaps unfortunately, sales and use 
tax problems are not being approached with an open mind. Instead, 
state and local tax authorities view them as merely another round 
in their decades-long struggle to impose collection and payment ob-
ligations on mail-order sellers. 369 The fact that the states have gen-
erally lost the battles in that arena may account for the strident, 
emotional character of their positions concerning Internet-based 
sales. 370 And it was in a 1992 mail-order use tax case, Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp,371 that the Supreme Court re-
                                                                                                                  
 366. Id. at 190. The majority gives traditional labels and treatment precedence over 
functional economic e quivalence. 
 367. Perhaps one could infer, in theory, that the external consistency test can be failed 
only by two or more taxes formally imposed on a single taxpayer. While that may seem a 
rather long leap in logic, there is little else to distinguish Jefferson Lines from Central 
Greyhound. 
 368. Unfortunately, Jefferson Lines might be used to rationalize employing inconsis-
tent rules for different taxes. 
 369. See, e.g., Jeri Clausing, Foes of Internet Tax Ban Vow to Fight On, N.Y. TIMES ON 
THE WEB, Apr. 4, 2000, at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/04/capital/04capital. 
html (last visited Apr. 6, 2000). The article quotes Shawn Bullard, Associate Legislative 
Director, National Association of Counties: “This was only one of many battles that we’ve 
fought, and we are getting ready to fight again.” Id.; see also Appendix B. 
 370. See Appendix B. 
 371. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
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minded372 states and taxpayers of the distinction between Due Proc-
ess and Commerce Clause limitations on state taxation.373 
 For reasons not altogether obvious, sales and use taxes have been 
treated as inherently distinct from other taxes. 374 Perhaps that is 
only because they are consumption taxes imposed on the consumer. 375 
As demonstrated in Jefferson Lines, the sales-and-use-tax combina-
tion rather easily satisfies the discrimination and “multiple burden” 
tests. However, they have generated a series of cases concerning not 
upon whom the tax can be imposed, but concerning who can be re-
quired to collect and remit taxes imposed on someone else. As will be 
seen, this distinction has not been consistently recognized; the retail 
seller/tax collector is often treated, if not referred to, as the taxpayer. 
 a.   The Jurisprudence.—One surveying the current political and 
legal discussions might conclude that the issues are new, and that 
the only significant consideration is the technological changes over 
the past thirty or so years. Actually, there is very little about the con-
troversy that is new or has not been discussed many years ago. About 
the only new thing is the amount of state revenue silicon-seers say is 
involved. Starting further back, closer to beginnings, allows a more 
objective consideration and reveals some explanations of otherwise 
perplexing questions. 
 The current debate swirls around state officials’ contention that 
they have, or should have, the right to compel all sellers to collect 
state consumption taxes from purchasers and to remit the tax 
amount (collected or not) to the purchasers’ state of residence.376 If 
forced to more precisely define the issue, state tax officials admit that 
                                                                                                                  
 372. The term “reminded” is used purposefully. See Justice Rutledge’s opinion concern-
ing the three companion cases, McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); General 
Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); and International Harvester Co. v. 
Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944), stating: 
[T]hough overlapping, the two conceptions [Due process and dormant Com-
merce Clause] are not identical. There may be more than sufficient factual con-
nections . . . between the transaction and the taxing state to sustain [a] tax as 
against due process objections. Yet it may fall because of its burdening effect 
upon the commerce. And, although the two notions cannot always be separated, 
clarity of consideration and of decision would be promoted if the two issues are 
approached . . . at least tentatively as if they were separate and distinct, not in-
termingled ones. 
General Trading, 322 U.S. at 353. 
 373. See discussion supra note 372. 
 374. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175 (1995). 
 375. Other excise taxes with a similar economic effect are imposed on a taxable event 
earlier in the distribution chain and are not separately stated on the consumer’s sales in-
voice. See infra text accompanying notes 381-386. If sales taxes were imposed on the seller 
and not separately charged to the buyer, the Court would have had a more difficult prob-
lem in Jefferson Lines. 
 376. See generally infra Part III.B.2.b. 
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the question is whether a state has the power to compel out-of-state 
sellers to collect use taxes from that state’s residents. 377 
 The practice of having tax revenues collected and submitted by 
someone other than the taxpayer is not new or limited to sales and 
use taxes. The advantages are obvious: (1) the person with the duty 
to remit is more likely to pay, since the funds paid are not the remit-
ter’s (it is always easier to spend other persons’ money); (2) the num-
ber of persons with whom the tax authorities must deal is greatly re-
duced; and (3) there may be administrative problems collecting from 
the taxpayer which are avoided when dealing with a third party. It 
seems this final reason was among the earliest recognized. As early 
as 1869, the Court noted that it was “common” in New England 
states to require corporations to pay the tax levied on the sharehold-
ers and that, with respect to nonresident shareholders, “it is the only 
mode in which the State can reach their shares for taxation.”378 The 
Court found no constitutional impediment to a state requiring the of-
ficers of a national bank to withhold and pay state property taxes as-
sessed against shareholders measured by their shareholdings.379 That 
method of collecting tax with respect to corporations has persisted for 
at least a century.380 
 With the proliferation of automobiles and the resulting need for 
road maintenance funds, states sought any viable means of collecting 
funds and distributing the cost; road users were many and varied; 
determining actual usage could be complicated and subject to ma-
nipulation. A rather elegant structure was created. The typical motor 
fuel (or “gasoline”) tax was imposed on the persons who used it for 
motor vehicle transportation, with the tax fixed at a specified price 
per gallon.381 To cut collection costs, states imposed the duty to pay 
taxes as far back the distribution chain as possible (refiner, importer, 
distributor, retail dealer, in that order of preference), with the re-
quirement or permission to pass the tax down to the ultimate con-
sumer.382 Since the tax was for road maintenance, the common gaso-
                                                                                                                  
 377. Of course if states have that power, they can enforce sanctions against sellers who 
do not comply. Those sanctions are, invariably, that the seller pay the amount it “should” 
have collected, plus penalties, interest, etc. See, e.g., Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 
340, 341, 344 (1954). 
 378. National Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 361 (1869). 
 379. See id.; see also Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 443 (1910) (bank acts 
as agent for shareholders); First Nat’l Bank v. County of Chehalis, 166 U.S. 440 (1897). 
 380. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 
(1944); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940). 
 381. The various states’ gasoline taxes had (and have) minor differences, but the gen-
eral scheme and manner of tax collection were essentially identical. Some of the cases that 
support the text description are the following: Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hopkins, 264 U.S. 137 
(1924); Standard Oil Co. v. Kurtz, 330 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1964); Anastasio v. Gulf Oil Corp., 
42 A.2d 149 (Conn. 1945); Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 205 N.W. 72 (S.D. 1925); and Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. Brodie, 239 S.W. 753 (Ark. 1922). 
 382. See, e.g., Kurtz, 330 F.2d at 181-82 (describing tax on dealer). 
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line tax allowed exemptions for farmers, stationary engine use, and 
the like.383 Because the tax was initially paid on all gasoline, exempt 
users were required to individually apply for refunds from the state 
(administrative convenience for the exempt consumer was appar-
ently not a high-level consideration).384 When it was contended that a 
state’s gasoline tax infringed on interstate commerce, the short an-
swer was that the tax was on the privilege of using state highways, 
which only happened after the gasoline had completed its interstate 
journey.385 Similar schemes are used to collect other excise taxes. 386 
 When the persons required to collect the gas tax complained that 
they were actually paying taxes imposed on other persons, the re-
sponse was that the involuntary tax collectors were not being taxed 
but merely being regulated.387 The Supreme Court expressly noted: 
“[A] State which has, under its constitution, power to regulate the 
business of selling gasoline . . . is not prevented by the [U.S. Consti-
tution’s] due process clause from imposing the incidental burden.”388 
By 1934, the Supreme Court could blithely say that the collection 
method was “a common and entirely lawful arrangement.”389 How-
ever, when a state tried to impose the tax collection and payment ob-
ligation with respect to a sale that took place entirely outside the 
state and was unconnected with the state, the Court held that tax 
did not meet due process requirements.390 
 The only located decision that specifically mentions accounting 
duties with respect to interstate commerce is Bowman v. Continental 
Oil Co.,391 decided in 1921. Continental imported gasoline into the 
state and sold some in the same containers in which it was imported 
(5.5% of sales) and the remainder from “broken” containers. 392 Since 
1921 was before greater flexibility of definition was introduced, the 
Court held that sales in the original containers were “in interstate 
commerce” at the time of the sales and thus not subject to the state’s 
gasoline excise tax.393 After reviewing the New Mexico statute, the 
Court found that the statute itself was not separable (interstate ver-
                                                                                                                  
 383. See, e.g., Jones, 205 N.W. at 73-74. 
 384. See, e.g., id. 
 385. See Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 93 (1934). 
 386. See, e.g., Heyman v. Mahin, 275 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1971) (cigarette tax). 
 387. See, e.g., Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hopkins, 264 U.S. 137 (1924); Standard Oil Co. v. Bro-
die, 239 S.W. 753 (Ark. 1922). 
 388. Pierce Oil Corp., 264 U.S. at 139. The Arkansas Supreme Court made an identi-
cal, express ruling in Brodie, 239 S.W. at 756. 
 389. Monamotor Oil Co., 292 U.S. at 93 (citing Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 217 
U.S. 443, 454 (1910), and Jones, 205 N.W. 72); see also Pierce Oil Corp., 264 U.S. 137; Bro-
die, 239 U.S. 753. 
 390. See American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965). 
 391. 256 U.S. 642 (1921). 
 392. See id. at 643-44. 
 393. See id. That holding was principally based on a previous holding of the Court in 
the same case. See Askren v. Continental Oil Co., 252 U.S. 444 (1920). 
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sus post-interstate), but that enforcement could be separated, thus 
saving the statute, by enjoining enforcement with respect to sales in 
unbroken containers (that is, those made while the goods were still 
in “interstate commerce”).394 Thus, the Court instructed the lower 
court to issue a decree requiring Continental Oil “to render detailed 
statements of all gasoline received, sold, or used by it, whether in in-
terstate commerce or not, to the end that the State may the more 
readily enforce said excise tax to the extent that it has lawful power 
to enforce it as above stated.”395 There is nothing in the opinion that 
indicates any state-required reporting or “accounting” had been an 
issue. So far as can be ascertained from the opinion, the reporting re-
quirement was based on the Court’s power to establish an enforce-
able decree, not on a conclusion that the state had the power to re-
quire such an accounting. 
 Thus, when sales taxes were being enacted, states had a readily 
available example of a comparable tax (comparable in being of small 
amount, with innumerable taxpayers), which had a tried and proven 
collection scheme that could be easily adapted to the retail sale of 
goods. The primary difference was that the sales tax was measured 
by the retail sales price, so the collection duties had to be imposed on 
the retailer where that price was first determined.  
 Similarly, the gasoline tax precedent was helpful to the Court 
when the constitutionality of use taxes came before it. In Henneford 
v. Silas Mason Co.,396 the Court cited, inter alia, a gas tax case for the 
proposition that “[a] tax upon the privilege of use or storage when the 
chattel [is] used or stored has ceased to be in transit is now an im-
post so common that its validity has been withdrawn from the arena 
of debate.”397 The Court offered considerable discussion on the equal-
ity and fairness of the sales-and-use-tax combination and expressly 
distinguished between the use tax (on property that has become part 
of the mass in the state) and an indirect tax on a foreign sale: “But 
the fact that the legislature has chosen to lay a tax upon the use of 
chattels that have been bought does not make the tax upon the use a 
tax upon the sale.”398 
                                                                                                                  
 394. See 256 U.S. at 646. The theory of “interstate commerce” at that time relied on 
drawing a bright line where particular items began and ended their interstate journey. See 
id. at 647. States could regulate items (or with respect to items) before or after—but not 
during—their interstate journey. See id. Thus the significance of sale from “broken” or “u n-
broken” containers. 
 395. Bowman, 256 U.S. at 650. 
 396. 300 U.S. 577 (1937). 
 397. Id. at 583 (citing Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934)). 
 398. Id. at 587. Silas Mason emphasizes the precise incidence of sales and use taxes. 
See 300 U.S. at 582; see also McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 
49 (1940). 
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 That distinction has been consistently followed.399 Imposing a tax 
on a sale in another state is beyond the state’s power and would vio-
late the Commerce Clause.400 If imposing a tax on a transaction that 
occurs in another state is beyond a state’s power, it is very difficult to 
see how imposing any other obligation on that transaction is not sub-
ject to the same infirmity. 
 Two years after Silas Mason the Court relied even more heavily 
on gasoline tax cases. In Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing Co. v. Galla-
gher,401 an Illinois corporation contended that it could not be required 
to act as California’s use-tax collection agent.402 The bulk of the brief 
opinion details the nature of Felt & Tarrant’s operations in Califor-
nia, that is, two exclusive general agents authorized to solicit sales, 
employ subagents, rent property in the company’s name, and other 
similar activities. 403 In addition to shipping ordered goods directly to 
purchasers, the company (to save shipping costs) made bulk ship-
ments to the agents, who then made the deliveries.404 The Court dis-
posed of the company’s arguments by referencing and quoting Silas 
Mason (discussed immediately above) and two gasoline tax cases, 
Monamotor Oil and Continental Oil.405 Specifically, in its reliance on 
the gasoline tax cases, the Court quoted Monamotor’s conclusion that 
a state could require a person to perform administrative tasks in 
support of the state’s collection of a lawfully imposed tax and that re-
quiring the distributor to act as the state’s collection agent was a 
“common and entirely lawful arrangement.”406 In addition, the Court 
stated: “Bowman v. Continental Oil Company recognized the right of 
the state to require a distributor ‘to render detailed state-
ments . . . .’”407 The Court’s reading of the Continental Oil opinion is 
not consistent with the opinion taken as a whole. It is, at best, taken 
out of context.408 Nevertheless, that statement in Monamotor has 
been subsequently (and apparently without further investigation) 
                                                                                                                  
 399. See, e.g., General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); Felt & 
Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939). 
 400. See McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); see also Oklahoma Tax 
Comm’n v. Jefferson, 514 U.S. 199 (1995) (holding that a retail sale of goods or services can 
only be taxed in the state where the sale occurs). 
 401. 306 U.S. 62 (1939). 
 402. Id. at 64. 
 403. See id. 
 404. See id. 
 405. See id. at 66–68 (citing Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937); Mona-
motor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 
(1921)). 
 406. Id. at 68 (quoting Monamotor Oil, 292 U.S. at 93). 
 407. Id. at 67 (quoting Continental Oil, 256 U.S. at 650). 
 408. See supra text accompanying notes 391-395. 
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cited in support of a conclusion that collection obligations can be im-
posed on out-of-state sellers. 409 
 When the first significant mail-order cases came before the Court 
in 1941, the Court had considerable recent experience with gasoline 
taxes for reference. In companion cases by Iowa against the mail-
order pioneers (and giants) Sears, Roebuck & Co.410 and Montgomery 
Ward & Co.,411 the Court expressed concern for the “practical opera-
tion” rather than the “precise form of descriptive words” that might 
be applied.412 With that in mind, the Court noted that use taxes were 
a constitutionally permissible means of preventing residents from 
evading sales taxes, 413 and imposing a reporting burden on interstate 
businesses was also permissible.414 Both Sears and Montgomery 
Ward sold goods to Iowa residents from in-state retail stores and via 
catalog.415 Sears’ approximately $10.1 million annual sales to Iowa 
residents were almost evenly divided between in-store sales and 
mail-order sales. 416 The Court emphasized the fact that the compa-
nies had registered as foreign corporations doing business in the 
state and had substantial local presence: Sears had twelve retail 
stores, 417 Montgomery Ward had twenty-nine plus several “order of-
fices.”418 As unitary, in-state business operations, the Court held “de-
partmentalization” did not immunize the companies from state regu-
lation:419 “these [mail-]orders are still a part of respondent’s Iowa 
business. The fact that respondent could not be reached for the tax if 
it were not qualified to do business in Iowa would merely be a result 
of the “’impotence of state power.’”420 The Court’s holding that both 
companies were required to collect, report, and remit use taxes on 
mail-order sales to Iowa residents was clearly premised on the fact 
that the companies were qualified to do business in that state and 
had very substantial local business operations. 
                                                                                                                  
 409. See, e.g., Heyman v. Mahin, 275 N.E.2d 421, 424 (Ill. 1971) (quoting Monamotor 
Oil). 
 410. See Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941). 
 411. See Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941). 
 412. Sears, Roebuck, 312 U.S. at 363 (quoting Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U.S. 
276, 280 (1931)). 
 413. See id. (citing Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 581 (1937)). 
 414. See id. at 363–64 (citing Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, 68 
(1939); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 95 (1934)). 
 415. See Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. at 374; Sears, Roebuck, 312 U.S. at 362. 
 416. See Sears, Roebuck, 312 U.S. at 362 n.3 (noting that Iowa sales in 1936 were 
$5080 from stores and $5,900,000 from mail order, and in 1937 were $5,600,000 from 
stores and $5,400,000 from mail order). 
 417. See id. 
 418. Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. at 374. 
 419. Sears, Roebuck, 312 U.S. at 364-65 (portraying one of the many instances in which 
the Court appears to be treating the collection agent as the taxpayer). 
 420. Id. at 364 (citing Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940)). 
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 Justice Roberts’ two-justice dissent emphasizes the functional 
separation of the companies’ mail-order business and the “interstate 
commerce” nature of mail-order sales. 421 Based on a then-old-style 
formal distinction between interstate and intrastate business activi-
ties, the dissent argued that forcing the companies to comply with 
use-tax collection rules was a direct burden on interstate commerce 
and therefore unconstitutional. 422 “Iowa may not abuse its conceded 
power to tax or regulate the respondent’s activities within the State 
by attempting to compel compliance by the respondent with uncon-
stitutional efforts to tax or burden its interstate commerce.”423 The 
dissent was not impressed by Iowa’s argument that it should be able 
to impose the use-tax collection rules against the companies because 
the state “[could not] effectively reach its own citizens in order to en-
force the use tax on them. This cannot, however, justify the state’s 
attempt to save itself trouble by placing an unconstitutional burden 
upon interstate commerce conducted by a citizen of another state.”424 
 Thus, a notable difference between the majority and dissent is 
that the majority viewed the companies’ operations as unitary and 
the dissent thought the two aspects of the business operations should 
be considered separately. When treated as a unitary operation, it was 
clear that the companies did business within the state and were sub-
ject to the state’s general regulatory jurisdiction. The fact that those 
regulations included obligations relating to one part of its Iowa busi-
ness operations rather than another was considered constitutionally 
insignificant by the majority.425 The opinions did agree, however, that 
if the companies had limited their activities to mail-order sales, they 
would not be subject to the state’s use-tax collection duties. 426 
 One interesting fact is that the state court had considered the ap-
plicability of use-tax collection duties to sales made to Iowa residents 
by retail stores in adjacent states. 427 The Iowa Supreme Court had 
held that Montgomery Ward was not required to undertake the “al-
most impossible task” of collecting use tax on those sales because 
there was “no feasible way of knowing or ascertaining where the cus-
tomer lives or where he is going to make use of the merchandise pur-
chased.”428 That issue was not raised by the petition for certiorari and 
was therefore not considered by the Supreme Court.429 
                                                                                                                  
 421. See 312 U.S. at 366-72 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 422. See id. 
 423. Id. at 369. 
 424. Id. at 371. 
 425. See id. at 364. 
 426. See id. at 362-63. 
 427. See Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. at 374 n.3. 
 428. Id. (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Roddewig, 292 N.W. 142, 142-43 (Iowa 
1940) (Hamilton, C.J., concurring)). 
 429. See Sears, Roebuck, 312 U.S. at 366 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
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 There does not appear to have ever been a thoughtful examination 
of the imposition of use-tax collection duties on out-of-state sellers, 
probably as a result of “sales-and-use-tax” being lumped together as 
a conceptual unit. In 1944, the Supreme Court heard a set of three 
“sales-and-use-tax” cases, McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co.,430 General 
Trading Co. v. State Tax Commissioner,431 and International Har-
vester Co. v. Department of Treasury.432 Each case involved a tax that 
the state wished to impose on a retail sale transaction involving the 
interstate movement of goods. Dilworth involved Arkansas’ sales tax 
and sales by Tennessee businesses to Arkansas purchasers, with the 
goods delivered to the purchasers in Arkansas. 433 General Trading 
involved Iowa’s use tax on sales by a Minnesota seller to Iowa pur-
chasers, sent from Minnesota directly to the Iowa purchasers.434 In-
ternational Harvester involved Indiana’s “gross income” tax on sales 
by local or out-of-state dealers where the out-of-state purchaser took 
physical delivery in Indiana.435 In each case, the relevant state stat-
ute required the seller to remit the tax to the taxing state.436 These 
cases established the tradition of treating sales and use taxes based 
on their precise combination of taxable event and incidence, without 
much concern for economic impact, which was continued fifty years 
later in Jefferson Lines.437 
 Dilworth held the Arkansas sales tax on Tennessee sales invalid 
as an attempt “to project its powers beyond its boundaries and to tax 
an interstate transaction.”438 General Trading, however, held the 
Iowa use tax valid, even though the transactions were essentially 
identical to the Dilworth transactions, because the Iowa tax was in-
cident on an in-state use, not an out-of-state sale.439 In its conclusion, 
the Court said, seemingly an afterthought: “To make the distributor 
the tax collector for the State is a familiar and sanctioned device.”440 
                                                                                                                  
 430. 322 U.S. 327 (1944). 
 431. 322 U.S. 335 (1944). 
 432. 322 U.S. 340 (1944). Justice Rutledge filed a single opinion in the three cases, dis-
senting to Dilworth and International Harvester but concurring in General Trading. See 
322 U.S. at 349 (Rutledge, J., concurring and dissenting). The principles enunciated in 
Justice Rutledge’s opinion have since become central in cases involving state taxation of 
interstate business. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 
306 (1992) (“[h]eeding Justice Rutledge’s counsel”). 
 433. See Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 328. 
 434. See General Trading, 322 U.S. at 336. 
 435. See International Harvester, 322 U.S. at 341-42. 
 436. The Indiana gross income tax appears to have been just that, a tax on all gross in-
come of state residents and nonresidents engaged in business in the state. See id. at 344 
n.4. The Court did not make any distinction between this tax and the sales and use taxes 
in the companion cases. 
 437. See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 187 (1995). 
 438. Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330. 
 439. See General Trading, 322 U.S. at 338. 
 440. Id. at 338-39 (citing Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939); 
Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1939)). 
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Other than that statement, there is nothing in the opinion to suggest 
that the taxpayer had argued that it could not be forced to collect the 
tax. One might infer that the quoted sentence was added in response 
to Justice Jackson’s dissent. That dissent was based on reasoning 
that is as accurate and pertinent to today’s Internet-mediated sales 
as it was in 1944: 
The transaction of sale is not taxed [by Iowa’s use tax] and, being 
clearly interstate commerce, is not taxable. So we are holding that 
a state has power to make a tax collector of one whom it has no 
power to tax. Certainly no state has a constitutional warrant for 
making a tax collector of one as the price of the privilege of doing 
interstate commerce. He does not get the right from the state, and 
the state cannot qualify it. I can imagine no principle of states’ 
rights or state comity which can justify what is done here. Nor 
does the practice seem conducive to good order in the federal sys-
tem. The power of Iowa to enforce collection in other states is cer-
tainly very limited and the effort to do so on any wide scale is 
unlikely either to be systematically pursued or successfully exe-
cuted.441 
 But this decision, by which one may not ship goods from anywhere 
in the United States to a purchaser in Iowa without becoming a non-
resident tax collector, exceeds everything so far done by this Court. 
In my opinion the statute is an effort to exert extraterritorial control 
beyond which a state could exert if there were no Constitution at all. 
I can think of nothing in or out of the Constitution that warrants this 
effort to reach beyond the state’s own border to make out-of-state 
merchants tax collectors because they engage in interstate commerce 
with the State’s citizens.442 As the dissent points out, the cases cited 
by the majority do not involve out-of-state sellers, but instead defen-
dants who were clearly doing business in, and making deliveries in, 
the taxing state.443 While the extent to which a state might impose 
regulations that burden interstate commerce may have expanded 
since 1944 (or are subject to different logic), the fundamental basis of 
state power has not changed. 
 If one examines the cases cited by the General Trading majority 
in support of its off-handed holding, no case involving out-of-state 
taxpayer/collectors is found.444 Subsequent cases citing Monamotor 
                                                                                                                  
 441. 332 U.S. at 339-40 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 442. See id. at 339. Justice Roberts joined in the dissent. Justice Rutledge’s opinion 
challenging the rationale applied in the three companion cases does not address the ques-
tion raised by Justice Jackson. 
 443. See id. 
 444. See Monamotor Oil, 292 U.S. 86 (Iowa motor fuel tax, Iowa distributors); Pierce 
Oil Corp. v. Hopkins, 264 U.S. 137 (1924) (Arkansas gasoline tax, Arkansas dealer); Citi-
zens Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 443 (1910) (Kentucky bank shares tax, Kentucky 
bank); Standard Oil Co. v. Brodie, 239 S.W. 753 (Ark. 1922) (Arkansas gasoline tax, Ar-
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Oil show a similar pattern.445 The end result is that there does not 
appear to have ever been a serious examination of the issue. Instead, 
requiring any seller to collect sales and use taxes was just a common 
and entirely lawful arrangement, which must a fortiorari be legal. 
What the gasoline and sales and use tax cases do show, at least 
through 1944, is that no collection duties were imposed on sellers 
that did not have substantial, continuous, and systematic in-state 
business activities. 446 
 Ten years after General Trading (in 1954) the Court, in Miller 
Bros. v. Maryland,447 did recognize that the retail seller was not the 
taxpayer. Maryland residents visited Miller Brothers’ Delaware re-
tail store and purchased furniture. The store did not make telephone 
or mail-order sales. Some of the purchases were delivered to the 
buyer’s home by common carrier and some by the seller’s own trucks. 
Maryland contended that it could require Miller Brothers to remit 
use taxes on all sales to Maryland residents. 448 The Supreme Court 
disagreed. Miller Bros. noted two factors that are still true, but fre-
quently ignored in contemporary rhetoric: (1) the collection of use 
taxes on inhabitants is an expensive administrative problem that 
states can avoid by shifting the burden to out-of-state sellers; and (2) 
the practical effect of transferring the collection burden to the seller 
is that the out-of-state seller pays the sales tax on a sale that does 
not occur within (is not taxable by) the taxing jurisdiction.449 Even 
though the Court noted that use tax questions were generally dis-
cussed as Commerce Clause questions, 450 its decision was based on 
due process considerations. 451 The facts showed that Miller Brothers 
was not “doing business” in Maryland.452 Maryland residents had to 
personally visit Miller Brothers’ Delaware store to make pur-
chases.453 The use tax Maryland was attempting to collect from Miller 
Brothers (“Miller Bros.”) was not due (because the taxable event did 
                                                                                                                  
kansas dealer); Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 205 N.W. 72 (S.D. 1925) (South Dakota motor 
fuel tax, South Dakota dealer). 
 445. See, e.g., National Geographic Soc’y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 
(1977); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954). 
 446. General Trading is not an exception to that statement because in that case the 
Court accepted the Iowa court’s factual conclusion that the company was an in-state re-
tailer “maintaining a place of business in” Iowa. General Trading, 322 U.S. at 337. 
 447. 347 U.S. 340 (1954). The majority opinion in Miller Bros., which held that the 
state could not force the out-of-state seller to collect use taxes, see id. at 347, was written 
by Justice Jackson, see id. at 341, but it did not specifically rely on Justice Jackson’s dis-
sent in General Trading, see id. at 346. 
 448. See id. at 341. 
 449. See id. at 343-44. 
 450. See id. at 345 n.14. 
 451. See id. at 344-45.  
 452. See id. at 347. 
 453. See id. at 341. 
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not happen) until after the transaction was complete.454 As the Court 
stated, “[That the Maryland] inhabitants incurred a liability for the 
use tax when they used, stored or consumed the goods in Maryland, 
no one doubts. But the burden of collecting or paying their tax cannot 
be shifted to a foreign merchant in the absence of some jurisdictional 
basis not present here.”455 
 The four-Justice dissent456 directly disagreed with the majority’s 
conclusion that Miller Bros. had not “injected” itself into the Mary-
land market by advertising and deliveries 457 and contended that the 
increased burden of collecting Maryland’s tax would, in these par-
ticular facts, be “a minimal burden.”458 The principal distinction be-
tween the majority’s and dissent’s position is that the dissent treated 
the problem as one of specific jurisdiction, while the majority contin-
ued the what was then long-standing practice by questioning 
whether the company was engaged in commercial activities in the 
taxing state.459 
 Six years after Miller Bros., the Court again addressed a state’s 
imposition of tax-collection duties on a nonresident seller. In Scripto, 
Inc. v. Carson,460 Florida demanded that Scripto’s specialty trading 
division remit Florida use tax on sales of promotional pens to Florida 
businesses. 461 Scripto had no offices or other physical facilities in 
Florida, but it received all orders in, and shipped its products from, 
its Atlanta, Georgia, offices. 462 Scripto contended that there was not 
sufficient nexus to allow Florida to enforce that demand.463 The Flor-
ida statute defined “dealer” for sales and use tax purposes to include 
all sellers who solicited sales (through representatives, catalogs, or 
other advertising) within the state, regardless of where the seller 
was located.464 Scripto did not have any employees or exclusive 
agents in Florida, but it did have contracts with ten “advertising spe-
cialty brokers” who had worked continuously in Florida as independ-
ent contractors for a number of years.465 These persons received cata-
logs and other materials from Scripto, solicited sales in Florida (sign-
                                                                                                                  
 454. See id. at 344. 
 455. Id. at 347. 
 456. Justices Black, Clark, and Warren joined an opinion authored by Douglas. 347 
U.S. at 357 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 457. See id. at 358. 
 458. Id. at 357. 
 459. The dissent’s use of inapposite theory has flavored subsequent decisions which, in 
turn, gives what slight support there is for some of the more extreme positions currently 
being taken by state tax officials. 
 460. 362 U.S. 207 (1960). 
 461. Id. at 207-08.  
 462. See id. 
 463. See id. at 208.  
 464. See id. at 208 n.1 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 212.06(2)(g)). 
 465. See id. at 209.  
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ing contracts as “salesman”), and were paid commissions on sales. 466 
Apparently these persons did not work exclusively for Scripto.467 The 
Court held that the distinction between “employee” and “independent 
contractor” was not constitutionally significant with respect to 
Scripto’s activities. 468 Recognizing that Miller Bros. required “some 
definite link” between the state and the transaction it seeks to tax, 
the Court stated: 
We believe that such a nexus is present here. First, the tax is a 
nondiscriminatory exaction levied for the use and enjoyment of 
property which has been purchased by Florida residents and which 
has actually entered into and become a part of the mass of prop-
erty in that State. [The old “bright line” theory of “interstate com-
merce.”] The burden of the tax is placed on the ultimate purchaser 
in Florida and it is he who enjoys the use of the property, regard-
less of its source. We note that the appellant [Scripto] is charged 
with no tax—save when, as here, he fails or refuses to collect it 
from the Florida customer.469 
 In context, it is apparent that the Court was considering the con-
nection between the Florida tax and the Florida taxpayer; there was 
sufficient nexus with respect to the tax itself. The Court’s discussion 
of the extent of Scripto’s activities within Florida was principally in 
that context, that is, was there any economically significant distinc-
tion between Scripto’s Florida activities and a resident retail seller’s 
in-state activities? The difference between the taxable events that 
trigger sales tax (retail transaction) and use tax (possession of prop-
erty) was not discussed. 
 With respect to imposing collection duties on Scripto, the Court 
stated: “As was pointed out in General Trading Co., this [requiring 
the seller to collect taxes] is ‘a familiar and sanctioned device.’ More-
over, we note that Florida reimburses appellant for its service in this 
regard.”470 The Court distinguished Miller Bros. on the basis that 
Miller Bros. could not know which cash purchasers in its Delaware 
store were Maryland residents and that it made only “occasional” de-
liveries to Maryland: “Marylanders went to Delaware to make pur-
chases—Miller did not go to Maryland for sales.”471 The Court con-
                                                                                                                  
 466. See id.  
 467. See id. at 209-10. 
 468. See id. at 211 (“The formal shift in the contractual tagging of the salesman as ‘in-
dependent’ neither results in changing his local function or solicitation nor bears upon its 
effectiveness in securing a substantial flow of goods into Florida.”). 
 469. Id. at 210-11. 
 470. Id. at 212 (quoting General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335, 338 
(1944)). 
 471. Id. The implications of that statement seem slightly inconsistent with the Miller 
Bros. facts. The stipulated facts in that case make it appear that the store delivered all or 
most of the sold merchandise to the customer’s home, which required that store employees 
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cluded that the minimum connections not present in Miller Bros. 
were present with respect to Scripto.472 The Scripto opinion is not 
particularly convincing. 
 The primary difference noted by the Court between Miller Bros.’ 
operations and Scripto’s was that Scripto made a specific effort to ex-
ploit the Florida market and, during the entire period in question, 
Scripto had a group of representatives continuously active in the 
state and generating significant revenues.473 It is relatively clear that 
the Scripto analysis was phrased in terms of judicial specific jurisdic-
tion, as required for due process. 474 Scripto was later characterized in 
Quill475 as being the furthest extension of the Commerce Clause 
nexus to out-of-state sellers. 476 
 Perhaps the more interesting part of Scripto is the Court’s conclu-
sion that General Trading Co. controls the decision.477 As discussed 
earlier, General Trading was based on the factual conclusion that the 
company was doing business in the taxing state.478 Therefore, even 
though much of the decision’s language can be read as applying judi-
cial specific jurisdiction rules, the decision is based on the more ex-
acting requirement that the company be engaged in significant, ongo-
ing commercial activities in the state.479 
 In 1967 (thirteen years after Scripto), the Court decided National 
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue.480 National Bellas Hess, 
Inc. (NBH, Inc.) was a national mail-order retailer, incorporated in 
Delaware and headquartered in Missouri. 481 It had no physical prop-
                                                                                                                  
learn the buyer’s residence address at the time of sale. See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 
347 U.S. 340, 341 n.2, 357 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 472. See Scripto, 362 U.S. at 213. 
 473. See id. at 212.  
 474. The Court mentioned Commerce Clause issues with respect to Florida’s exaction 
of sales/use taxes on the products Scripto shipped into Florida. See id. at 210-211. It is 
clear that the Court was applying the “old” rules about when goods in transit in interstate 
commerce “come to rest” in a state sufficiently to allow state taxation of those goods, viz. 
the Court stated: “[T]he mere fact that property is used for interstate commerce or has 
come into an owner’s possession as a result of interstate commerce does not diminish the 
protection which he may draw from a State to the upkeep of which he may be asked to bear 
his fair share.” Id. at 212 (citing General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335, 
338 (1944)). In that context, there was no need for the Court to consider the Commerce 
Clause “nexus” requirements developed in later cases. Of course, the “n exus” between the 
taxpayer-user and the state is not the real issue. 
 475. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).  
 476. See id. at 306 (noting that the tax had been upheld even though all of the sales ac-
tivity had been conducted by independent contractors). 
 477. See Scripto, 362 U.S. at 212. 
 478. See supra text accompanying note 439.  
 479. Scripto ’s language (not its holding) continued the slide started in Miller Bros. to-
ward using specific jurisdiction language when discussing a prescriptive jurisdiction prob-
lem. 
 480. 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled in part by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heit-
kamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 481. See id. at 754-55. 
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erty or agents in Illinois. 482 Its contact with Illinois was through cata-
logs and “flyers” mailed to Illinois consumers. 483 Illinois residents 
mailed their orders to Missouri, and the ordered goods were sent 
from there to the customer by mail or common carrier.484 The Illinois 
use-tax statute imposed tax collection duties on any “’[r]etailer main-
taining a place of business [within] [Illinois],’” which phrase was de-
fined to include retailers who solicited sales solely by catalogues or 
other advertising, regardless of where the orders were accepted. 485 
Based on this definition, Illinois contended that NBH, Inc., was re-
quired to collect use taxes from its Illinois customers, turn over the 
proceeds to Illinois, keep records, give receipts, and the like, or be 
subject to civil and criminal penalties. 486 One civil penalty was to 
“submit” customers’ use-tax obligations, even though the customers 
had not paid the tax to NBH, Inc., a customary result for sales and 
use taxes.487 NBH, Inc., contended that Illinois’ attempt to impose 
these obligations violated due process and constituted an unreason-
able burden on interstate commerce.488 The burden was clearly not 
trivial. 489 
 The Court started by stating that the two constitutional limita-
tions were closely related. For Commerce Clause purposes, the Court 
said, the test was whether the tax was designed to make interstate 
commerce bear a “fair share of the cost of the local government whose 
protection it [interstate commerce] enjoys.”490 For the Due Process 
Clause, the Court said, the “simple but controlling question is 
whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.”491 
With specific reference to the burden of collecting use taxes, the 
                                                                                                                  
 482. See id. at 754. 
 483. See id. 
 484. See id. at 754-55. 
 485. Id. at 755 (quoting the statute). 
 486. See id. at 755-56 (citing various statutes). 
 487. See id. at 757 n.9. 
 488. See id. at 756. 
 489. The Court described many requirements imposed by the statute beyond collecting 
the tax: 
National [NBH, Inc.] must give the Illinois purchaser ‘a receipt therefore in the 
manner and form prescribed by the [Department of Revenue],’ if one is de-
manded. It must also ‘keep such records, receipts, invoices and other pertinent 
books, documents, memoranda and papers as the [Department of Revenue] 
shall require, in such form as the [Department of Revenue] shall require,’ and 
must submit to such investigations, hearings, and examinations as are needed 
by the appellee to administer and enforce the use tax law. 
Id. at 755 (footnotes omitted). 
 490. Id. at 756 (quoting Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946), and citing North-
western States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 462 (1959); Central 
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 663 (1948)). 
 491. Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940), and citing 
Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952); Ott v. Mississippi Val. Barge Line Co., 336 
U.S. 169, 174 (1949)). 
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Court stated that due process requires some “definite link, some 
minimum connection” between the state and the person it seeks to 
encumber.492 The Court noted that in decisions preceding Bellas Hess, 
it had held that a state could impose the duty to collect use taxes on 
out-of-state sellers when the out-of-state seller maintained in-state 
retail stores, 493 when the sales were arranged by local in-state 
agents,494 and when the out-of-state seller had independent-
contractor salesmen engaged in continuous solicitation in the taxing 
state.495 The Court expressly declined to “obliterate” the line it had 
previously drawn between sellers who had an in-state operation and 
those who only communicated with the state through mail or com-
mon carrier.496 The Court summarized its reasons why the use-tax 
collection burden was unconstitutional in this setting primarily in 
Commerce Clause terms: 
[I]t is difficult to conceive of commercial transactions more exclu-
sively interstate in character than the mail order transactions here 
involved. And if the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens 
upon National [NBH, Inc.] were upheld, the resulting impediments 
upon the free conduct of its interstate business would be neither 
imaginary nor remote. For if Illinois can impose such burdens, so 
can every other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, 
every school district, and every other political subdivision through-
out the Nation with power to impose sales and use taxes. The 
many variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in 
administrative and record-keeping requirements could entangle 
[NBH, Inc.’s] interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated 
obligations to local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose 
“a fair share of the cost of the local government.”497 
Those considerations are the same ones Justice Jackson raised in his 
dissent in General Trading, decided over twenty years earlier.498 The 
difference in result can be explained principally by the fact that the 
Court in Bellas Hess did not accept, as fact, that NBH, Inc., was “do-
ing business” in the state. If the long-distance interaction between 
NBH, Inc., and Illinois residents had been sufficient to support Illi-
nois’ position, it would have supported a similar conclusion concern-
ing every other taxing jurisdiction where NBH, Inc., had customers. 
                                                                                                                  
 492. Id. (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954), and citing 
Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1960); American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 
451, 458 (1965)). 
 493. See Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941); Nelson v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941). 
 494. See General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); Felt & Tar-
rant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939). 
 495. See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960). 
 496. See National Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. at 758. 
 497. Id. at 759 (footnotes omitted).  
 498. See General  Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 339 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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The practical burden that would thereby have been imposed on NBH, 
Inc., (whose out-of-state shipments went across the nation) would 
have been orders of magnitude greater than the practical burden im-
posed on General Trading (whose out-of-state shipments went to one 
adjacent state). From this comparison, one might infer that decisions 
concerning burdens on interstate commerce are to be judged more on 
the particular litigant’s relative financial strength than on legal cri-
teria. 
 After another ten years passed, the Court again addressed the 
problem of imposing use-tax collection duties on an out-of-state seller 
in National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization.499 
In National Geographic, the state’s target was the National Geo-
graphic Society (the Society), which made mail-order sales of maps, 
atlases, and other materials to California residents from its offices in 
Washington, D.C., and Maryland.500 California contended that the 
Society’s two in-state offices were sufficient to allow imposition of 
California use-tax collection duties on the mail-order sales.501 The So-
ciety disagreed, pointing out that the offices had no connection with 
the mail-order sales, but only sold advertising in the Society’s maga-
zine.502 The Society’s advertising sales offices had been operating in 
the state for nearly twenty years before the case was heard by the 
Supreme Court, during which time the staff had doubled (to eight 
persons total) and advertising sales had aggregated about $1 million 
annually.503 The Court held that the lack of a functional connection 
between the in-state offices and the mail-order sales was not rele-
vant, affirming the judgment of the California Supreme Court that 
the imposition of collection duties was constitutional.504 Significantly, 
however, the Court expressly rejected the California Supreme 
Court’s holding that when an out-of-state seller conducts a substan-
tial mail-order business with a state’s residents, the “slightest pres-
ence” of that seller in that state, independent of the interstate mail-
order business, was sufficient nexus to allow imposition of use-tax 
collection duties.505 
 In reaching its decision in National Geographic, the Court placed 
on one side a group of cases which had held a sufficient nexus existed 
                                                                                                                  
 499. 430 U.S. 551 (1977). 
 500. See id. at 552. 
 501. See id. at 554. 
 502. See id. at 560. For a short period, the California offices did make some sales of 
similar materials and collected California sales tax with respect to those sales. However, 
both the California Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court found it unnecessary to 
consider those activities in reaching a decision with respect to the mail-order sales. See id. 
at 554 n.3. 
 503. See id. at 554 n.2. 
 504. See id. at 560. 
 505. Id. at 555-56. 
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for imposing apportioned gross receipts taxes506 or use-tax collection 
duties, 507 when the target company had continuing, income-producing 
activities in the state. On the other side the Court placed Miller Bros. 
and Bellas Hess, in which the Court had held there was no basis for 
imposing use-tax collection duties. With respect to the gross receipts 
tax cases, the Court emphasized that it had approved the tax when it 
was clear that the value taxed was related to the in-state activities; 
that is, it was appropriately apportioned.508 It then stated that a 
state has an even stronger claim when it is “only” imposing the ad-
ministrative duty of collecting taxes imposed on other persons be-
cause there is no possibility of double taxation (specifically referring 
to sales and use taxes).509 With respect to the prior use-tax collection 
cases (both those which had approved, and those which had disap-
proved, imposing the duty), the Court emphasized the state services 
enjoyed by the company, as a whole, as a justification for imposing 
the tax-collection duties. 510 It expressly rejected the theory that those 
prior cases had been based on whether there was a functional con-
nection between the seller’s in-state activities (which “benefited” 
from state services) and the activities generating the sales on which 
use taxes were to be collected.511 The Court equated the state’s ser-
vices to National Geographic’s in-state sales offices with the services 
provided by the state to the retail outlets of Sears, Roebuck and 
Montgomery Ward; the fact that the Sears and Ward’s retail outlets 
had functionally participated in the respective mail-order businesses’ 
operations was held insignificant.512 
 National Geographic was considered essentially simultaneously 
with Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.513 As mentioned at the 
opening of this section, Complete Auto articulated a four-part test for 
determining if a state’s tax unduly burdens interstate commerce. 
Given their propinquity, if the Court understood National Geo-
graphic as a Commerce Clause case, one would expect and applica-
tion of the Complete Auto formula; however, one would be disap-
                                                                                                                  
 506. See id. at 556-58 (citing Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington Rev. Dep’t, 419 
U.S. 560 (1975); General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); Felt & Tarrant 
Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939)). 
 507. See id. at 555-57 (citing Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960); Nelson v. 
Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. 373 (1941); Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 
(1941)). 
 508. See id. at 557-58. 
 509. See id. at 558. There was no mention of the fact that such an administrative bur-
den had been considered very substantial, and legally significant, in Bellas Hess. 
 510. See id. at 558-62. 
 511. See id. at 560-61. 
 512. See id. 
 513. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). National Geographic was argued one month after Complete 
Auto and the National Geographic decision was handed down one month after Complete 
Auto ’s. This suggests that when National Geographic was argued, the Complete Auto opin-
ion was being written. 
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pointed. Instead, the Court relies on the decisions discussed above 
that focus on whether the company is actively involved in in-state 
business, such as Continental Oil, Felt & Tarrant, General Trading, 
Monamotor Oil, Sears, Roebuck, and Miller Bros., strongly suggest-
ing a due process analysis.514 
 Again unfortunately, though the Court was looking at whether 
the Society was “doing business” in California, it used words and 
phrases familiar to judicial specific jurisdiction cases. In its rather 
confusing analysis, the Court did refer to both Complete Auto515 and 
Bellas Hess516 but did not discuss the relationship, if any, between 
the two.517 Trying to determine where, how, or if the Court used the 
Complete Auto analysis in National Geographic is futile, because the 
Court did not actually treat it as a tax case. 
 With this history, in 1991, the North Dakota Supreme Court con-
sidered State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp.,518 a case almost identi-
cal to Bellas Hess. Because the intervening twenty years had pro-
duced significant legal and technological changes, the North Dakota 
court held that it was no longer appropriate to follow Bellas Hess. 519 
                                                                                                                  
 514. The Court cited Complete Auto twice: the majority cited it once as an example of a 
properly apportioned tax; Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in the result, once as an exam-
ple of inconsistency in the Court’s tax rulings. See National Geographic, 430 U.S. at 559, 
563 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the result).  
 515. See id. at 558. The citation to Complete Auto was only that, a bare citation sup-
porting the statement that “fairly apportioned” taxes had been sustained when they were 
fairly related to state services to the out-of-state taxpayer. See id. The concurrence cited 
Complete Auto as proof that the Court’s tax cases were “not fully consistent.” Id. at 563 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the result). 
 516. See id. at 559. 
 517. Ironically, in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp , the Court used Na-
tional Geographic’s reference to Bellas Hess to support its argument that Complete Auto 
had not weakened Bellas Hess. 504 U.S. 298, 311–12 (1992). 
 518. 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991), rev’d, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 519. See id. at 213. In its opinion, the North Dakota mentioned the growth o f the mail-
order business from a “relatively inconsequential market niche” to a retail “Goliath” with 
$183.3 billion in 1989 sales. Id. at 208, 209. It also relied on the advances in computer 
technology to conclude that compliance with the multitude of regulations imposed less of a 
burden than in the early 1960s. See id. at 215. 
 It is interesting to note that the North Dakota Supreme Court did not mention either the 
relative size of the mail order market (compared to the entire retail market which also in-
creased during that period) or the increase in the number of both sales-taxing jurisdictions 
and tax rates that occurred during the same period. That is consistent with state tax au-
thorities’ tactics in the current debates, where they assert that very large dollar volumes of 
sales are going untaxed, creating an impression that an extremely significant portion of re-
tail sales are not taxed. When placed in the context of total retail sales, and retail sales tax 
revenues, however, it is fairly obvious that even the exaggerated untaxed sales and alleged 
tax “losses” are not all that significant. See ROBERT J. CLINE AND THOMAS S. NEUBIG, 
ERNST & YOUNG LLP, THE SKY IS NOT FALLING: WHY STATE AND LOCAL REVENUES WERE 
NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACTED BY THE INTERNET IN 1998, at ii (1999) [hereinafter THE SKY 
IS NOT FALLING], http://www.ey.com/global/vault.nsf/US/Sky_is_not_falling/$file/Sky.pdf 
(visited Mar. 31, 2001). The Ernst & Young study estimated sales tax “losses” at $170 mil-
lion, less than one tenth of one percent of total sales and use tax revenues, and this in a 
year that produced a $36 billion surplus in state budgets. See id. If state budget figures are 
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The North Dakota use-tax definition of “retailer” included all persons 
who engaged in “regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer 
market” in the state.520 Related regulations defined “regular or sys-
tematic” as three or more advertisements within a twelve-month pe-
riod.521 North Dakota filed an action in state court to compel Quill to 
pay use taxes, plus penalties and interest, on all sales after July 1, 
1987.522 
 Quill sells office equipment and supplies through catalogs, fliers, 
advertisements, and telephone calls. 523 While it has physical facilities 
in only three states, it makes sales throughout the United States. 524 
It is a “typical,” but comparatively large, retail mail-order seller. 525 
The Supreme Court noted that Quill’s annual national sales (for an 
unidentified year) were over $200 million, with “almost” $1 million in 
sales to about 3000 North Dakota customers. 526 Though Quill was 
stated to be the sixth largest “vendor of office supplies” in the state, 
it had no physical facilities or agents in North Dakota, and it deliv-
ered all of the merchandise via U.S. mail or common carrier from 
out-of-state locations. 527 Naturally, Quill took the position that North 
Dakota had no power to compel it to collect or pay use taxes.528 
 Obviously, Quill is factually indistinguishable from Bellas Hess. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged the similarity, but 
decided that Bellas Hess was no longer good law.529 That conclusion 
was based on the interim evolution in both due process theory and 
business methods and technology.530 With respect to due process, the 
North Dakota court noted the changes in theory discussed earlier. 531 
The post-Bellas Hess cases approve judicial specific jurisdiction over 
persons whose activities are directed toward the state, even if that 
person is never physically present in the state.532 Thus, the Court 
concluded, North Dakota courts could exercise jurisdiction over Quill, 
                                                                                                                  
rounded to tenths of billions (e.g., $17.2 billion), which is not uncommon, it is unlikely that 
any state’s budget figures would be changed if all use taxes were actually collected. 
 520. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1992) (quot-
ing N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01(6) (Supp. 1991)). 
 521. Id. at 303 (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 81-04.1-01-03.1 (1988)). 
 522. See id. at 303. 
 523. See id. at 302.  
 524. See id.  
 525. See id.  
 526. Id. at 302. 
 527. Id. Quill did retain title to some software a few North Dakota customers used to 
make orders, but that was so de minimis no one considered it a real basis for jurisdiction. 
See id. at 315 n.8. 
 528. See id. at 303.  
 529. See State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 213 (N.D. 1991), rev’d , 
504 U.S. 298 (1992).  
 530. See id.  
 531. See supra Part III.B. 
 532. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
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at least with respect to goods sold to North Dakota customers. There-
fore, the Due Process Clause also did not protect Quill from use-tax 
collection duties.533 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, noting that Quill 
had “purposefully directed” its commercial activities at North Dakota 
residents sufficiently to satisfy due process requirements. 534 
 Relevant to the Commerce Clause issue, which it did not clearly 
separate from due process, the North Dakota court described two 
types of changes to support its decision to disregard Bellas Hess. The 
first change was the line of cases after Bellas Hess that rejected a 
formalistic approach to state taxation of interstate commerce in favor 
of a more flexible approach based on the practical effect of the tax, 
that is, Complete Auto and its progeny. The North Dakota court 
stated that since Bellas Hess was based on a formalistic “physical 
presence” test, it had been discredited by subsequent decisions. 535 
Further, the court noted, the state of North Dakota provided services 
and benefits that allowed Quill to sell its goods in the state, including 
but not limited to disposal of “24 tons” of catalogs and flyers, thereby 
justifying the imposition of the tax-collection obligations. 536 
 The second change noted by the North Dakota court related to the 
burden imposed on interstate commerce by use-tax collection duties. 
Bellas Hess relied in part on the number and diversity of sales taxes 
in the United States and the consequent compliance burden on mail-
order businesses. 537 The North Dakota court noted that the mail-
order business, at least as a whole, had become big business, imply-
ing that it had resources not available twenty-five years earlier.538 It 
also noted advances in computer technology, which went from effec-
tively nonexistent in the 1960s to pervasive in the 1990s. According 
to the court, these two factors combined to substantially lessen the 
                                                                                                                  
 533. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.  
 534. See id. at 306-08. Neither court addressed the distinction between “special” and 
“general” judicial jurisdiction. Both referred to judicial specific jurisdiction cases. 
 535. State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 214 (N.D. 1991), rev’d, 504 
U.S. 298 (1992). 
 536. Id. at 218-19. Here, like the Supreme Court in National Geographic, the North 
Dakota court failed to note that under Complete Auto, the necessary relationship is be-
tween the taxes paid to, and the services rendered to the taxpayer by, the state. There is 
no obvious connection between the services provided by the state and a requirement that 
the theoretical recipient of the services in turn perform services for the state. One might be 
excused for thinking that the alleged state services were provided to the use-tax payers 
(state residents), with the quid pro quo being the taxes collected rather than the collection 
services. 
 537. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), 
overruled in part by  Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 538. See id. at 208-09. Perhaps it was hoping that the current Supreme Court would 
vote with the Bellas Hess dissent, which made the same argument as the North Dakota 
court, but over 20 years earlier. Instead, the Bellas Hess dissent undermines the North 
Dakota court’s “changed circumstances” argument. See National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 
765 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of “vastly underestimat[ing] the skill of con-
temporary man and his machines”). 
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burden of complying with multiple sales tax regimes. 539 While the 
Supreme Court indirectly acknowledged these environmental 
changes, it disagreed with the North Dakota court’s conclusion.540 
 Thus, when Quill came to the Supreme Court, the Court had to 
address Bellas Hess and the evolution of Due Process and Commerce 
Clause doctrine in the intervening years. The Supreme Court’s first 
step was to revitalize the separation of Due Process and Commerce 
Clause issues. 541 The two clauses, it said, were analytically distinct: 
While a lack of due process, the Court said, necessitates a conclusion 
that the tax is an undue burden, even if there is sufficient contact for 
due process purposes, the tax may still impose an undue burden for 
Commerce Clause purposes. 542 Therefore, the Court said, the two is-
sues should be analyzed separately. 
 The Court acknowledged that there had been an evolution in the 
application of the Commerce Clause to taxation after Bellas Hess. 543 
In particular, the Court noted that Complete Auto had established a 
more flexible, four-part test to determine if a tax is an undue burden 
on interstate commerce.544 But the Court said Bellas Hess, and there-
fore Quill,  concerned only the first of those four factors, that is, 
whether the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus 
with the taxing state.545 The Court stated that the North Dakota 
court had treated the “minimum contacts” requirement of due proc-
ess theory (judicial specific jurisdiction) as equivalent to the “sub-
stantial nexus” requirement of Commerce Clause theory546 (which, 
one might have said before Quill, was not a surprising thing for the 
North Dakota court to do). Due process concerns relate to the connec-
tion between the state and the person over which it wishes to exer-
cise jurisdiction, emphasizing “notice” and “fair warning” are key fac-
                                                                                                                  
 539. See id. at 215. The North Dakota court did not cite any authority for the proposi-
tion that what constitutes an unconstitutional burden when imposed on a poor man may 
be constitutionally imposed on a rich man. 
 540. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 316 (1992). 
 541. See id. at 305-06. 
 542. See id. (quoting International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 
340, 353 (1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)). This clear reference 
to Justice Rutledge’s opinion is significant because, as discussed below, it was his dissents 
that first enunciated the theoretical basis for the more flexible approach to taxation of in-
terstate activities. 
 543. See id. at 309-10. 
 544. See id. at 311. 
 545. See id.  
 546. See id. The Court dismissed the North Dakota court’s conclusion that Bellas Hess 
was outmoded by referring to post-Complete Auto cases that relied on Bellas Hess, specifi-
cally: Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989) (a decision particularly significant for 
taxing Internet-related activities); D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 33 (1988); 
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Com-
missioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); and National Geographic Soc’y v. California Bd. of 
Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 559 (1977). 
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tors. 547 In contrast, the Court stated, Commerce Clause nexus re-
quirements “are informed not so much by concerns about fairness for 
the individual defendant as by structural concerns about the effects 
of state regulation on the national economy.”548 
 The Court noted that none of the cases relied on by the North Da-
kota court involved persons with no physical presence in the state.549 
Further, the Court stated that while more recent theory favors a 
flexible, case-by-case approach, it does not categorically reject a 
“bright-line” rule under appropriate circumstances. 550 Instead of be-
ing “’a trap for the unwary,’” the Court characterized the Bellas Hess 
rule as furthering the ends of the Commerce Clause by delineating a 
“discrete realm” of interstate commerce that is free from use taxa-
tion.551 The Court admitted that if Bellas Hess had not existed, it 
might have reached a different decision, justifying the continued va-
lidity of Bellas Hess more on stare decisis than Commerce Clause 
theory.552 The bright-line test, the Court said, created a clear, firmly 
established boundary in an area of the law it characterized as a 
“’quagmire’” with much room for controversy, confusion, and litiga-
tion.553 In addition, consistent with the theory underlying stare de-
cisis,554 the Court noted that for twenty-five years there had been 
substantial reliance on the settled rule and that the dramatic growth 
of the mail-order business may have been due in part to the existence 
of that rule.555 Finally, the Court noted that clearly dividing due 
                                                                                                                  
 547. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 312. 
 548. Id. Despite the Court’s statement, however, it could be argued that Complete 
Auto ’s factors two and three directly address those structural concerns, and therefore, ad-
dressing them in the nexus (factor one) context is redundant. 
 549. See id. at 314.  
 550. See id. 
 551. Id. at 314-15. The quoted phrase should be taken in context, that is, state imposi-
tion of use -tax collection duties on out-of-state mail-order retailers. 
 552. Id. at 317-18.  
 553. See id. at 315. That statement could be a harbinger of other bright-line rules and 
a swing back toward the “formalistic” approach to state taxation of interstate commerce. At 
the least, it could be used to justify bright-line rules concerning Internet-mediated activi-
ties, with respect to which there are so many impenetrable swamps of legal theory and po-
litical rhetoric that they will be finally overcome only by rising above the swamp or drain-
ing it. 
 554. Three Justices who joined in part of the majority opinion specifically addressed 
stare decisis. They asserted that the inquiry into the reasons underlying Bellas Hess was 
unnecessary. See id. at 319-21 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment). 
Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined Justice Scalia. See id. These three believed that the 
Court should have merely reversed the North Dakota Supreme Court with a bare citation 
to Bellas Hess. Justice White’s solo dissent challenged the majority opinion almost across 
the board, specifically challenging the separation of Due Process and Commerce Clause 
nexus requirements, the validity of the majority’s position that interim decisions had con-
tinued Bellas Hess’s vitality, and the strength of the stare decisis argument. See id. at 322-
34 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 555. See id. at 316. Later, the Court states, “[T]he Bellas Hess rule has engendered 
substantial reliance and has become part of the basic framework of a sizeable industry.” Id. 
at 317. That essentially turns the North Dakota court’s position on its head; the expansion 
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process issues and Commerce Clause issues makes it clear that Con-
gress can adopt appropriate rules using its Commerce Clause power 
without running afoul of the Constitution’s due process limitations. 556 
 Quill establishes a protective harbor for a limited category of out-
of-state sellers (those “’whose only connection with customers in the 
[taxing] state is by common carrier or the United States mail’”),557 
but it does not precisely address related problems. As the Court 
noted, Quill did have title to some computer programs (and disks?) 
physically present in North Dakota.558 However, that was insufficient 
to create a “substantial nexus” because the Court had earlier (in Na-
tional Geographic) expressly rejected a “’slight presence’” as suffi-
cient for Commerce Clause purposes. 559 Thus, the distinction between 
“slight presence” and “substantial nexus” remained unanswered. 
Only mail-order sellers with no in-state physical presence are within 
the safe harbor; all others are apparently subject to some undefined 
“more flexible” analysis under which a “substantial nexus” is enough, 
but something more than the “slightest presence” is required. 
 Quill completed the slide toward applying judicial specific juris-
diction terms to regulatory issues. Perhaps more significantly, it did 
not rely on, or even mention, the line of tax collection-duty cases dis-
cussed earlier and relied on in Bellas Hess. Of equal significance is 
that the Court throughout its opinion referred to Quill as the tax-
payer. To say that Quill increased the depth and width of the state-
tax quagmire is a gross understatement. 
 Two related issues have been addressed following Quill: (1) what 
relationship between in-state persons and the out-of-state seller is 
sufficient to attribute an in-state presence to the seller (2) what takes 
in-state activities or things beyond “slightest presence” into “sub-
stantial nexus” territory. The cases in which these issues have been 
addressed reveal the depth of state tax officials’ desire to squeeze 
Quill into a safe harbor for nothing larger than a one-person inflat-
able raft. 
 There are two areas in which the relationship to in-state persons 
have been addressed. The first concerns related corporations. In SFA 
Folio Collections, Inc. v. Tracy,560 the Ohio Supreme Court held that 
                                                                                                                  
of the mail-order business becomes a justification for continuing the Bellas Hess rule, 
rather than an argument for abandoning it. 
 556. See id. at 318-19. Since Quill, Congress has taken up the Internet taxation issues 
with an eye toward creating a national solution. See infra discussion Part V. That effort 
should have been made less tentative by Quill, but due process questions remain relevant. 
 557. Id. at 315 n.8 (quoting Bellas Hess). 
 558. See id. at 315 n.8. 
 559. See id. 
 560. 652 N.E.2d 693 (Ohio 1995). SFA Folio is almost identical to Bloomingdale’s by 
Mail, Ltd. v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Revenue, 567 A.2d 773 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), which 
found that the presence of a sister corporation did not establish nexus with an out-of-state 
mail order seller, despite their coordinated marketing themes. 
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an in-state retailer’s presence did not establish Commerce Clause 
nexus over its sister corporation, a mail-order-selling corporation 
with no in-state property or agents.561 The Ohio Tax Commissioner 
argued that SFA Folio and Saks-Ohio were parts of a unitary retail 
merchandising operation and that, therefore, SFA Folio was required 
to collect use tax on mail-order sales to Ohio residents. 562 There was 
apparently some evidence that Saks-Ohio stores, as a matter of inde-
pendent policy, accepted “returns” of SFA Folio merchandise and dis-
tributed about 200 SFA catalogs per issue.563 The Ohio court held 
that SFA Folio and Saks-Ohio were separate legal entities under 
Ohio corporation law and could not be treated otherwise for its tax 
laws.564 The court noted that Saks-Ohio’s return policy and its catalog 
distribution might have created sufficient nexus for due process con-
cerns, but they were insufficient to satisfy Commerce Clause sub-
stantial nexus requirements. 565 
 A second relationship area addressed since Quill relates to con-
tacts between the out-of-state seller and less-than-professional state 
residents. A group of school “book club” cases (some of which predate 
Quill) involves two companies, Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc., and Troll 
Book Clubs, Inc.566 The companies’ operations are essentially identi-
cal. Packets containing book descriptions and order forms are sent to 
elementary school teachers.567 The teachers may, or may not, make 
that information available to their students.568 The students pur-
chase books and give their payments to the teacher.569 The teacher 
sends a consolidated order to the “book club” with payment.570 The 
                                                                                                                  
 561. See SFA Folio, 652 N.E.2d at 697.  
 562. See id. at 695-96. 
 563. See id. at 697. 
 564. See id. at 696-97. 
 565. See id. at 697. The court expressly rejected a “unitary business” argument to es-
tablish Commerce Clause nexus. See id. at 698. That theory, the court said, was a due 
process theory applied to a taxpayer with a proven in-state nexus to determine what po r-
tion of that taxpayer’s total income was taxable in the state. See id. (citing Allied-Signal 
Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 778 (1992)). The SFA Folio situation is clearly 
distinguishable from Reader’s Digest Ass’n v. Mahin, 255 N.E.2d 458 (Ill. 1970), upholding 
the imposition of a use-tax collection burden on a parent company where the in-state em-
ployees of a subsidiary solicited orders, on a contract basis, for the parent company’s prod-
ucts. See id. at 459. 
 566. Pledger v. Troll Book Clubs, Inc., 871 S.W.2d 389 (Ark. 1994) (post-Quill); Scho-
lastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 255 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Ct. App. 1989) (pre-
Quill); Appeal of Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc., 920 P.2d 947 (Kan. 1996) (post-Quill); Scho-
lastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 567 N.W.2d 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) 
(post-Quill). The description of facts in the text is accurate for both Troll Books and Scho-
lastic Books and is distilled from all four of the cited cases. 
 567. See Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 78. 
 568. See id. at 78-80 (indicating that the response rate to Scholastic’s mailings was 
14.6%, which may be better than the average mail-order catalog but does seem to indicate 
that the teachers were not under any compulsion to obtain orders from their students). 
 569. See id. at 78. 
 570. See id. 
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“book club” fills the orders by sending the books to the teacher, who 
distributes them to the students. 571 Teachers who submit orders re-
ceive “bonuses” that allow them to purchase books, or other items, 
which they can use however they choose.572 The cases arose in states 
where the selling company had no in-state physical presence (prop-
erty, employees, or professional agents) and all contacts with the 
state were through mail or common carrier. Perhaps it is not surpris-
ing that the results were mixed—two courts held that sufficient 
nexus existed to impose use-tax collection duties, and two courts held 
that no such nexus existed. 
 In Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization573 
(decided before Quill), the California Court of Appeal held that the 
company was required to collect and pay use taxes on books sold to 
California residents. 574 The primary issue, the court felt, was whether 
the teachers were the company’s agents. 575 Based on the facts, the 
court found that the teachers were the company’s agents, but it is not 
clear if that conclusion is based on a pre-sale implied contract or 
post-sale ratification.576 The court then analogized the situation to 
the facts in Scripto and held that the teachers were not legally dis-
tinguishable from the professional salespersons in Scripto.577 The 
court did not separately analyze the Due Process and Commerce 
Clause nexus issues. The decision appears to consider only due proc-
ess issues. 
 In the second case, Pledger v. Troll Book Clubs, Inc.578 (decided af-
ter Quill), the Arkansas Supreme Court also concentrated on the 
agency question.579 The court noted that an agency relationship nec-
essarily includes some degree of control by the principal.580 The fact 
that over eighty percent of the teachers receiving the company’s 
mailings did nothing, the court said, proved that no agency relation-
ship existed.581 The Arkansas court distinguished the prior California 
decision on two grounds: the California case was decided before Quill 
and thus did not consider the physical presence aspect dispositive, 
and Arkansas law did not allow “the relationship of agency to be im-
                                                                                                                  
 571. See id. at 79. 
 572. See id. 
 573. Id. 
 574. Id. at 81. 
 575. See id. 
 576. The court said that once the teachers started to act, they were acting under the 
company’s authority and that an agency relationship can be implied based on conduct and 
circumstances, as well as by ratification. See id. at 79-81. 
 577. See id. at 81. 
 578. 871 S.W.2d 389 (Ark. 1994). 
 579. Id. at 392. 
 580. See id. 
 581. See id. 
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plied retroactively by ratification.”582 Because the teachers were not 
the seller’s agents, the Arkansas court held that Quill required a 
holding that use-tax collection duties could not be imposed on the 
out-of-state seller.583 
 Subsequently, the Kansas Supreme Court held the teachers were 
the company’s agents,584 and the Michigan Court of Appeals held that 
they were not.585 In all the cases, only the Michigan court expressly 
and directly addressed Quill’s Commerce Clause nexus require-
ments. The Michigan court held that the teachers were not the com-
pany’s agents, and that Quill’s actual-in-state-presence requirement 
was not satisfied.586 It did not hold that if the teachers were agents, 
the company would be required to collect and remit use taxes. 
 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court examined another com-
mon sales technique involving nonprofessionals in House of Lloyd v. 
Pennsylvania.587 The out-of-state company established a marketing 
“hierarchy of district managers, supervisors, demonstrators, and 
hostesses.”588 Except for the hostesses, who sponsored small “parties” 
in their homes, the persons signed contracts with House of Lloyd and 
receive sample kits that contained products, apparently with a value 
between $150 and $300.589 House of Lloyd contended it was not re-
quired to pay use taxes on the sample kits and various “prizes” and 
“gifts.” House of Lloyd was apparently successful in its recruiting 
program, because the court noted that it had over 50,000 persons 
“dedicated to promoting and selling [its] products, to recruiting and 
training salespeople, and to securing a substantial flow of goods into 
the Commonwealth.”590  
                                                                                                                  
 582. Id. 
 583. See id. 
 584. The Kansas court initially indicated that it was “easy” under Kansas law to imply 
agency, then went on to prove that. The court concluded that “[b]y Scholastic’s accepting 
orders and payments and shipping merchandise to teachers for distribution to the student 
purchasers, the Kansas teachers are the implied agents of Scholastic.” Appeal of Scholastic 
Book Clubs, Inc., 920 P.2d 947, 956 (Kan. 1996). 
 585. The Michigan court said the teachers were more like parents who ordered books 
for their children from a mail-order catalog, and no one would contend the parents were 
the mail-order seller’s agents. See Scholastic Book Clubs, Inc. v. Department of Treasury, 
567 N.W.2d 692, 696 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). 
 586. See id. at 695-96. A directive from Michigan’s Treasury Department, Use Tax 
Nexus Standards, Mich. Rev. Admin. Bull. 1999-1 (Mich. Dep’t of Treas., May 12, 1999), 
Westlaw, MI TAX RAB 1999-1, discussed infra at Part III.D.2.b., could easily be read as 
inconsistent with this decision. Under the directive, almost anyone who does anything in 
the state that benefits an out-of-state seller creates a “sufficient” Commerce Clause nexus. 
See id. (“Jurisdictional Standard” discussion in part entitled “Law and Analysis”). 
 587. 694 A.2d 375 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997). 
 588. Id. at 376. 
 589. See id. 
 590. Id. at 376-77; see also John Swenson Granite, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 685 A.2d 
425, 429 (Me. 1996) (holding Quill ’s Commerce Clause nexus requirements were satisfied 
when a company, in four and one-half years, sold $4 million in products from New Hamp-
shire into Maine, carried 89% of the deliveries in its own trucks, and kept its vice-president 
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 This case reveals a marketing strategy that clearly lies outside 
the Quill safe harbor, even if it includes no in-state offices or physical 
facilities. The number of in-state persons who promoted House of 
Lloyd’s products places its marketing scheme in an entirely different 
universe than mail-order and school-book-club marketing.591 The 
“home party” marketing scheme purposefully establishes a long 
term, continuous, in-state team of marketers. Mail-order sellers only 
send out catalogs (or now, create Internet Web sites). It should also 
be noted that House of Lloyd did not concern collection of use taxes 
owed by Lloyd’s customers. 592 The use-tax obligation was triggered by 
Lloyd’s use (through its in-state agents) of personal property in the 
state for promotional purposes; property to which Lloyd retained title 
and control.593 The taxable event occurred while Lloyd owned and 
used the property, and therefore, Lloyd was the taxpayer, not merely 
an involuntary tax collector.594 
 The issue of what direct action takes an out-of-state seller into 
“substantial nexus” territory has also been addressed, but perhaps 
less rationally. In Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of New York,595 
the New York Court of Appeals held that Quill does not require the 
physical presence to be substantial, but only that it be “more than a 
‘slightest presence.’”596 The New York court examined the physical 
activities of two companies within New York.597 It concluded that 
those activities were more than a minimum and therefore the state 
could properly impose the burden of collecting state sales taxes. 598 
 With respect to one taxpayer, Orvis Company, Inc., the New York 
court inferred that there may have been an average of four visits per 
year to “as many as 19 wholesale customers.”599 Thus: 
                                                                                                                  
and a Maine-resident employee present in the state promoting new and repeat business). 
But see Laptops Etc. Corp. v. District of Columbia (In re Laptops Etc. Corp.), 164 B.R. 506 
(Bankr. Md. 1993) (noting that a substantial portion of sales from a Virginia retail store 
were made to Washington, D.C., residents, but the minimal personal presence of employ-
ees in Washington, D.C., for business purposes was insufficient to establish a sufficient 
Commerce Clause nexus). 
 591. Cf. Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1991) (same corporation 
found to be “doing business” in Texas for corporate franchise tax purposes, on similar 
facts). 
 592. See House of Lloyd, 694 A.2d at 377-78. 
 593. See id. 
 594. See id. 
 595. 654 N.E.2d 954 (N.Y. 1995). 
 596. Id. at 961. 
 597. See id. 
 598. See id. 
 599. Id. at 962. In reaching that conclusion, the court approved the Tax Tribunal’s, and 
the administrative law judge’s, decision to disregard testimonial affidavits (allowed by the 
tribunal’s rules) in favor of broad inferences from a letter from Orvis’ treasurer. That letter 
was in response to a preliminary inquiry by an informal New York sales tax auditor and 
was treated as an “admission against interest.” The court, after acknowledging that the 
Tribunal’s rules expressly allowed submission of affidavits in lieu of live testimony, com-
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[T]he foregoing evidence supported a reasonable inference by the 
Tax Appeals Tribunal that Orvis’ substantial wholesale business 
in this State was generally accomplished by means of its sales per-
sonnel’s direct solicitation of retailers through visits to their stores 
in New York, subject only to approval of all orders in Vermont.600 
To reach its decision, the New York court cumulated all of the as-
sumed activities of the wholesale division during the three-year audit 
period and concluded that those cumulated activities provided suffi-
cient nexus to require the operationally distinct mail-order division 
to collect use taxes from the beginning of the audit period.601 The 
court stated, “This sales activity in New York would presumptively 
suffice as a nexus to impose a use-tax collection responsibility.”602 
 The other taxpayer in the Orvis case, Vermont Information Proc-
essing, Inc. (VIP), sold computer software and hardware to New York 
beverage distributors. 603 The products were delivered to New York by 
common carrier or mail. However, over the three-year audit period, 
VIP employees went to New York on forty-one occasions to deal with 
“the more intractable problems” with its products. 604 Here, too, the 
court stated, as a factual matter, that it could be “reasonably in-
fer[red]” that VIP’s sale contracts obligated VIP to make charge-free 
visits to customers within sixty days of a sale.605 The court found that 
the employees’ in-state presence “enhanced sales and significantly 
contributed to VIP’s ability to establish and maintain a market . . . in 
New York.”606 Again, the court held the taxpayer responsible for New 
York use-tax collection from the beginning of the audit period.607 
                                                                                                                  
mented, “The fact is, on the crucial issue in this litigation, Orvis declined to expose its wit-
nesses to cross-examination by producing them at the hearing . . . .” Id. at 961. Thus, 
rather than 12 visits in three years, as indicated by the evidence, the court based its con-
clusion on an inference that there may have been an average of four visits per year to “as 
many as 19 wholesale customers.” Id. at 962. 
 Orvis’ affidavits indicated that its wholesale sales persons visited New York customers 
for the purpose of discussing shipping problems and to check displays. Even the letter on 
which the Tax Tribunal relied indicated that the persons making the in-state visits had no 
authority to take orders. See id. at 961. 
 600. Id. at 961. It is interesting to note that, just prior to the quoted statement, the 
court mentioned that the state auditor had found wholesale sales to “from 9 to 16” New 
York customers, but concluded (based on the “incredible” affidavits) that the sales persons 
had visited up to 19 customers. Id. Perhaps there was a misprint in the opinion. While one 
might expect such obvious antitaxpayer bias from a Tax Tribunal hearing officer, it is not 
the type of objective analysis one would expect from the highest court of a state. 
 601. See id. 
 602. Id. (emphasis added). 
 603. See id. at 955. 
 604. Id. at 962. VIP did not advertise in New York or do any direct mail solicitation. 
See id. at 966 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). 
 605. Id. at 962. 
 606. Id. 
 607. See id. 
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 The New York court’s legal analysis is on a level with its factual 
legerdemain. The decision spends a number of pages reviewing the 
“evolution” of U.S. Supreme Court “doctrine” concerning state taxa-
tion of interstate commerce.608 In support of its conclusion that after 
Bellas Hess it is easy (“not unduly exacting”) to find the required 
physical presence, the court relied on two cases, Standard Pressed 
Steel Co. v. Washington609 and Goldberg v. Sweet.610 The court found 
solace in Standard Pressed Steel because, in that case, the taxpayer’s 
in-state presence consisted of one engineer who worked out of his 
home and consulted with the taxpayer’s single in-state customer. 611 
What the court did not note was that dealing with the customer, Boe-
ing Aircraft Co., was a full-time job performed wholly within the 
state over a number of years and that the business and occupation 
tax involved was only on the in-state sales directly related to the engi-
neer’s services.612 The New York court also failed to mention that a 
group of company engineers visited Boeing for about three days every 
six weeks. 
 The court’s reference to Goldberg is even more curious. That case 
involved Illinois’ excise tax on interstate telephone calls. 613 The New 
York court characterized the decision as basing its findings of a suffi-
cient nexus on the fact that the tax was on calls terminating or origi-
nating in Illinois and billed to an Illinois address. 614 Immediately af-
ter that conclusion, the New York court correctly noted that neither 
the parties nor the U.S. Supreme Court questioned Illinois’ nexus to 
tax.615 The intended implication was that such a small thread (one 
end of a telephone call and a billing address) provided nexus. Such a 
reading of Goldberg is unwarranted. Neither the parties nor the 
courts questioned nexus between the state and taxpayers in that case 
because it was beyond question.616 A cursory examination of Goldberg 
                                                                                                                  
 608. See id. at 955-60. 
 609. 419 U.S. 560 (1975). 
 610. 488 U.S. 252 (1989). 
 611. See Orvis Co., 654 N.E.2d at 957. 
 612. See Standard Pressed Steel, 419 U.S. at 561-62. 
 613. See Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 254. 
 614. See Orvis Co., 654 N.E.2d at 957. The page cited by the New York court discusses 
apportionment, not nexus. See Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 263. 
 615. See Orvis Co., 654 N.E.2d at 957; cf. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 260. 
 616. The tax in Goldberg was only imposed on telephone calls that originated or ended 
in the state and were billed to in-state addresses. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262. The nexus be-
tween the event and the tax is obvious, the same that exists when sales tax is imposed on 
an in-state sale. The plaintiffs in Goldberg brought a class-action suit on behalf of all Illi-
nois persons who paid telephone bills. See id. at 257. The defendants, aside from the Direc-
tor of Illinois’s Department of Revenue, were all telephone companies (like GTE) on whom 
the collection obligation was imposed and who contracted with those bill-payers for long 
distance services. See id. The relevant nexus was not a mere telephone call and billing ad-
dress, it was the provision of long distance telephone services to thousands of state resi-
dents. Undoubtedly those service providers also had offices and employees within the 
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shows that the only question was whether the tax was properly ap-
portioned; to the extent that the relied-on portion of Goldberg men-
tioned nexus, the discussion was speculation about whether other 
states might have nexus to impose a similar tax.617 
 While the New York court did include abbreviated descriptions of 
prior U.S. Supreme Court sales and use tax cases,618 it consistently 
stressed the number of taxpayer agents that had contact within the 
taxing state, not the quality or nature of the in-state business activi-
ties carried on by those agents.619 By reducing the apparent require-
ments to a minimum-numbers game,620 the New York court was able 
to say that the numbers justified imposition of use-tax collection du-
ties under its assumed facts concerning Orvis and VIP. 
 Ultimately, the New York court treats Quill as establishing a 
positive bright-line test, that is, that any taxpayer who has more in-
state physical contact than Quill, regardless how fleeting, automati-
cally satisfies Commerce Clause nexus requirements. 621 The court 
concluded that “contemporary Commerce Clause analysis” does not 
require that the vendor’s in-state physical presence be substantia l. 
“Rather, it must be demonstrably more than a ‘slightest presence.’”622 
To make that determination, the court relied on numbers, not sub-
stance, which is not approved by Quill or any other Supreme Court 
decision. Saying that the New York court “missed the boat” in Orvis 
would be inaccurate—“missed the harbor” would be more precise. 
 One important issue that the court did not discuss in Orvis is 
when nexus was established. Whether there was sufficient nexus at 
the beginning of the audit period was never addressed. Since the 
duty to collect cannot arise until nexus exists, the court failed to ad-
dress a crucial question. Instead, it imposed the duty from the begin-
ning of the audit period, apparently assuming that the taxpayers had 
carried on similar in-state activities for some unstated time before 
the audit period. When the nexus is based on an accumulation of 
temporary visits, there must be some consideration of how many and 
what type of visits are sufficient; otherwise there is no real accumu-
lation and one temporary visit is sufficient (which is clearly not sup-
ported by any Supreme Court decision). Without evidence concerning 
                                                                                                                  
state, but that is not mentioned in the decision because nexus was not even a potential is-
sue. See id. at 257, 260. 
 617. See id. at 261-63. 
 618. See Orvis Co., 654 N.E.2d at 960. 
 619. See id. 
 620. See id. 
 621. See id. at 960-61. The court asserted that treating Quill otherwise (i.e., as only 
creating a safe harbor for mail-order sellers, which is what Quill actually does) would to-
tally undermine the Supreme Court’s primary justification for its holding. See id. 
 622. Id. at 960-61. 
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pre-audit-period activities (none were mentioned), a more clear ex-
ample of an ex post facto duty would be difficult to find. 
 Decisions like Orvis put out-of-state vendors in a very precarious 
position. If out-of-state vendors do not, from the very beginning, col-
lect use tax from all purchasers, there may come a time when a court 
renders a judgment requiring payment of the taxes they “should 
have” collected, plus penalties and interest. Out of self-preservation, 
vendors may start collecting taxes even if it is obvious that no Com-
merce Clause nexus exists. One supposes state tax collectors would 
applaud the result, that is, the collection and remission of use taxes 
by persons who could not constitutionally be required to do so, the 
ends justifying the means. Some state tax collectors have not been 
content with sitting back and waiting for court decisions to frighten 
vendors into volunteering collection services. Businesses that take 
state tax administrators’ pronouncements seriously will be forced to 
collect sales tax or use tax on all sales. 
 b.   State Tax Regulators.—Perhaps due to prior losses, 623 a Michi-
gan Department of Treasury directive reduces minimum Commerce 
Clause nexus to the point of nonexistence. Revenue Administrative 
Bulletin 1999-1624 (“RAB 1999-1”) asserts that if one person indirectly 
associated with an out-of-state seller is in the state for any part of 
one day, sufficient nexus exists for imposing use-tax collection duties 
on that seller for the next year.625 For “administrative convenience,” 
the Department declared that it would only engage in enforcement 
efforts if someone were in the state on two or more days during any 
twelve-month period.626 RAB 1999-1 states that there is sufficient 
Commerce Clause nexus for Michigan to impose use-tax collection ob-
ligations on a seller whenever the seller has an employee or any 
other type of associate “regularly and systematically present in 
                                                                                                                  
 623. See Magnetek Controls, Inc. v. Michigan, 562 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). 
In Magnetek, the Michigan Department of Treasury argued that regular trips to other 
states by marketing personnel, plus having independent contractor representatives in 
those states, was not sufficient to allow those states to impose taxes, thus the taxpayer 
owed more to Michigan. See id. at 221. The court relied heavily on Orvis to rule against the 
Department. See id. at 223-24 (citing Orvis Co., 654 N.E.2d at 954). Perhaps that loss 
prompted an internal review at the Department. See id. at 223. On the other hand, per-
haps the Department merely takes inconsistent positions, one for use taxes and the oppo-
site for “single business tax” solely due to the revenue effect. See id. at 223-24; see also 
Gear Research v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, Nos. 227850, 239890, 1997 WL 672609 
(Mich. Tax Tribunal July 15, 1997) (arguing that Quill requires some continuous physical 
presence (office, factory, store, etc.) before recognizing jurisdiction to tax). 
 624. Use Tax Nexus Standards, Mich. Rev. Admin. Bull. 1999-1 (Mich. Dep’t of Treas., 
May 12, 1999), Westlaw, MI TAX RAB 1999-1. 
 625. See id. (“Jurisdictional Standard” discussion in part entitled “Law and Analysis”). 
 626. Id. Sellers should be wary, however, because the RAB’s preamble states that it 
can be modified at any time. See id. Conclusion II of the RAB states that the directive (and 
any amendments, no doubt) will be applied retroactively to “all open years and for cases 
still open and on direct review.” Id. 
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Michigan conducting activities to establish or maintain the market 
for the out-of-state seller.”627 To that point, the position is not 
particularly remarkable. The language following that general 
statement, however, totally eviscerates the “regularly and 
systematically” language and stretches “establish or maintain” far 
beyond common understanding.628 The directive includes in the list of 
acts that “establish or maintain the market” anything that might 
result in direct or indirect contact with actual or potential customers. 
The list includes everything from soliciting sales to conducting 
training for potential customers, to dealing with deadbeat 
customers. 629  The Multistate Tax Commission (MTC)630 created a “Public Par-
ticipation Working Group” to draft guidelines on the constitutional 
nexus necessary for imposing use-tax collection burdens.631 The re-
sult, which appears to be complete deadlock, might have been used to 
predict the climate in Congress’ Advisory Commission on Electronic 
Commerce.632 In January 1998, the MTC released a draft set of 
“guidelines” (MTC State Draft) written by the state tax administra-
                                                                                                                  
 627. Id. (paragraph I(6) of “Conclusions”). It might reasonably be inferred that the 
“market” being established or maintained is in Michigan, though that is not required by 
the language used. 
 628. See id. 
 629. See id. (paragraph I(6)(a) of “Conclusions”). The relevant portion states: 
(a) Activities that establish or maintain the market for the out-of-state seller 
include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(1) Soliciting sales; 
(2) Making repairs or providing maintenance or se rvice to property sold or to 
be sold; 
(3) Collecting current or delinquent accounts, through assignment or other-
wise, related to sales of tangible personal property or services; 
(4) Delivering property sold to customers; 
(5) Installing or supervising installation at or after shipment or delivery; 
(6) Conducting training for employees, agents, representatives, independent 
contractors, brokers or others acting on the out-of-state seller’s behalf, or for 
customers or potential custo mers; 
(7) Providing customers any kind of technical assistance or service including, 
but not limited to, engineering assistance, design service, quality control, prod-
uct inspections, or similar services; 
(8) Investigating, handling, or otherwise assisting in resolving customer com-
plaints; 
(9) Providing consulting services; or 
(10)Soliciting, negotiating, or entering into franchising, licensing, or similar 
agreements. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 630. The Multistate Tax Commission is an organization created by interstate compact 
with a significant number of state-members. Its purpose is to promote uniformity in the 
administration of state taxes. See Multistate Tax Commission Home Page, at 
http://www.mtc.gov (visited Mar. 31, 2000). 
 631. See Public Participation Working Group Materials (updated Apr. 24, 1998), at 
http://www.mtc.gov/PPWGs/ppwglist.html. 
 632. See discussion infra p. 739. 
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tor portion of the group.633 The MTC State Draft’s authors would be 
obvious even if they were not expressly identified. The proposal con-
sists of a number of “guideline” statements, most followed by a num-
ber of examples. The following are among the things that the draft 
identifies as creating “Commerce Clause nexus:” 1) an employee who 
“telecommute[s]” to work (with permission for an indefinite period) 
establishes the out-of-state employer’s physical presence in the em-
ployee’s home state;634 2) owning real property in the state, as an in-
vestment and totally unrelated to business activities, establishes 
nexus in the state where the property is located;635 3) storing some of 
a business’ financial records at its auditor’s office establishes the 
business’ nexus with the state where the auditor’s office is located; 636 
4) delivering sold goods to another state by contract carrier, rather 
than common carrier, establishes nexus where the delivery is 
made;637 5) the existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship auto-
matically creates nexus for the other relationship member(s) in every 
state where one member has a physical presence, if there is even the 
slightest association between the two business activities;638 and 6) a 
business that “resells” telephone services using a prepaid phone card 
that is usable in other states due to arrangements made with service 
providers has nexus wherever a phone card purchaser actually uses 
the card.639 The examples here could be extended to include the ma-
                                                                                                                  
 633. MULTISTATE TAX COMMISSION, CONSTITUTIONAL NEXUS GUIDELINE FOR 
APPLICATION OF A STATE ’S SALES AND USE TAX TO AN OUT-OF-STATE BUSINESS (State Par-
ticipant Revised Participation Working Group Draft, Jan. 1998) [hereinafter MTC STATE 
DRAFT], http://www.mtc.gov/PPWGs/nexus/nexus24.pdf (visited Mar. 31, 2001). For a more 
extensive review of the MTC and its multi-year campaign against nexus requirements, see 
generally John C. Blase & John W. Westmorland, Quill Has Been Plucked! MTC States Are 
Slowly Eroding the Substantial Nexus Standard, 73 N.D. L. REV. 685 (1997) (discussing 
the March, 1997, draft). 
 634. MTC STATE DRAFT, supra note 633, para. II.C.1., at 7 (Example 6). 
 635. See id. para. II.C.2, at 7 (Example 2). One wonders if being a 1% member of an 
LLC that has 1% of its capital invested in property in a state would also satisfy the nexus 
requirements. Based on the general tenor of the draft, it is clear that state tax administra-
tors answer “yes.” See id. para. II.C.3, at 9 (Example 4). 
 636. See id. para. II.C.3, at 9 (Example 5). 
 637. See id. para. II.C.5, at 10 (Example 2). Why the state collectors feel there is any 
meaningful distinction between contract carriers and common carriers, under Quill or any 
other authority, is not stated. This example is, however, not atypical of the extent to which 
some state advocates willingly don intellectual blinders in their attempt to nullify Supreme 
Court decisions. 
 638. See id. para. II.C.5, at 9-11 (various examples). These examples are rather obvi-
ously contrary to state court decisions on the topic. See, e.g., SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. 
Bannon, 385 A.2d 666 (Conn. 1991); Bloomingdale’s by Mail v. Commonwealth, 591 A.2d 
1047 (Pa. 1991). The only possible justification for taking these positions is that the deci-
sions were not made by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, the decisions were based on 
fundamental principles of corporation law, which is essentially identical in all states, par-
ticularly with regard to the notion that corporations have separate legal existence regard-
less of the owners’ identities. 
 639. MTC STATE DRAFT, supra note 633, para. II.C.6, at 11 (Example 1). This example 
obviously totally ignores World-Wide Volkswagen. See generally World-Wide Volkswagen 
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jority of the examples used in the draft, many of which are equally 
absurd. 
 Of particular interest are two statements in the draft. Paragraph 
II.C.4 is “reserved for a possible discussion of physical presence 
based upon an out-of-state business’ relationship to intangible prop-
erty in the taxing state.”640 This statement is made more than once.641 
Apparently the logical impossibility of using intangible things to es-
tablish physical presence was not noticed, or was not considered 
relevant, by the drafters. Perhaps they also consider virtual reality 
real. The potential threat to use Web site locations as a basis for 
nexus is obvious. The second interesting statement makes that po-
tential even more obvious: Under paragraph II.C.6, Example 2 is “re-
served for a possible illustration of physical presence based upon the 
ownership, lease, use or maintenance of an establishment in the tax-
ing State that facilitates the conduct of a business through computer-
based telecommunications.”642 
 An “industry response” was prepared, providing individual com-
ments on each paragraph and example in the “state participant re-
vised” draft.643 The comments took issue with almost every “guide-
line” and example. One frequent comment was: “This example is of 
limited use because the conclusion reached is devoid of underlying 
analysis.”644 Most of the shortcomings of the state participant draft 
come under fire, frequently with citations to relevant court deci-
sions. 645  
 The industry response is not, however, totally meritorious. In 
more than one place, the industry response takes the position that 
Quill does not create a “safe harbor” but, instead, the Court intended 
to establish a “bright line” test that is independent of the situs of the 
sale or subsequent use.646 The comments do not say how one distin-
guishes between a “bright line test” and a “safe harbor” or how the 
seller’s or buyer’s physical location is irrelevant under Quill. 
                                                                                                                  
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). However, a state tax official might argue that 
World-Wide Volkswagen deals with due process and, therefore, does not prevent finding 
Commerce Clause nexus. 
 640. MTC STATE DRAFT, supra note 633, para. II.C.4, at 9. 
 641. See id. para. II.C.7, at 12. Paragraph II.C.7 implies that nexus will exist even if 
the relationship is indirect through a representative of the taxpayer who has some rela-
tionship with in -state intangible property. 
 642. Id. para. II.C.6, at 12 (Example 2). 
 643. See Industry Response to State Participant Revised Public Participation Working 
Group Draft of the Constitutional Nexus Guidelines (presented at full Public Participation 
Working Group meeting of Mar. 27, 1998) [hereinafter Industry Response], 
http://www.mtc.gov/PPWGs/Nexus/nexus25.PDF. 
 644. Id. passim. 
 645. See, e.g., id. at 12 (Industry Response to para. II.C.5 (Example 5)) (citing Bloom-
indales by Mail v. Commonwealth, 591 A.2d at 1047 (Pa. 1991); SFA Folio Collections, Inc. 
v. Bannon, 585 A.2d 666 (Conn. 1991)). 
 646. E.g., id. at 5 (Industry Response to para. II.B.3). 
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 One who reviews the MTC State draft and the Industry Response 
will find little hope for compromise. The draft does not appear to be 
an effort to reach workable or objective guidelines; instead it is a 
rather obvious effort to restrict the holding in Quill to the narrowest 
possible scope and to expand what is sufficient to Commerce Clause 
nexus to “relationships” so attenuated that the term loses all mean-
ing. Many of the “guidelines” and examples describe situations which 
go beyond even the most liberal interpretations of due process limita-
tions on judicial specific jurisdiction. 
3.   Politics As Usual 
 After Quill there has been significant political controversy con-
cerning taxes and the Internet. While the issues are not limited to 
mail-order sales matters, those have featured prominently in the 
publicity. Congress placed a moratorium on new state Internet-
focused taxes and appointed an Advisory Commission on Electronic 
Commerce to study the issues and report back to Congress. 647 The 
Commision’s activities have been characterized by dissenseion and 
political posturing rather than consensus making. Congress man-
dated that Commission membership be divided among state officials, 
federal officials, and industry representatives. Naturally, the Com-
missioners’ opinions are equally divided, and there seems to have 
been more hardening of positions than movement toward compro-
mise. The Commission did not produce any softening of attitudes or 
positions. A simple majority voted in favor of an industry-proposed 
recommendation, but a two-thirds majority is required to make the 
recommendations official. 648 Perhaps the only result of the Commis-
sion process was to demonstrate that (1) a rational compromise be-
tween the directly affected parties is impossible, and (2) the expendi-
ture of many tax dollars could prove, beyond doubt, what was only 
patently obvious before the process began. From any point of view 
that is even marginally objective, there can be no workable solution 
to taxing Internet-mediated sales (that is, requiring Internet sellers 
to collect state use taxes) unless something is done to simplify that 
task. Most of the more viable proposals submitted to the Commission 
do something along those lines. 
                                                                                                                  
 647. See Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. XI, 112 Stat. 2681, 2719-
21 (1998). 
 648. See John Schwartz, Internet Tax Commission Ends Meeting in Deadlock, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 22, 2000, at E1 [hereinafter Schwartz, Internet Tax ]; John Schwartz, Web Tax 
Panel Falls Short of Goal: After 18 Months, Commission Gives Issue Back, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 31, 2000, at E3. 
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 One such proposal was submitted by the National Governors As-
sociation, “Streamlining State Sales Tax System.”649 As envisioned by 
the proposal, the Association has created the Streamlined Sales Tax 
Project, 650 a pilot program by a few states that (a) makes uniform 
definitions, classifications, and administrative procedures, (b) limits 
the number of tax rates, and tax rate changes, within any state, and 
(c) establishes a “Certified Service Provider” system for collecting and 
paying use taxes.651 The “Certified Service Provider” would act as a 
collection and distribution point, and sellers who choose to partici-
pate would be able to limit their potential liability by complying with 
the procedures. 652 The system would be voluntary, both for states and 
for sellers, and does not require federal legislation. It specifically 
says that there would be no change in current nexus rules, which 
may be a rather empty statement because opinions about what those 
rules are remain divergent, to say the least. 
 Another proposal, submitted by the “Business Caucus,” has many 
of the same objectives, but it proposes federal legislation establishing 
the revised system. 653 Among the prominent features of the envi-
sioned federal legislation are (1) encouraging states to cooperate in 
creating a uniform state law that would fix uniform rates, limit rate 
changes, and provide uniform definitions, audits, and other stan-
dards; (2) establishing a detailed rule on when nexus exists for state 
taxation of business activities and use-tax collection duties; and (3) 
continuing or enacting federal moratoria on state tax changes pend-
ing completion of the new rules.654 One very interesting, and contro-
                                                                                                                  
 649. See Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce, Document Library, at 
http://www.ecommercecommission.org/library.htm (visited Mar. 31, 2001). 
 650. See Streamlined Sales Tax System for the 21st Century, at http://www.geocities. 
com/streamlined2000/Proposal.asp (visited Mar. 31, 2001). 
 651. See Streamlined Sales Tax Project, Executive Summary 2 (Mar. 1, 2001), 
http://208.237.129.206/sline/EXECSUM.pdf (visited Mar. 31, 2001). 
 652. See Streamlined Sales Tax Project, Pilot 2 (Mar. 8, 2001), http://208.237.129.206/ 
sline/pilotprojectoverview.pdf (visited Mar. 31, 2001); see also UNIFORM SALES AND USE 
TAX ADMINISTRATION ACT § 9, at 5 (Streamlined Sales Tax Project, as amended Jan. 24, 
2001). A similar “trusted third party” arrangement is one of the options being considered in 
Europe to address similar VAT-tax collection problems. See Working Party No. 1, Euro-
pean Comm’n, Harmonisation of Turnover Taxes 7 (June 8, 1999) (working paper) [herein-
after EC Working Paper], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/ 
publications/working_doc/taxation/ecommerceEN.pdf (visited Mar. 31, 2001). 
 653. See ACEC Business Caucus, A Proposal for Internet Tax Reform and Reduction, 
http://www.ecommercecommission.org/document/202BusinessCaususProposal.doc (last vis-
ited Nov. 6, 2000). The Business Caucus includes Charles Schwab Corp., America Online, 
Inc., MCI WorldCom Inc., AT&T Corp., Time Warner Inc., and Gateway Inc. See Curt 
Anderson, Associated Press, Internet Tax Ban Extension Urged (Feb. 9, 2000), 
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/htx/nm/20000209/bs/tax_internet_3.html (visited Feb. 13, 
2000); Reuters, New Internet Sales Tax Ideas Offered (Feb. 9, 2000), http://dailynews. 
yahoo.com/htx/nm/20000209/bs/tax_internet_1. html (visited Feb. 13, 2000). 
 654. This proposal envisions a significant federal involvement and implementing legis-
lation, both of which may be necessary. It is unrealistic to expect 50 states and all their 
subdivisions to agree to any single operational method or to voluntarily limit their own 
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versial part of this proposal would suspend state sales taxes on 
things like books, records, and videos, which are capable of digital 
distribution via the Internet. That certainly meets the rhetorical call 
for equal taxation of electronic and “traditional” sales (the mythical 
“level playing field”), but not quite in the manner state tax authori-
ties have in mind. This proposal received the endorsement of a ma-
jority of the Commission, but not the “supermajority” required to 
make the result “official.”655 
E.   Legislative or “Prescriptive” Jurisdiction 
 Prescriptive (that is, legislative or regulatory) jurisdiction is both 
similar to and different from judicial jurisdiction. Both refer to limi-
tations of legal authority; any attempt to act beyond those limits has 
no legal status. A judgment entered against a person over whom the 
court has no personal jurisdiction is of no greater legal significance 
than regulations adopted by the Ku Klux Klan to control mango har-
vesting in Central Mongolia, and vice versa. The same is true for 
laws adopted by a state legislature that control, in effect or inten-
tionally, activities of nonresidents beyond state borders. The princi-
ples of prescriptive jurisdiction are the “subject matter jurisdiction” 
rules for the legislative and executive branches of government. Of 
course, any attempt by the judicial branch to enforce void enactments 
is equally void. 
 The basic principles behind prescriptive jurisdiction are those of 
international law discussed in the introduction. They are a direct re-
sult of the absolute internal sovereignty of nations and States; the 
acts of one government cannot have legal force within the territorial 
jurisdiction of another government.656 No other result is possible 
unless the concept of sovereignty itself is changed or eliminated. 
 In the U.S. federal system, legal issues concerning federal pre-
scriptive (subject matter) jurisdiction are common. Legal issues con-
cerning state prescriptive jurisdiction are much less common. State 
legislators and executives are aware of their government’s geo-
graphic boundaries. However, there are situations in which other-
wise valid state enactments are invalid because of their impact on 
persons and events outside those boundaries. Given the habit of re-
lating restrictions on government actions to provisions in the Consti-
tution, most state prescriptive jurisdiction issues are treated as Due 
Process or Commerce Clause issues. 
                                                                                                                  
power to impose taxes. Of course, based on the political rhetoric to date, it will probably 
not be much easier for Congress to find a majority to support any single plan. 
 655. See Schwartz, Internet Tax, supra note 648. 
 656. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714, 722 (1877), overruled in part by  Shaffer 
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
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 One case that discussed prescriptive jurisdiction principles is 
Pennoyer v. Neff,657 the foundational case on state jurisdiction over 
nonresidents. Though its express decision has been substantially 
eroded by time, technology, and theory, the principles it enunciated 
are as valid today as they were a century ago. The Court there enun-
ciated “principles of public law” that apply to the States because of 
their fundamental independence: 
One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive ju-
risdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its 
territory. . . . The other principle . . . follows from the one men-
tioned; that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and 
authority over persons or property without its territory. The sev-
eral States are of equal dignity and authority, and the independ-
ence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it 
is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of 
one State have no operation outside of its territory . . . and that no 
tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that terri-
tory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions. 
“Any exertion of authority of this sort beyond this limit,” says 
Story, “is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or 
property in any other tribunals.”658 
Developments concerning judicial personal jurisdiction during the 
twentieth century appear to have significantly eroded Pennoyer’s 
strict territorial limitations on judicial jurisdiction,659 but those de-
velopments have not changed or expanded the fundamental princi-
ples on which Pennoyer was based. At most, the more recent cases 
have expanded what can be recognized as consent to jurisdiction660 
and what constitutes “acting in a state” for judicial jurisdiction pur-
poses. 661 
 More modern decisions rarely resort to these fundamental princi-
ples. Instead, reference is made to the Due Process Clause662 or the 
Commerce Clause.663 Decisions such as International Shoe and 
World-Wide Volkswagen hold that due process principles preclude 
the exercise of state judicial jurisdiction over persons or entities that 
have insufficient connection with the forum’s territorial jurisdic-
tion.664 The “principles” are those enunciated in Pennoyer. 
                                                                                                                  
 657. Id. 
 658. Id. at 722-23 (citations omitted). For application of the same principles in a state 
tax setting, see St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1870). 
 659. See, e.g., Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186. 
 660. See id. at 201-05. 
 661. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 662. See id. 
 663. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). 
 664. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
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 With respect to legislative action and Commerce Clause princi-
ples, the connection between modern cases and those fundamental 
principles is less direct and sometimes obscured because many 
Commerce Clause cases are founded on other principles, such as dis-
crimination. However, the connection remains. One of the purposes 
for delegating to Congress power to regulate commerce among the 
states was to eliminate the discriminatory and protectionist laws en-
acted by the states while the Articles of Confederation were in ef-
fect.665 The “dormant Commerce Clause” corollary to the delegation 
precludes states from actions that discriminate against, or unduly 
burden, interstate commerce. 
 One manner in which a State might discriminate against inter-
state commerce is by adopting rules that have the effect of regulating 
actions beyond the state’s borders. For example, Baldwin v. G.A.F. 
Seeling, Inc.,666 involved New York milk marketing regulations. To 
prevent the price-support provisions from being rendered ineffective 
by out-of-state competition, the regulations prohibited milk dealers 
from selling milk purchased out of state unless the price paid to the 
out-of-state producer was at least equal to in-state minimum 
prices. 667 Invalidating that rule, the Court stated: 
New York has no power to project its legislation into Vermont by 
regulating the price to be paid in that state for milk acquired 
there. So much is not disputed. New York is equally without power 
to prohibit the introduction within her territory of milk of whole-
some quality acquired in Vermont, whether at high prices or low 
ones. . . . 
 Such a power, if exerted, would set a barrier to traffic between 
one state and another as effective as if customs duties, equal to the 
price differential, had been laid on the thing transported.668 
The Court held that New York’s rules were invalid under the Com-
merce Clause.669 It could have just as easily held the rules nullities as 
being beyond the state’s prescriptive jurisdiction. 
 A similar result was reached in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,670 concern-
ing an Illinois statute regulating tender offers for corporate shares. 
The scope of the act was such that it would require compliance even 
though there were no Illinois residents that might have been af-
fected. The Court concluded: 
                                                                                                                  
 665. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 
Otto) 714, 720, 722–23 (1877); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). 
 666. 294 U.S. 511 (1935). 
 667. See id. at 519 n.1 (quoting the regulation). 
 668. Id. at 521. 
 669. See id. at 522. 
 670. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
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[T]he Illinois statute is a direct restraint on interstate commerce 
and . . . has a sweeping extraterritorial effect. Furthermore, if Illi-
nois may impose such regulations, so may other States; and inter-
state commerce in securities transactions . . . would be thoroughly 
stifled. . . . The Commerce Clause also precludes application of a 
state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the 
State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within 
the State. . . . “[A]ny attempt ‘directly’ to assert extraterritorial ju-
risdiction over persons or property would offend sister States and 
exceed the inherent limits of the State’s power.”671 
 In other cases, a number of state statutes intended to control in-
state prices of alcoholic beverages (to obtain the best prices for resi-
dents) have been struck down on Commerce Clause grounds because 
their practical effect was to control the prices at which distributors 
could sell their products in other states. 672 The Court summarized the 
interaction of the Commerce Clause and state regulations with extra-
territorial effect: 
First, the “Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a 
state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the 
State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within 
the State” . . . . Second, a statute that directly controls commerce 
occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the in-
herent limits of the enacting State’s authority and is invalid re-
gardless of whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was in-
tended by the legislature. . . . Third, the practical effect of the 
statute must be evaluated not only by considering the conse-
quences of the statute itself, but also by considering how the chal-
lenged statute may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes 
of other States and what effect would arise if not one, but many or 
every, State adopted similar legislation. Generally speaking, the 
Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent legislation arising 
from the projection of one state regulatory regime into the jurisdic-
tion [territory] of another State. . . . [N]o state may force an out-of-
state merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State before un-
dertaking a transaction in another.673 
Thus, the Court uses Commerce Clause language to enforce the lim-
iting rules inherent in state sovereignty, that is, prescriptive juris-
diction. 
 In cases presenting extraterritorial application of state tax rules, 
the Court has tended to use either the Due Process Clause or the 
Commerce Clause without following any particular pattern about 
                                                                                                                  
 671. Id. at 642-43 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1877)) (citations omit-
ted). 
 672. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. 
New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986). 
 673. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336-37 (citations omitted). 
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when which is used. The earlier gasoline tax and sales tax cases, dur-
ing the period when there was a bright line between interstate com-
merce and local commerce, frequently referred to the Commerce 
Clause because the parties usually contended that the tax was being 
imposed on interstate commerce.674 The bright line theory precisely 
limited state prescriptive jurisdiction to “local” commerce. For exam-
ple, the Silas Mason decision applied that bright line theory and held 
that the state use tax at issue was not invalid under the Commerce 
Clause, because (among other things) the tax could not become pay-
able until after the related goods had completed their interstate 
journey; in other words, the tax was on in-state use of property.675 
The company argued that despite the formal incidence, the use tax 
was really a sales tax on the out-of-state sale, but the Court was not 
swayed.676 The 1941 mail-order cases, Sears, Roebuck677 and Mont-
gomery Ward,678 applied the newer, more flexible approach to inter-
state commerce, but nevertheless sustained the imposition of tax col-
lection duties by reference to cases applying the bright line theory. 
 When the three companion sales and use tax cases679 were heard 
in 1944, the Court continued to apply the bright-line theory, invali-
dating the Arkansas sales tax because it was being applied to an “in-
terstate sale,” but approving the Iowa use tax because the tax did not 
apply until the property had come to rest in the state and was being 
enjoyed by the consumer.680 Justice Jackson’s General Trading dis-
sent, however, directly addressed the underlying problem of prescrip-
tive jurisdiction, arguing that the state did not have the power to im-
pose collection duties extraterritorially, because that would be be-
yond the State’s fundamental powers even if there were not relevant 
constitutional restrictions.681 
 When the Court made the effort in Quill to separate Due Process 
and Commerce Clause issues, the opinion was unenlightening. It ap-
plies gloss rather than principles and ignores Justice Frankfurter’s 
admonition quoted earlier. In the due process portion of Quill, the 
                                                                                                                  
 674. See, e.g., Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934); Pierce Oil Corp. v. 
Hopkins, 264 U.S. 137 (1924); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921); Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. Jones, 205 N.W. 72 (S.D. 1925). 
 675. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582-86 (1937). 
 676. See id. at 587-88. In Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939), the 
company argued that the California use-tax collection duties violated both due process and 
Commerce Clause rules, see id. at 66, and it lost both arguments, see id. at 68. The Court 
relied on cases applying the bright line rule. See id. at 66. 
 677. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941). 
 678. Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941). 
 679. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); General Trading Co. v. State 
Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Taxa-
tion, 322 U.S. 435 (1944). 
 680. Compare Dilworth, 322 U.S. at 330-32 (rejecting Arkansas sales tax), with Gen-
eral Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 338 (upholding Iowa use tax). 
 681. General Trading, 322 U.S. at 339-40 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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majority opinion implicitly assumes that the state has legislative ju-
risdiction to regulate and addresses judicial specific jurisdiction gloss 
instead of the true issue. In the Commerce Clause portion, the major-
ity opinion totally misses fundamentals, sliding around in Commerce 
Clause gloss before ultimately falling back on stare decisis. 
 The Court might have reached the same conclusion by simply re-
ferring to prescriptive jurisdiction limitations. State prescriptive ju-
risdiction does not extend to persons not doing business in the state. 
However, federal prescriptive jurisdiction is not affected by state 
boundaries. If the opinion had been written in prescriptive jurisdic-
tion terms, it would not have invited the tax officials’ manipulative 
interpretations discussed earlier. In Quill, prescriptive jurisdiction 
receives only a brief mention. In his three-Justice concurring opinion, 
Justice Scalia stated: 
I agree . . . that abandonment of Bellas Hess’ due process holding is 
compelled by reasoning “[c]omparable” to that contained in our 
post-1967 cases dealing with state jurisdiction to adjudicate. I do 
not understand this to mean that the due process standards for ad-
judicative jurisdiction and those for legislative (or prescriptive) 
jurisdiction are necessarily identical.682 
 The limitations of prescriptive jurisdiction are more frequently 
discussed in the Commerce Clause context. If a state regulation has 
an impact on persons and events not associated with the state, it is 
invalid.683 In Healy v. Beer Institute, the Court said: 
[A] statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly out-
side the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the 
enacting State’s authority and is invalid regardless of whether the 
statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended . . . . The critical in-
quiry is whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control 
conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.684 
 One of the more complete and well-reasoned decisions concerning 
state’s attempts at regulating Internet-mediated activities is Ameri-
can Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki.685 That case involved New York’s 
criminalization of child pornography. Despite the statute’s laudable 
intentions, after carefully exploring the nature of the Internet and its 
various components, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York concluded that the statute was invalid under the Com-
merce Clause because it reached far beyond the state’s boundaries 
                                                                                                                  
 682. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 319-20 (1992) (cita-
tions omitted) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 683. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Healy v. Beer Inst., 
491 U.S. 324 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 
573 (1986). 
 684. 491 U.S. at 336. 
 685. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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and it was impossible to limit the effects to conduct within New 
York.686 Of particular interest in the current context is the district 
court’s observation that Internet users are indifferent to the geo-
graphic location of the Web sites they visit and Web site owners have 
no control over the location from which their site is accessed.687 
 To apply prescriptive jurisdiction principles requires specificity 
concerning what the state is attempting to do and its effects outside 
the state’s boundaries. Sales-and-use-tax schemes as a whole are not 
at issue. Neither is the state’s authority to impose separate sales and 
use taxes on in-state activities. The only question is whether the 
state can impose use-tax collection duties on persons outside the 
state, relating to a transaction completed outside the state, simply 
because the related item eventually came into the state for initial use 
by a consumer. 
 A state can regulate activities, property, and events actually 
within the state.688 The out-of-state seller does not act within the 
                                                                                                                  
 686. See id. at 169, 177. 
 687. See id. at 170-171. The district court said: “An internet user who posts a Web page 
cannot prevent New Yorkers or Oklahomans or Iowans from accessing that page and will 
not even know from what state visitors to that site hail.” Id. at 171. 
 688. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS  § 402 (1986). Section 402 lists 
the circumstances in which a government can establish a binding rule: 
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to  
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its terri-
tory; 
 (b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its terri-
tory; 
 (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial 
effect within its territory; 
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well 
as within its territory; and 
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is di-
rected against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state 
interests. 
Id. § 402. Section 403(1) states that even if a nation-state might otherwise validly exercise 
prescriptive jurisdiction under § 402, it cannot exercise that jurisdiction with respect to 
nonresidents if that would be unreasonable. Section 403(2) provides: 
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is 
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate: 
 (a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, that is,, 
the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has sub-
stantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; 
 (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, 
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the ac-
tivity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is 
designed to protect; 
 (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regula-
tion to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such ac-
tivities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally 
accepted; 
 (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt 
by the regulation; 
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state, the transaction is completed outside the state, and the events 
that trigger the tax take place after the out-of-state seller’s participa-
tion ends.689 Treating the sale transaction as a discrete event, com-
pleted solely in the state where the sale occurs, is mandated by the 
way the concept of a “sale” has been consistently and continuously 
treated for sales tax purposes. Jefferson Lines is a good example. 690 
In that case, the Court reviewed the meaning of “sale” in the sales 
tax context. In that context the Court said: 
A sale of goods is most readily viewed as a discrete event facili-
tated by the laws and amenities of the place of sale, and the trans-
action itself does not readily reveal the extent to which completed 
or anticipated interstate activity affects the value on which a 
buyer is taxed. We have . . . held [sales] taxes properly measurable 
by the gross charge for the purchase, regardless of any activity 
outside the taxing jurisdiction that might have preceded the sale 
or might occur in the future. Such has been the rule even when the 
parties . . . specifically contemplated interstate movement of the 
goods either immediately before, or after, the transfer of owner-
ship.691 
 To say that the state where sold goods are delivered has jurisdic-
tion to regulate or tax an out-of-state sale based on the transaction is 
contrary to Jefferson Lines and the cases it cites and would effec-
tively destroy whatever level of functionality the sales-and-use-tax 
combination has. Jefferson Lines held that the sales tax did not have 
to be apportioned because of this characteristic of a “sale.”692 If the 
definition of “sale” is stretched to include all events up to the item 
coming to rest in the state where it will be used, both sales and use 
taxes will have to be apportioned to satisfy Complete Auto’s “fair ap-
portionment” requirement. Thus, the question reverts back to what 
the out-of-state seller did within the state. Judicial specific jurisdic-
tion rules are inappropriate. For those rules to apply, there must be 
some in-state event, resulting from the defendant’s voluntary act 
                                                                                                                  
 (e) the importance of the regulation to the inte rnational political, legal, or 
economic system; 
 (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of 
the international system; 
 (g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating 
the activity; and 
 (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. 
Id. § 403(2). 
 689. In D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988), the Court said that the 
old bright line rule between interstate movement and local situs was no longer relevant for 
Commerce Clause purposes. However, it is relevant to use taxes because that point is em-
ployed in use taxes to determine when a tax be comes due, which D.H. Holmes admits. In 
that case, there was no real question about nexus between the taxpayer and the state. 
 690. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995). 
 691. Id. at 186-87 (citations omitted). 
 692. Id. 
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that was in some way directed toward the state.693 Prescriptive juris-
diction rules, at least in the case of an out-of-state seller, require 
some connection with the state that is not dependent on the in-state 
event before the state can regulate the seller. 
 In some Internet-mediated sales, the seller may know the buyer’s 
geographic location and may even know there is a high probability 
that the sold item will be used there. But in many or most cases, the 
seller will not need or have reliable information, but still risks a tax 
auditor’s later, different conclusion. In economic and Internet-
operational terms, there is little to distinguish between states’ use-
tax collection statutes and the anti-pornography law discussed in 
Pataki: the state is attempting to regulate activities and persons out-
side its borders. There is one significant difference, however. New 
York’s law was intended to alleviate a significant social problem that 
could not be adequately addressed in a different manner. In contrast, 
use-tax collection statutes are intended to alleviate some of the ad-
ministrative burden of state tax departments that have a clear, and 
constitutionally unquestionable, method of adequately addressing by 
other means. In Commerce Clause “undue burdens” situations, the 
degree of permissible burden depends, in part, on the benefit to be 
gained.694 If an anti-child pornography statute “can’t get no sympa-
thy,” use-tax collection statutes should not get more. 
 Limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction, whether treated as a due 
process issue or a Commerce Clause issue, do not preclude regulating 
or taxing activities or events that have a significant connection with 
the enacting agency’s territory. The type of connection might vary, 
but one aspect is clear in all of the authorities: the regulated party 
must intentionally act with intent to have an effect in the enacting 
agency’s territory. What is equally clear is that use-tax collection 
statutes and state tax authorities’ assertions cast the net much 
wider. Even if tax authorities rarely take legal action to enforce their 
assertions, the threat and burden still exist. 695 
                                                                                                                  
 693. See supra Part III.B. 
 694. See Maine v. Taylor 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Line, Inc., 
359 U.S. 520, 526 (1959). 
 695. The Pataki case recognizes the burden imposed by the existence of a statute. A 
number of witnesses testified that they felt compelled to restrict their otherwise legal ac-
tions because of the possibility of being prosecuted under the New York statute. See 
American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 174–75 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The district 
court found the resulting “chilling” effect to be significant. Id. at 180. 
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IV.   DISCUSSION—A PATH THROUGH THIS WEB? 
A.   Context—Reality Check 
 The preceding materials demonstrate that what one might have 
predicted to be a simple problem has been transformed into some-
thing rather complex. Changes in economic patterns, legal theory 
thought patterns, political rhetoric, tax policy, and many other things 
(not to mention somewhat ad hoc court decisions) appear to have 
conspired. The result is not unlike the Internet—no central core, but 
a number of areas of concentration with many independent intercon-
nections. Removing one connection is little loss to the structure as a 
whole, just as it adds little. But perhaps appearance is not all reality; 
a little perspective might help. 
 Always seeking easy means of extracting funds, states (like other 
governments throughout history) tax retail sales, which produces a 
relatively constant, not-too-painful-to-taxpayers source of state reve-
nue.696 Paying a few cents each time a purchase is made is less trau-
matic than paying a much larger amount less often. Nothing is taken 
directly and obviously from the taxpayer’s paycheck, no complex 
forms need to be laboriously completed and filed, and very few tax-
payers would make the significant effort required to determine just 
how much sales tax she or he actually paid in a year. Sales taxes are 
relatively simple to administer: The retailers collect the tax, sending 
in the money frequently. Retailers also routinely keep accounting re-
cords so auditing is not a significant problem; if the retailer has not 
collected enough in tax, it is forced to pay the uncollected amount 
from its own funds. The retailer has, therefore, a strong incentive to 
collect the tax—it must either pay with others’ money or pay with its 
own. 
 A complication arose when some tax official noticed, or speculated, 
that consumers were (or might be) able to buy in an adjacent state 
with a lower (or no) sales tax, thereby obtaining the goods without 
enriching the state where they lived.697 That was represented as “un-
fair” to residents who could not (or did not) make out-of-state pur-
                                                                                                                  
 696. If one were cynical, one might speculate that there is less political risk in voting to 
raise a sales tax by one tenth of a percent than to vote to increase income tax rates. It may 
also be politically expedient to  dedicate any specific sales tax increase to a particular 
budget category with a clear public benefit (e.g., mass transit, school construction) which, 
incidentally of course, allows general revenue funds to be allocated to budget categories 
with less precise parameters. 
 697. With the adoption of local option and special district sales tax add-ons, the con-
sumer’s ability and incentive to adjust shopping patterns increased—it is usually not as far 
to the county or city line as to the state line. It would be interesting to see a study designed 
to determine if a new sales tax changed gross retail sales in border areas. If there is such a 
study it would provide a foundation for contemplating the impact of imposing tax collection 
duties on Internet sellers—a better foundation, certainly, than the highly speculative pre-
dictions featured in the political rhetoric. 
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chases; actually, it is probably more accurate to say that it was per-
ceived as unfair to the state budget. The “solution” was to impose an 
equal tax on state-resident consumers who purchased things for in-
state use without paying the state’s sales tax.698 Perhaps the credit 
for out-of-state sales taxes paid was added to preserve the appear-
ance of fairness. That solution created more problems. 
 Once a tax is imposed, it should be collected. It would be highly 
unrealistic to expect individuals to stop by the tax office to pay a few 
cents each time they purchased something in another state. Auditing 
all of the individuals in a state to determine if they owed use taxes 
would, obviously, be a losing proposition. The “solution” to the use-
tax collection problem was obvious—apply the same tax collection 
duties on all retail sellers as the sales tax imposes on in-state retail-
ers. For the most part, state tax authorities recognized the futility of 
trying to vigorously enforce use taxes, and not very much potential 
revenue went unpaid, because businesses paid the tax on their con-
sumption, only individuals did not get taxed on their consumption. 
As the number of states with sales taxes increased, this uncollected 
revenue became even smaller because of the credit for out-of-state 
taxes paid. Reasonably, there was not much interest in trying to col-
lect use taxes on purchase by individual consumers.699 But, at some 
point, tax authorities became aware of a possible way to collect some 
of those unpaid taxes. 
 Some creative marketing person had the idea of using the U.S. 
mail to sell things to persons who were not able to visit the seller’s 
store, and mail-order catalogs were born (actually before states had 
sales taxes). At least for some rural states, the goods shipped into the 
state by mail-order sellers became a measurable portion of consumer 
purchases.700 Obviously, large mail-order sellers were a much more 
lucrative target than local farmers, who were hard-pressed anyway, 
or the hardware store in the town just across the state line. Sales 
                                                                                                                  
 698. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583-86 (1937). One can only 
speculate about the thinking that went into initial use tax enactments. At least in retro-
spect, it seems that the originators could not have been so naive as to think that individual 
consumers would ever voluntarily pay, or be forced to pay, use taxes. However, commercial 
operations purchasing large and/or valuable items could reasonably be expected to pay the 
tax. This is particularly true in states that impose a personal property tax or an income 
tax, which includes all, or almost all, states. A personal property tax audit (or income tax 
audit) could easily include a use -tax audit by merely requiring the owner supply a pu r-
chase invoice for all property purchases or expenses. If those were the originators’ 
thoughts, the taxes that current state officials complain about “losing” have never been col-
lected (and therefore cannot be “lo st”) and were never seriously intended to be collected. 
 699. State sales or use taxes are regularly enforced against individual consumers with 
respect to motor vehicles and the like. State vehicle registration rules typically require 
proof of sales taxes paid. Without proof of prior payment, the sales or use tax must be col-
lected before the vehicle will be registered. 
 700. See Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 362 n.3 (1941) (noting that 
Iowa mail-order sales exceeded in-store sales some years). 
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volume, and records of where goods were sent, made mail-order sell-
ers a feasible target for use-tax collection efforts. Thus states were 
willing to incur the costs necessary to take their efforts to, and 
through, the courts. 
 Taking on the biggest mail-order sellers, the states lost in 1941 
because of some pesky legal theories concerning much less important 
things— jurisdiction, due process, and the Commerce Clause.701 From 
that time forward, states have been trying to find routes around, or 
shrink the scope of, those restrictions. Changes in due process theory 
probably encouraged tax officials. After more than forty-five years of 
effort, it looked like they had finally succeeded when the North Da-
kota Supreme Court held that out-of-state Quill was required to re-
mit use taxes on its mail-order sales shipped to North Dakota ad-
dresses. 702 But, hopes were dashed when the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the North Dakota court made a mistake.703 On the positive 
side (for the tax collectors), the Court said that due process did not 
preclude enforcement against Quill, but the states lost because the 
dormant Commerce Clause still precludes forcing mail-order sellers 
to collect use taxes. 704 
 Despite how it may sound at times, all the noise is about a small 
segment of taxable retail sales: 
 
SALE TYPE 
SALES OR 
USE TAX 
PAID?* 
Individual, in person, home state Always 
Individual, in person, not home state Always 
Commercial consumers Always 
Individual by phone, etc., in-state seller Always 
Individual by phone, etc., out-of-state seller Sometimes 
 *Assumes that all states have sales tax 
Personal experience demonstrates how small the uncollected part is. 
                                                                                                                  
 701. See Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941); Sears, 312 U.S. at 
359.  
 702. State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991), rev’d, 504 U.S. 
298 (1992). 
 703. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1992).  
 704. See id. 
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B.   Post-Quill State Administrative Activities 
 Like most court decisions, Quill does not achieve total clarity on 
all points. However, it does support some relatively certain conclu-
sions. The first is that something more is required to satisfy “Com-
merce Clause tax nexus” than is required to satisfy due process 
nexus.705 If that were not true, separate analysis would be unneces-
sary. The first question is whether due process requirements are sat-
isfied. If they are not, there is no need to inquire into Commerce 
Clause questions. However, if due process nexus is established, then 
there is the additional question of whether Commerce Clause nexus 
is established. State response to Quill (no doubt exacerbated by exu-
berant predictions of e-commerce growth) was to take the assault on 
constitutional restrictions to a new level. The Michigan Department 
of Treasury’s efforts, discussed in Part III.D.2 above, are not atypi-
cal.706 
 The “Law and Analysis” section of RAB 1999-1707 consistently in-
terprets Quill in surprising ways. For example, it states, “The U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that mailing catalogs into the state consti-
tutes economic presence.”708 The referenced portion of Quill indicates 
that due process nexus exists when “a mail-order house . . . is en-
gaged in continuous and widespread solicitation of business within a 
State,” even if that solicitation is accomplished by a “deluge of cata-
logs rather than a phalanx of drummers.”709 The distance between 
the Court’s actual language (“deluge of catalogs”) and the Depart-
ment’s interpretation (simply “mailing”) is amazing. The Court’s 
nexus discussion relates to the quality and nature of contact: the 
point was merely that mailing can be qualitatively sufficient con-
tact—assuming it is also sufficiently extensive. RAB 1999-1’s lan-
guage suggests that nexus is satisfied by any quantity greater than 
one, without regard to quality or nature. 
 An even more obvious misconstruction is supplied with respect to 
Quill ’s “bright-line.” RAB 1999-1 states, “Under the bright-line stan-
dard of Quill any physical presence in the state[,] such as an em-
ployee present for one day[,] constitutes substantial nexus.”710 There 
                                                                                                                  
 705. Id. at 313 n.7. The Court noted: “Although such comments [as in Trinova Corp. v. 
Michigan, 498 U.S. 358, 373 (1991)] might suggest that every tax that passes contempo-
rary Commerce Clause analysis is also valid under the Due Process Clause, it does not fol-
low that the converse is as well true: A tax may be consistent with due process and yet un-
duly burden interstate commerce.” Id. 
 706. See Use Tax Nexus Standards, Mich. Rev. Admin. Bull. 1999-1 (Mich. Dep’t of 
Treas., May 12, 1999), Westlaw, MI TAX RAB 1999-1. 
 707. Id. 
 708. Id. 
 709. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308. Using Quill’s due process discussion to justify a Commerce 
Clause position is clearly contrary to Quill. 
 710. Mich. Rev. Admin. Bull. 1999-1. 
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is no citation supporting that statement. If nothing else, its accuracy 
is belied by the fact that in Quill, there was property of the seller 
within the state, which is some physical presence, but which the 
Court held was insufficient to establish nexus. 
 Similarly, RAB 1999-1 states that Quill overruled Miller Bros. v. 
Maryland711 to the extent that Miller Bros. held that the in-state 
presence of an out-of-state seller’s trucks was insufficient to create 
commerce clause nexus.712 It then goes on to state that “Miller Bros. 
is no longer good law.”713 Neither of those statements is correct. In its 
specific discussion of due process nexus (not Commerce Clause 
nexus), the Quill decision starts with a quotation from Miller Bros., 714 
hardly what one would expect for a decision “overruled” in the quot-
ing decision. The Quill decision does partially overrule some prior 
due process nexus decisions: “Thus, to the extent that our decisions 
have indicated that the Due Process Clause requires physical pres-
ence in a State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we over-
rule those holdings . . . .”715 Since in Miller Bros. the out-of-state 
seller did have some physical presence in the state, and the Court 
held that there was still not sufficient Commerce Clause nexus, RAB 
1999-1 misstates both Miller Bros. and Quill’s effect on it. It simi-
larly mischaracterizes other Supreme Court decisions in its efforts to 
justify its conclusions. 716 
 Quill does not say that due process nexus requirements need not 
be met if Commerce Clause nexus requirements are met. It is rea-
sonable to infer from RAB. 1999-1 that the Michigan Department of 
Treasury thinks otherwise. One can easily propose any number of 
scenarios that would satisfy RAB 1999-1’s Commerce Clause nexus 
conditions but would not come close to satisfying due process re-
quirements. 717 Just one example should suffice: 
                                                                                                                  
 711. 347 U.S. 340 (1954). 
 712. Mich. Rev. Admin. Bull. 1999-1 (sixth unnumbered paragraph of the “Jurisdic-
tional Standard” discussion). 
 713. Id. 
 714. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 306 (“The Due Process Clause ‘requires some definite link, 
some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property, or transaction it 
seeks to tax’ . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 715. Id. at 308. 
 716. For example, RAB 1999-1, in unnumbered paragraph 8 of the section entitled 
“Law and Analysis,” discusses Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960), which Quill 
characterized as the “furthest extension of that power” to impose use tax collection duties.” 
Quill, 504 U.S. at 306. Scripto involved the multi-year, continuous, in-state activities of a 
number of nonexclusive sales representatives. See Scripto, 362 U.S. at 207. RAB 1999-1 
characterizes the Scripto salespersons as “part-time,” periodic, and cyclical, which is fa-
cially inaccurate. The difference between 10 sales persons who are continuously active in a 
state over a number of years (Scripto) is orders of magnitude different from one, indirect 
associate handling a minor matter within the state on two minor occasions within any 12-
month period. See RAB 1999-1. 
 717. Such a question could arise only because of the obvious misinterpretation of Quill. 
Since, per Quill, Commerce Clause nexus requirement are more demanding than due proc-
2001]  PREYING ON THE WEB 755 
 
Alfa Corp. sold (across the counter in its single Ohio retail store) a 
$100 cell phone to Jethro, an individual living at the time of sale in 
Ohio. (The store collected and submitted Ohio sales tax). Jethro 
moves to Michigan, closing the Ohio bank account on which the 
payment check was drawn. Jethro’s check is returned unpaid. Alfa 
Corp. eventually assigns the check to Weedunum Collection 
Agency. Weedunum’s account manager travels round-trip between 
Cleveland and Kansas City on personal business, both directions 
changing airplanes at Detroit [Michigan] Metro Airport. Both 
times in Detroit Metro, while waiting for her flights, the account 
manager telephones Jethro and leaves a message on his answering 
machine, threatening legal action in Ohio if the check is not made 
good. 
According to RAB 1999-1, Alfa Corp. would be required to register as 
a use-tax-collecting retailer and collect and submit use taxes on all 
sales to Michigan residents for twelve months, starting on the day of 
the second telephone call. It should be obvious that the collection 
agent’s two unsuccessful telephone calls are not sufficient contact for 
due process purposes. (Or what Quill actually holds for that matter.) 
 Despite its extreme position, the Michigan Department of Treas-
ury is not the most radical state tax advocate. The state participants 
in the Multistate Tax Commission (MTC) nexus guideline project 
probably lead the pack when it comes to stretching legal logic.718 The 
MTC is an organization of state tax officials from the majority of U.S. 
States. Its purpose is to promote uniformity in state taxation.719 That 
does not prevent it from being an advocatory body. 
 Quill ’s “bright-line” test is negative, not positive as wished by 
state tax authorities and Orvis. The Supreme Court did not say “suf-
ficient Commerce Clause nexus is established by any physical contact 
with a state, direct or indirect, between property or associates of an 
out-of-state seller unless the contact is solely and exclusively via mail 
and common carrier.” The Court did say that regardless of the extent 
to which an out-of-state seller has directed its activities toward a 
state, there is not sufficient Commerce Clause nexus if that seller’s 
only physical contacts with the state’s use-tax payers are via mail or 
common carrier. Quill only creates a safe harbor for some mail-order 
                                                                                                                  
ess nexus requirements, if the former is satisfied, the latter would also be satisfied. The 
fact that RAB 1999-1 finds Commerce Clause nexus in situations that would not satisfy 
due process requirements proves its misinterpretation. 
 718. See supra text accompanying notes 630-646. The draft even goes beyond the line 
in some instances, probably on the rationale that the court decisions which the proposals 
ignore are only state court decisions that are not mandatory precedent for all states. See, 
e.g., SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon, 585 A.2d 666 (Conn. 1991). 
 719. See Multistate Tax Commission Home Page, at http://www.mts.org. 
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vendors. It adds very little, if anything, to understanding which other 
vendors may or may not have Commerce Clause nexus.720 
C.   Post-Quill Politics 
 Quill probably would have been only one more in a series of minor 
state losses if the Internet had not sprung into existence about the 
same time. Tax officials correctly noted that there is no legally sig-
nificant difference between an out-of-state seller who receives an or-
der by old-fashioned mail and one who receives an order by e-mail or 
webpage form. Responding to that, and to hype about the expansion 
and power of commerce via the Internet, state tax officials turned to 
propaganda and politics. (The Supreme Court provided advance en-
couragement in Quill.) Use-tax collection moved from a nagging 
problem, albeit minor and obscure, to a near-center-stage political 
performance cum brouhaha.721 
 Both in general and before Congress and its Electronic Commerce 
Advisory Commission, state and local government officials have 
loudly and repeatedly contended that any restriction on states’ abil-
ity to collect use taxes on Internet-mediated sales will have a disas-
trous impact. 722 If one mistakes the rhetoric for fact, one would be-
lieve that the federal government will soon totally control state 
budgets, and in a few years the states will be bankrupt, many of 
their schools and other educational programs closed, public transpor-
tation crippled, and other basic services stopped or severely re-
stricted. Not only that, but most physical-reality-based retail busi-
nesses would be bankrupt—“brick and mortar” “home town” business 
will be a thing of the past. In their enthusiasm, state officials seem to 
have forgotten that the “home town business” they imply will disap-
pear has already mostly disappeared; they have become Wal-Marts, 
                                                                                                                  
 720. This safe harbor aspect has been recognized by at least one state court. In Florida 
Dep’t of Revenue v. Share Int’l, Inc., 667 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), aff’d, 676 So. 2d 
1362 (Fla. 1996) (adopting appellate court opinion), the state contended that Quill estab-
lished a bright-line which, when crossed, automatically established Commerce Clause 
nexus. The court rejected that argument: 
If the “bright line” is crossed and the out-of-state vendor no longer falls within 
the safe harbor, it must then be determined whether the vendor’s activities 
within the state establish a substantial nexus with the taxing state such that 
imposing the duty to collect and remit . . . does not violate the Commerce 
Clause. 
Id. at 230. The court held that sponsoring a yearly three-day seminar, for persons from all 
over the United States at which products were sold, did not establish sufficient presence to 
allow imposition of tax collection duties with respect to orders delivered by mail and com-
mon carrier. Id. 
 721. One might be tempted to  call it a “debate,” but that word implies some degree of 
reason is utilized, which seems to be a rare occurrence. 
 722. Rather than include extensive notes concerning the rhetoric, which would be mar-
ginally appropriate for an academic discussion, samples and comments (with citations) are 
included in Appendix B. 
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K-Marts, and shopping malls full of franchise stores, all of which are 
busy creating and promoting their own Internet Web sites (and col-
lecting sales taxes). If one recalls that states can and do collect sales 
taxes from mail-order sales made by companies that have stores or 
distribution facilities in the buyers’ state, it is easy to see why states 
use the “Main Street Business” “spin.” It evokes the image of small 
rural towns with historical brick-front buildings with stores that 
have been operated by generations of the town’s outstanding citizens. 
In addition, those officials conveniently overlook the fact that with an 
Internet Web site, a small “home town” business can compete on al-
most even terms with international marketers, unless tax collection 
costs increase Web site costs beyond the smaller businesses’ budgets. 
 A significant portion of the “factual” basis for the hype and doom-
saying comes from predictions about the growth of the Internet and 
Internet-mediated sales. Since the Internet is a new thing, both un-
predicted and unpredictable, those “facts” must be carefully exam-
ined, particularly because a superficial examination shows most of 
them to be based on assumptions (some stated) and equally specula-
tive predictions of others. Many of the relied-upon predicted “facts” 
are published by persons or groups having a financial interest in the 
directions predicted.723 
 Perhaps the most disturbing thing is that state officials seem to 
believe their own rhetoric, or are intentionally misleading by omis-
sion, or both. The rhetoric constantly and vociferously decries “lost” 
tax revenues, claiming amounts that are unimaginably huge for the 
average person, that is, tens or hundreds of billions of dollars. They 
always omit at least two very important facts. 
 The first is that the tax revenues “lost” have never before been col-
lected, despite the fact that they have been, are, and will remain le-
gally due and collectable from state residents. There is a significant 
difference between losing something and not gaining something one 
never had before. The states’ claims are not different from those of a 
person who never studied for the bar exam and then complains that 
he “lost” $5 million because he failed the exam. 
 The second omission is that the “spin” never provides any context 
for the stated amounts. Despite the apparently huge amounts in-
volved, the proportion of sales and use tax revenues potentially un-
collected is minuscule. One report filed with the Advisory Commis-
sion on Electronic Commerce points out that the Internet-mediated 
sales (and thus potential tax revenues) are 0.2% to 0.3% of total 
business-to-consumer sales. 724 
                                                                                                                  
 723. See Appendix B. 
 724. AARON LUKAS, CATO INST., TAX BYTES: A PRIMER ON THE TAXATION OF 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE n.17 (draft version), http://www.ecommercecommission.org/ 
library.htm. 
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 Concerning mail-order retailers and use taxes, there is a strain of 
argument, sporadic but persistent, with an alluring “logic” that could 
be very dangerous. The argument is, in one disguise or another, that 
a particular target is so economically successful that imposing a tax 
collection duty on it would not be a significant burden. It has superfi-
cial appeal because the question, after all, is whether the state action 
places an “undue burden” on interstate commerce. The word “bur-
den” invites matching load against ability. What may be a great bur-
den for the average ten-year-old would be nothing for the average 
twenty-five-year-old body builder. That argument is inherent in the 
National Bellas Hess dissent, which starts by noting that the seller 
was a “large retail establishment” with $60 million in net sales in 
1961 and over $2 million in Illinois sales during a fifteen-month pe-
riod.725 The dollar volume of business that will be exempted by the 
National Bellas Hess decision runs through the dissent.  
 A similar strain runs through the North Dakota Supreme Court’s 
initial decision in Quill.726 It emphasizes not only Quill’s success, but 
also the success of the mail-order business in general. Success may 
be somewhat relevant for due process considerations, as evidence of 
the defendant’s purposeful direction of activities toward a state. 
However, the interstate business’ financial standing is not generally 
relevant to Commerce Clause issues. The Court’s Commerce Clause 
decisions require a comparison between the financial or other burden 
placed on interstate commerce, as compared to the burden on intra-
state commerce. Economic strength is not a factor on either side. 
 If economic success were a factor in Commerce Clause analysis, 
what measure should be used? Gross income? Net income (before or 
after taxes)? Total assets? Return on investment? Ratio of gross sales 
to net income? Would the cost of compliance (however estimated) be 
compared to income (however calculated) and a percentage fixed at 
which a burden becomes “undue”? The difficulties that would be cre-
ated by such an approach are obvious.  
 However, that is indirectly what the North Dakota court did in 
Quill. Had the North Dakota court’s decision been affirmed, it may 
not have been a substantial blow to Quill’s financial strength. But 
that minor legal theory known as “precedent” would take over and an 
untold number of other companies might have been dealt disabling 
financial blows. The Internet is touted as a means through which one 
can go into a global business with very little capital—where the little 
guy can compete on even terms with the big guy. That would no 
longer be true if every Internet Web site seller had to be prepared to 
                                                                                                                  
 725. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 760-61 
(1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
 726. State ex rel. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991), rev’d, 504 U.S. 
298 (1992). 
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collect taxes for every consumption-taxing jurisdiction or face finan-
cial disaster when it became successful enough for some tax auditor 
to take notice, and a court, à la Orvis, to impose ex post facto collec-
tion obligations. 
 In the political debate, some proposals have been made (supported 
by some state officials) that actually address the problem. A signifi-
cant factor in Supreme Court decisions concerning use-tax collection, 
especially National Bellas Hess and Quill, is the heavy burden on in-
terstate businesses, as compared to the burden on in-state busi-
nesses, if they were required to collect use taxes on all sales. The 
burden comes solely from the astonishing complexity, number, and 
variety of state sales and use tax laws. 727 It is not rational to expect a 
retailer with less than $100s of millions in sales to be able to afford 
the personnel and computing power necessary to keep up with the 
thousands of tax rates, rules, and reports that nationwide collection 
duties would presently require.  
 It has been proposed that states embark on simplification, re-
stricting the number of sales tax rates per state and the number of 
rate and rule changes per year, and establishing a national collection 
service that will calculate and remit taxes to states.728 Such proposals 
have been attacked by other state officials, 729 some asserting that 
uniformity would somehow impinge on state sovereignty, which, 
ironically, is the cause of the jurisdictional restrictions against which 
they are struggling. 
 Of course, the Supreme Court has not done much to resolve issues 
relating to state use taxes. Changes in the application of due process 
and dormant Commerce Clause theories over the past sixty years 
have, in general, made application more uncertain raher than less. 
D.   State Jurisdiction and Extraterritorial Acts 
 In due process cases, 730 the Court has recognized that technologi-
cal, political, and social changes since the Constitution was written 
(or even during the past century) require some flexibility in inter-
preting the Constitution. It may seem illogical to apply rigid, geo-
graphically prescribed limits on state jurisdiction at a time when 
persons travel across and throughout the nation in a matter of hours 
and routinely take actions (via electronics or otherwise) that have 
                                                                                                                  
 727. See generally II HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 56. In Missouri alone, 
there was, in 1994, over 1000 sales-taxing jurisdictions, each of which could have a unique 
tax rate. See Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 644 (1994). 
 728. ACEC Business Caucus, A Proposal for Internet Tax Reform and Reduction, at 
http://www.ecommercecommission.org/library.htm; National Governors Ass’n, Streamlined 
Sales Tax System for the 21st Century, at http://www.ecommercecommission.org/proposal. 
htm. 
 729. See Appendix B. 
 730. See supra Part III.  
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some connection with a remote state or country. However, the federal 
system embodied in the Constitution and the theory behind that (not 
to mention international law principles) require that political 
boundaries be recognized. Contemporary theories of government pre-
vent states from exercising governmental powers beyond their 
boundaries, notwithstanding wishes of government officials.  
 That is not detrimental to a state’s individual interests. Territo-
rial limits on a state’s ability to impose its will equally protect all 
states from actions of other states. The reciprocity that makes the in-
ternational system work also operates on the interstate level. The is-
sues in Quill, and the current political posturing, involve much more 
than a minute portion of state tax revenues. They involve the fun-
damental rules that circumscribe the exercise of all government pow-
ers, not just the power to tax. 
 Because fundamental principles are involved, it is mandatory that 
the questions be precisely focused. Thus, getting past the rhetoric re-
quires clarity concerning what the discussion really is, and is not, 
about: 
It is not about: 
  A. State sales taxes. 
  B. If, when, or from whom, use taxes are due and payable. 
It is about: 
  A. State officials’ attempt to shift the burden of use-tax collec-
tion from their own shoulders to the shoulders of out-of-state sell-
ers, from whom no tax is due. 
  B. Long-standing constitutional limitations (1) on government 
efforts to impose burdens on (take property from) persons beyond 
the government’s geographic boundaries, and (2) on state govern-
ment actions that unreasonably impinge on the national economy. 
 The fact that the Supreme Court has not consistently or clearly 
articulated the jurisdictional theory to be applied has led directly to 
the current political row. The clear trend over the past half-century 
has been toward further attenuating the connection required to sat-
isfy due process requirements in judicial specific jurisdiction cases. 
Court opinions do not clearly discourage applying the same rules in 
tax cases. The Quill majority opinion does just that, though it is not 
obvious that was an intentional choice.731 On their surface, use-tax 
                                                                                                                  
 731. Quill also consistently identifies Quill as the taxpayer, which it is not. Quill Corp. 
v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, passim (1992). If the Court’s usage indi-
cates a conscious decision to look at some “economic reality,” rather than continuing the 
formality applied to sales and use taxes from the beginning, it should say so. Silas Mason 
expressly declined to treat the use tax as a sales tax on an out-of-state seller. Henneford v. 
Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937). If the Court has changed its point of view, Silas Ma-
son should be overruled, or at least disavowed. 
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collection actions appear to present specific judicial jurisdiction prob-
lems, that is, whether a sufficient connection between the defendant 
and the subject matter of the legal action exists, or more specifically, 
whether the defendant is connected with the nonpayment of tax. But 
if one looks beyond surface appearances and casual language, the ac-
tual issue is whether the state has prescriptive jurisdiction, which is 
a very different problem. As the connection required for judicial ju-
risdiction becomes even more attenuated, the need to clearly distin-
guish prescriptive jurisdiction rules becomes more important. 
 One reason that Internet-mediated activities excite controversy is 
because they can be made to appear to justify stretching the already 
tenuous judicial specific jurisdiction limitations. In large part, the at-
tempted justification is based on a misconception (purposeful or not) 
of who does what in Cyberspace. As described in Part II, a Web site 
is, in and of itself, passive. The Web site program remains dormant 
until it is contacted from the outside.732 On external request, the Web 
site program sends information to the inquirer. That is true whether 
the Web site is or is not “interactive.” At this point, the geographic 
location of the inquirer is totally irrelevant. Decisions such as Inset 
Systems place the situation entirely on its head, effectively conclud-
ing that a Web site program somehow ventures out uninvited and 
forces itself onto the computer screen of Internet users.733 Persons 
who actually do that are called “spammers,” “hackers,” or “crackers,” 
not Web site programs. Programs that do that are called “viruses.” 
Connecting a computer containing Web site programs to the commu-
nication system merely makes it possible for others to contact the 
site, if they find the address, very much like having one’s telephone 
number listed. The browser initiating contact with a Web site is no 
more intruded upon by the Web site than someone voluntarily open-
ing a telephone “Yellow Pages” book. 
 Until a browser provides it, a Web site has no information about 
where the browser might be geographically. If that information is not 
necessary to the Web site’s function, such as when selling and 
downloading digital products, there is no business reason why that 
information should be obtained or retained.734 It is likely that Inter-
net digital-products sellers in the future will have even less opportu-
nity to obtain information about the purchaser’s location. “E-cash” is 
as untraceable as cash, and there is a growing sentiment favoring 
                                                                                                                  
 732. An interesting philosophical question might be posed: Does a Web site inhabit Cy-
berspace, or exist anywhere, when it is not communicating with an external terminal? Of 
course that attributes a personality, or entity-ness, to a computer program, which is not 
justified given the present state of the art. 
 733. Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).  
 734. Even when a credit card is used to pay, the seller may not obtain or retain 
information about the purchaser. See E-Data Corp. v. Micropatent Corp., 989 F. Supp. 173 
(D. Conn. 1997). 
762  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:649 
 
browsers’ privacy and actively opposing the collection and retention 
of information by Web site operators. 735 A product recently introduced 
by a Canadian company guarantees browsers’ anonymity, so a Web 
site seller cannot know who the browser is or where she is physically 
located.736 
 Many of the cases which have held that the Web site owner pur-
posefully directed its acts toward the forum state are correct, if the 
question is judicial specific jurisdiction. When anyone sends informa-
tion (through the Internet or otherwise) to a person or company 
whose physical location is known, the act is intended to have some 
result at the destination. It cannot, however, be concluded that due 
process requirements are therefore automatically satisfied for use-
tax collection purposes. When a browser purchases tangible products 
that must be physically delivered, the Web site seller is acting in the 
same manner as any other seller who receives orders from distant 
purchasers. This returns one to the problems discussed above, that 
is, that the use-tax collection rules are retroactive and assume the 
seller has information it cannot obtain with certainty. An Internet 
buyer, should he so desire, is equally or more capable of concealing 
his identity and purposes than a person making an in-person pur-
chase. 
 In contemporary political/legal thought, a fundamental principle 
of personal jurisdiction is the subject’s ability to know when he or she 
may be within the reach of a government’s authority. That is the rea-
son behind the “purposefully directed toward” language in the due 
process cases. Having notice of the rules, allows avoidance of particu-
lar jurisdictions. Even though geographical political boundaries may 
be easily crossed, they still give notice of which government presides 
over the geographic area. Because physical boundaries do not exist in 
Cyberspace, that notice is lacking. Without other objective and reli-
able boundaries, a Cyberspace user is unable to purposefully put 
himself within, or purposefully avoid, any particular jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                  
 735. On e-cash, see, for example, eCash Technologies, Inc., eCash Global Software So-
lutions, at http://digicash.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2001); Editorial , E-Cash 2.0, THE 
ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 2000, http://www.economist.com/editorial/freeforall/current/fn7284. 
html (last visited Feb. 18, 2000); Mondex International, Ltd., All About Mondex, at 
http://www.mondex.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2001). On privacy, see, for example, Mike 
Brunker, Privacy Tools Usher in an Era of Net Anonymity, MSNBC, Dec. 14, 1999, at 
http://www.msnbc.com/news/345954.asp; Americans for Computer Privacy, at http://www. 
computerprivacy.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2000) (discussing encryption and federal legisla-
tion); Electronic Privacy Information Center, at http://www.epic.org/privacy (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2000); Zero-Knowledge Systems [Home Page], at http://zeroknowledge.com (last vis-
ited Feb. 4, 2000). Regulators, at least in Europe, are concerned about the tracing problems 
posed by e-cash. See EC Working Paper, supra note 652, at 9; UK’S TAXATION AGENDA, su-
pra note 40, at pt. 4 
 736. See Zero-Knowledge Systems [Home Page], at http://zeroknowledge.com (last vis-
ited Feb. 4, 2000). 
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This holds equally true for passive Web sites. When a Web site re-
sponds to a request and transmits information to an Internet ad-
dress, the Web site owner is unaware of the destination. Therefore, 
the Web site owner is not consenting to the jurisdiction of the ad-
dress owner’s physical political government any more than a person 
who is kidnapped, blindfolded, and carried across political bounda-
ries. The basis upon which “implied consent” to jurisdiction is 
founded does not exist in Cyberspace. 
 The lack of actual or implied consent is not the only problem. Most 
discussions overlook a jurisdictionally significant factor: what is le-
gally involved when states try to impose use-tax collection duties on 
out-of-state sellers. Those discussions (including court decisions) ap-
pear to proceed on the assumption that a use tax is imposed on the 
seller. Some sales taxes are technically imposed on the seller.737 In 
contrast, all use taxes are imposed on the buyer, the terminology in 
Quill notwithstanding.738 On the out-of-state seller, some states im-
pose the burden of collecting the use tax the consumer might have to 
pay to some state. If the seller fails to collect a tax that later actually 
becomes due from the purchaser, the penalty is paying the amount it 
should have collected.739 Mistakenly treating a use-tax case as one to 
collect a tax due from the defendant might be understandable, but it 
is the product of, and results in, imprecise analysis. The object of a 
“use tax” action against an out-of-state seller is to exact a penalty for 
                                                                                                                  
 737. A thorough review of state sales taxes is provided in HELLERSTEIN & 
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 56, at tbl. 12.1. That source indicates that in 18 states the seller 
is the sales-tax payer. The name used for a tax may be “retailers’ occupation tax” or “gross 
receipts tax” or “gross sales tax,” but functionally they are identical: The seller separately 
states, and collects from the purchaser, an amount equal to a percentage of the purchase 
price. It is common (regardless of name or technical incidence of the tax) to refer to them 
all as “sales taxes” and to admit the practical reality, which is that the consumer is aware 
that she or he is paying a specific amount to the government, that is not part of the item’s 
purchase price. For reasons mentioned earlier, seller-incident sales taxes are coupled with 
a “use tax” just like the purchaser-incident sales taxes. See id. 
 738. The use tax can only be imposed on the consumer and still be logical. The taxable 
event is the “use” of goods that somehow escaped being subject to a sales tax when pur-
chased (mail- or Internet-order purchase is not the sole possibility). If a use tax could be 
imposed on a transaction at the time of sale, it would be a sales tax. Only after a purchase 
transaction can it be determined that no sales tax has been paid to the possessor’s state. 
By definition, the seller has no connection with the sold item’s use. This distinct characte r-
istic of use taxes was recognized in Miller Bros. Corp. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 343-44 
(1954), when sales taxation was relatively new. However, during the ensuing 45 years, 
“sales and use taxes” have so frequently been identified as a unit that their fundamental 
differences have largely disappeared from consciousness. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex 
rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), consistently refers to the out-of-state seller as the “tax-
payer.” 
 739. It would seem that the seller would have a legal right to go back to the purchaser 
and collect the tax. It is unlikely that a seller would take that action in an average retail 
sale, however, since the cost of collecting would be greater than the tax collected. The out-
of-state seller would not have the legal abilities of a state in collecting minor amounts of 
taxes from state residents of other states. 
764  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:649 
 
failing to comply with the state’s regulations. If the tax was not col-
lected, which is usually the case, the defendant-seller’s bank balance 
is decreased based on the extent to which he failed to comply, plus 
penalties and other costs. But regardless of loose language, the legal 
issue is what the law required (or can require) the seller to do, not 
how much tax he owes. 
 Collecting sales taxes on in-state sales is a burden on the seller, 
but one to which sellers are generally resigned, one that clearly can 
be imposed under the state’s general regulatory powers, and one that 
is relatively simple—one tax rate, one set of rules, one submission 
form. Collecting use taxes on sales to residents of other states is a 
different problem. 740 Use taxes are payable by a state’s residents but 
are difficult and costly for the state to collect. Through the use tax-
collection rules, what states are trying to do is transfer the burden to 
the out-of-state sellers, because it is not cost-effective for the state to 
do its own collection work.741 
 The cost-transferring rules are an attempt to exercise the state’s 
general regulatory power over persons beyond the state’s boundaries. 
In the due process context, such an exercise of prescriptive jurisdic-
tion is indefensible. The decisions “expanding” the scope of state 
court judicial jurisdiction concern particular defendants in particular 
fact situations where the litigation specifically relates to the defen-
dants’ particular actions in or directed toward the states involved.742 
Those decisions make a clear distinction between “specific” judicial 
jurisdiction and “general” judicial jurisdiction.743 “Specific” jurisdic-
tion looks to the particular defendant’s acts and whether the alleged 
cause of action arises out of those acts. To base the state’s authority 
                                                                                                                  
 740. The most complicated task for in-state retailers is determining which items are 
taxable and which are not, which often cannot be determined logically. Use -tax collectors 
have the same problem, but it is complicated when states each have different rules. Any 
one state’s taxable -vs.-nontaxable rules do not frequently change and, as the North Dakota 
court discussed, computerization has eased that problem. “UPC” codes and laser scanners 
have eliminated the need for individual judgment, and that technology is essentially uni-
versal in retail stores. Significantly, UPC codes and code readers have multiple functions 
that benefit the retailer’s general operations, justifying the cost. But the additional com-
puter hardware and software needed to collect use taxes would be expensive, and the only 
benefit would accrue to the tax collection agencies, which would bear none of the costs. 
 741. In Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 343, the Court recognized this: “The collection of the 
use tax from inhabitants is a difficult administrative problem, and if out-of-state vendors 
can be compelled to collect it and remit it to the taxing state, it simplifies administration 
[for the state tax authorities].” Id. at 343. 
 Many states allow use -tax collectors a “discount” as compensation for the administrative 
burden. But those same states allow an identical discount to sales-tax collectors (i.e., in-
state retailers who collect only for one state). See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra 
note 56. Moreover, it is unlikely that the discounts cover the actual collection costs, par-
ticularly when any “shortage” in collection effectively reduces the discount dollar-for-
dollar. 
 742. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 743. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
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to collect a use tax, as a tax, on specific judicial jurisdiction, the ques-
tion must be, “Is the use tax due because of the seller’s acts?” The an-
swer to that is, “No, the use tax is imposed on in-state use by some-
one other than the seller.” A state legal action to make the out-of-
state seller collect use taxes is not based on the sale contract but on 
the state’s general law applicable to residents. 
 That is more like the province of “general” judicial jurisdiction. If 
one tries to apply general judicial jurisdiction rules to use-tax collec-
tion actions against nonresidents, the question is whether the actions 
of the defendant have been such that it has become, effectively, a 
resident of the state.744 Are the defendant’s activities within the state 
sufficiently “continuous and systematic” to constitutionally justify 
the state’s imposition of its general regulatory authority over that de-
fendant?745 If the answer in a mail- or Internet-order situation is 
“yes,” then there is no limit on the extent to which state regulations 
can be enforced against a person with less contact with the state 
than is required for special judicial jurisdiction. That the scope of 
general jurisdiction would become broader than the scope of “specific” 
jurisdiction is contrary to logic and Supreme Court decisions. 746 
 If use-tax collection actions are treated as merely questions of ju-
dicial special jurisdiction problems, there must be a case-by-case 
analysis to determine the quality and nature of the defendant’s acts 
directed toward the forum. The Internet-related due process cases 
discussed earlier show significant disagreement about what is suffi-
cient. Based on the better-reasoned cases, there should be a showing 
that the defendant at least had the opportunity to choose not to en-
gage in transactions with persons from the forum state. The best 
analyses, like the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Alabama in Butler v. Beer Across America,747 treat a Web site as a 
relatively trivial factor and, instead, look at the actual commercial 
transactions connected with the state. There can be no reason-based 
assumption that merely connecting to the Internet, without active ef-
forts to avoid a particular forum, is a positive choice to interact with 
that forum. 
 It is somewhat more logical to treat use-tax collection actions as 
judicial general jurisdiction questions. There is no legal connection 
between the in-state taxable event and the out-of-state seller. The 
seller does not cause the consumer to use any item at a particular lo-
                                                                                                                  
 744. See Millennium Enter., Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. 
Ore. 1999). 
 745. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16 (quoting Perkins v. Banguet Consolidated Mining 
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)). In Perkins, the defendant company’s president had been carrying 
on all possible corporate functions from within the state of Ohio during the time that its 
physical facilities, in the Philippine Islands, were in the hands of hostile Japanese forces. 
 746. See Millennium, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907. 
 747. 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2000). 
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cation. Connecting the out-of-state seller to the independent in-state 
use is contrary to World-Wide Volkswagen.748 However, if the seller 
has a systematic, continuing association with the state, to the extent 
that the in-state activities are functionally equivalent to a resident’s, 
then it is not unreasonable to subject that person or entity to all the 
state’s laws. Imposing a legal duty on a resident is not a violation of 
due process, even if the duty relates to out-of-state activities. As dis-
cussed earlier, there are no cases that have found a defendant sub-
ject to judicial general jurisdiction based solely on Internet-mediated 
events. That does not mean it is impossible. The state-related actions 
of Internet-based companies like Amazon.com are only slightly dif-
ferent (that is, mode of physical delivery) from their reality-based in-
state competitors. 
 Even if a particular out-of-state mail-order seller is held subject to 
state judicial jurisdiction, the second question (Commerce Clause) 
remains. Does this exercise of jurisdiction discriminate against, or 
impose an undue burden on, interstate commerce? Examined in the 
light of Commerce Clause regulatory cases, the answer should be 
“yes” to both: Use-tax collection regulations, by definition, discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce because they are imposed on out-
of-state vendors. Based on cases such as Maine v. Taylor,749 the state 
would have to show that there is no other way in which it could col-
lect the use taxes due from its own citizens, something that a state 
could not do. Decisions such as Raymond Motor Transport, Inc. v. 
Rice750 teach that in such situations, the proper inquiry is the poten-
tial for multiple states to impose related, but different, regulations 
and the burden that would impose on interstate commerce, as com-
pared to the burden on intrastate commerce. Rather obviously, the 
burden of complying with the thousands of differing state and local 
collection regulations is substantially greater than complying with 
one state’s sales tax regulations. If use-tax collection cases are 
treated as business-regulation enforcement actions, which they are, 
and then tested against Commerce Clause rules about state regula-
tion (not taxation) of commercial activities, the collection regulations 
are not enforceable. 
 However, when the issues are clearly posed, it becomes obvious 
that this is not merely a Commerce Clause problem. In most, if not 
all, Commerce Clause cases, the state clearly has territorial jurisdic-
tion over the defendant or its acts, for example, the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                  
 748. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).  
 749. 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (sustaining discriminatory regulation only because there was 
no other means of protecting a very important state interest). 
 750. 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (holding regulation on length of trucks on state highways in-
valid because the state could not demonstrate a state benefit that outweighed the substan-
tial burden such regulations would place on interstate commerce). 
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trucks drove through the state,751 its trains traversed the state,752 it 
brought fish into the state,753 it imported alcoholic beverages754 or 
waste755 into the state, or it otherwise engaged in some overt act 
within the state. The question in those cases is thus, “Given the 
state’s jurisdiction in the matter, can it nevertheless not enforce its 
regulation because of the burden on, or discrimination against, inter-
state commerce?” In the use-tax collection situation, the question is 
whether the state has the power to impose the regulation in the first 
instance. That brings into question the scope of legislative, or pre-
scriptive, jurisdiction, which is a due process issue, not a Commerce 
Clause issue. 
 A state does not have the power to regulate or tax nonresidents 
with respect to events that are completed outside the state’s geo-
graphic boundaries.756 Thus, states cannot tax, or otherwise regulate, 
sales transactions completed in other states or countries, regardless 
of who the parties are.757 That is why use taxes were enacted. A use-
tax obligation is triggered by a consumer’s use of property in the 
state, regardless of the user’s residence or citizenship, and regardless 
of where or how the property was acquired. Attempting to impose tax 
collection duties on nonresident sellers runs squarely into the Due 
Process Clause; nonresidents are not subject to state prescriptive ju-
risdiction without some connection to the state. The loosening of due 
process requirements, according to Quill, eliminates the due process 
barrier when the nonresident seller enters into a contract to sell 
something to, or deliver something to, a state resident. 758 In due 
process terms, that allows the state to exercise specific judicial juris-
diction with respect to that contract or delivery, or its subject matter. 
However, the more difficult question remains, when a state imposes 
                                                                                                                  
 751. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). 
 752. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
 753. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). 
 754. See Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989). 
 755. See Oregon Waste Management Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 
U.S. 93 (1994). 
 756. See supra Part III.E. States can tax a resident’s income earned outside the state, 
but that jurisdiction is based on the taxpayer’s continuing association with the state, not 
on the acts that earned the income. 
 757. See supra Part III.E. In theory, a state could enact a consumption tax that re-
quires residents to pay a tax whenever and wherever they spend money, which could be 
justified on the same basis as taxing residents whenever and wherever the residents earn 
income. An all-encompassing consumption tax on residents, however, would create the 
same administrative problems encountered concerning use taxes. 
 Actions based on product liability rules, commenced against an out-of-state seller, do not 
violate this rule if some of the resulting damages were incurred in the forum state and the 
defendant-seller had reason to believe that the product might be in that state. See World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980). 
 758. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).  
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use-tax collection duties, what type of jurisdiction is it attempting to 
exercise? 
 It is respectfully suggested that judicial jurisdiction rules do not 
apply. “Specific” judicial jurisdiction theory allows a state’s courts to 
enter a judgment against a nonresident concerning injuries suffered 
in that state due to that nonresident’s actions. The legal rules applied 
are those of the forum. Thus, in a specific-jurisdiction-type case, the 
court is applying local law to a local event that is connected to an ex-
ternal event. Due process requires a direct connection between the 
nonresident and the local event. That a nonresident is involved does 
not change the state’s ability to enforce its laws with respect to the 
in-state event. While the obligation to pay a use tax is internal to the 
taxing state, imposing tax collection obligations on nonresident sell-
ers is not. This was recognized in Miller Bros.759 
 If judicial jurisdiction rules are applied in the use-tax collection 
situation, the result is always retroactive and constitutionally unfair. 
Liability is imposed on a nonresident because of subsequent actions 
taken in another state by an unrelated person, which actions the 
nonresident could not control nor reliably predict. Regardless of a 
sale’s circumstances, the seller can never be certain that a particular 
item will become subject to any particular state’s use tax. Sending an 
item to a state does not guarantee that the item will be taxably used 
there unless the state’s use tax is so broad as to impose a tax when-
ever an item physically appears in the state, however briefly, for 
whatever purpose.760 The seller would be responsible for collecting (or 
failing to collect) the use tax of whatever state in which the ultimate 
consumer first uses the item. Sellers would frequently be correct if 
they guessed that the first use would be in the state to which an item 
is being shipped.761 But the fact that a seller may guess correctly does 
not grant jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                  
 759. See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954).  
 760. It should be obvious that a use tax so broad would run afoul of the Commerce 
Clause because it would impose a tax both on instrumentalities of interstate commerce and 
things moving in interstate commerce, which has been known to violate Commerce Clause 
restrictions for over 100 years. 
 761. A court might conclude that a seller could reasonably foresee use in the pur-
chaser’s state of residence. But what is reasonably foreseeable if the purchaser directs de-
livery to someone in a different state? Or to herself at an address different from her 
claimed residence address? What if the purchaser lives in New Jersey, has his credit card 
bills sent to New York, and directs the item shipped to himself at a Post Office box in Mo n-
tana? Foreseeability alone is insufficient to support specific judicial jurisdiction. See World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 287. Logically, foreseeability also should be insufficient to 
support prescriptive jurisdiction. Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Quill says the two 
are similar, not the same. See 504 U.S. at 299. Prescriptive jurisdiction usually requires 
more definite connections, not more tenuous ones. Would a seller be safe if she obtained an 
affidavit from every purchaser concerning the state in which the item(s) will be used? Or 
that the purchaser will pay the use tax? Probably not. 
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 A use-tax collection duty is inherently retroactive (also known as, 
ex post facto). No use-tax obligation arises until the property is first 
used by a consumer. Based on current understandings of temporal 
physics, no tax is due until after the sale is consummated and the 
item has been taken from the seller’s control. 762 
 Regardless of verbiage and lofty theory, legislation imposing use-
tax duties on nonresident sellers should be legally treated as what it 
is in reality and economic effect, the retroactive imposition of sales 
tax on out-of-state sales by a nonresident seller, which violates both 
the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause. To date the Su-
preme Court has not seen fit to look behind the labels, so sellers and 
tax officials are left with trying to make sense of the decisions. 
E.   Reconciling the Unreconcilable 
 If there is any way to reconcile Supreme Court decisions concern-
ing use-tax collection duties and out-of-state sellers, it is that the 
seller is, at least for those limited fact situations, a “constructive” 
resident. In fact, that is about the only way the Court’s decision in 
National Geographic763 makes sense. That case cannot be explained 
under judicial specific jurisdiction rules because the taxpayer’s in-
state presence was not related to either the out-of-state sale or the 
in-state use. If the National Geographic Society is treated as a resi-
dent, the tax collection duties can be imposed because it is a resident, 
and the state, therefore, had prescriptive jurisdiction. Similarly, the 
analysis in Scripto emphasizes the congruence between the in-state 
activities attributed to the defendant and the activities of a state 
resident. 764 The Court treated Scripto Corporation in the same man-
ner it would treat a resident who just happened to have its distribu-
tion warehouse in another state. The same logic can be applied, ad-
mittedly less comfortably, to Quill. There, the Court held that judi-
cial specific-jurisdiction-type due process requirements were met, but 
that something more is needed to satisfy Commerce Clause require-
ments. The things mentioned that might satisfy the “something 
more” were things typical of a state resident, that is, some type of 
significant, long-term physical presence. If Quill had been a construc-
tive North Dakota resident, there would have been no constitutional 
limitation on imposing use-tax collection duties, regardless of the 
number of other states in which it might do business, which is 
probably why the Court ultimately relied on stare decisis. 
                                                                                                                  
 762. That might be partially ameliorated by giving the purchaser the right to a refund. 
But that would not help the cash flow of the seller who guessed wrong, or the customer-
relations of the seller who insists on collecting use taxes that never become payable. 
 763. See National Geographic Soc’y v. California, 430 U.S. 551 (1977).  
 764. See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).  
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 Even though the term was mentioned only in Quill, and there 
only briefly in a concurring opinion, in tax cases the Court has fre-
quently indulged in considerations more appropriate to prescriptive 
jurisdiction than to general or specific judicial jurisdiction. If it were 
directly presented with the question, it is not likely that the Court 
would say that rules governing general jurisdiction, à la Helicop-
teros,765 would have to be satisfied to legislatively create a construc-
tive resident for use-tax collection duties. 
 Even if due process requirements can be satisfied under a con-
structive resident theory, that does not automatically eliminate 
Commerce Clause requirements, as was made clear by Quill.766 The 
temptation to equate the nexus requirement in Complete Auto with 
judicial specific jurisdiction (due process) nexus is understandable 
because they are usually satisfied by similar actions—and the Court 
has rarely made the distinction.767 But outside the tax context, it is 
fairly obvious that regulations which are otherwise clearly within a 
state’s jurisdiction sometimes cannot be applied, even to persons 
with unquestioned contact with the state, because of the undue bur-
den that enforcement would impose on interstate commerce. The cost 
of complying with the complicated and inconsistent use-tax regula-
tions of different states and localities is no less burdensome than the 
cost of complying with less complicated but inconsistent truck-length 
regulations of different states. 768 Imposing additional costs on out-of-
state sellers is not conceptually different from imposing additional 
costs on out-of-state waste producers. 769 
 The states’ rhetoric in the current political controversy about how 
any federal involvement in any resolution violates principles of fed-
eralism and infringes on state’s rights is ludicrous. They are fighting 
a battle that was decisively lost long ago. The last time the federal 
government was precluded from acting in a way that might have a 
negative effect on state revenues was the day before the Constitution 
                                                                                                                  
 765. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).  
 766. 504 U.S. at 301-02.  
 767. If the tax question involves a tax on an out-of-state person, the question of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction and judicial specific jurisdiction are effectively combined. If a state 
has prescriptive jurisdiction to tax a particular event, judicial specific jurisdiction is esse n-
tially automatic because of the connection between the taxpayer and the taxable event. 
That is why the habit of saying “sales and use taxes” (implying unity) is unfortunate; im-
precise language can lead to imprecise analysis. 
 The Quill majority opinion fell into that trap. See 504 U.S. at 317. It clearly states that 
what North Dakota statute requires is that the out-of-state seller collect and remit use 
taxes imposed on North Dakota consumers. See id. at 302. Despite that, the opinion’s lan-
guage addresses the issue as if Quill is the taxpayer, making no distinction between the 
case before it and the prior cases actually involving a tax on the defendant. See id. passim. 
 768. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). 
 769. See Oregon Waste Management Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 
U.S. 93 (1994). 
2001]  PREYING ON THE WEB 771 
 
was ratified. Any lingering doubts were well laid to rest when the 
Commerce Clause “affectation doctrine” was adopted.770 
 What additional connection is needed so that the imposition of 
use-tax collection duties on out-of-state sellers like Quill or Ama-
zon.com does not violate Commerce Clause restrictions? To say that 
the Supreme Court has given little guidance is an understatement of 
immense proportions. The Court expressly rejected California’s 
“more than the slightest presence” formulation in National Geo-
graphic,771 but it did not offer any other formulation. Neither Quill 
nor any other Supreme Court decision has quantified what is 
enough. While failing to offer a precise quantification is no doubt 
consistent with the case-by-case approach used for Due Process and 
Commerce Clause issues, it provides little solace to taxpayers, invol-
untary tax collectors, or tax authorities. The lack of guidance merely 
enables states to take positions that are, from a common sense point 
of view, outrageous; the lack of clear and precise legal rules means 
that, from a legal-formalist point of view, they cannot be found to vio-
late any specific rule. 
V.   SUMMATION—THIS DOESN’T LOOK LIKE A KANSAS WEB 
 The variety, background, history, and politics of the issues cur-
rently associated with state use taxes is intriguing and sometimes 
astonishing. Whether one starts with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, 
or Gibbons v. Ogden772 in 1824, or the Babbidge Difference Engine in 
1833, or the 1908 Sears, Roebuck catalog, or William Gibson’s 1984 
Neuromancer, one inevitably has to go back and pick up other strings 
from other beginnings. The web of history is more complicated than 
the World Wide Web, and its interconnections are often less obvious. 
The legal portions of that history web may not have as much variety 
as the technological, or be quite so contrived as the political, but it is 
not so continuous or easily followed. One tracing the development of 
legal rules about constitutional restraints frequently becomes disori-
ented by the multiple, and often unstated, interconnections between 
cases. The courts cannot be faulted if they sometimes appear to have 
strayed or failed to leave a clear route to follow; courts are made up 
of people, who are influenced by their times. Judges and lawyers con-
stantly study history (otherwise known as precedent) to find support 
for desired results. But how a court’s decision is written depends as 
much on the parties’ pleadings and contentions as it does on the 
weight of precedent. A court must decide the controversy before it 
                                                                                                                  
 770. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 (1995); McLain v. Real Estate 
Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 771. National Geographic Soc’y V. California, 430 U.S. 551, (1977).  
 772. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
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(including its social and economic context), not a clean hypothetical 
situation created to demonstrate hypothetical solutions. Legal theory 
development does not follow a logical or preplanned route, but jumps 
from one “real-world” problem to the next. 
 Supreme Court decisions concerning states’ power over persons 
and events that have connections beyond state boundaries do not 
provide a clear, steady progression. They have also been significantly 
influenced by judicial interpretation of the Commerce Clause, par-
ticularly the watershed reevaluation in the 1930s. Cases presenting 
issues relating to state taxation of interstate commerce have come 
before the courts less frequently or consistently than other issues. 
Perhaps because of that, there appears to be a delay or hesitation in 
applying more recent theory to developing issues. Finding principled 
bases for predicting future results is rather difficult. The language of 
a particular decision, when compared to the language of other deci-
sions, often provides generous room for interpretation and disagree-
ment. That is certainly true with respect to state use taxes and elec-
tronic commerce. Therefore, going back to the most basic foundations 
of government authority is not only justified, it is probably required. 
 One foundational principle supporting the U.S. Constitution is 
that no government has power beyond the permission granted by the 
persons to be governed. Having specific geographic boundaries is a 
characteristic common to governments. Beyond its geographic 
boundaries, a government’s pronouncements may be interesting in-
formation, but they are not rules that anyone must heed. In United 
States legal theory, boundaries on governmental action (geographic 
and others) are gathered under the term “jurisdiction.” While there 
are different types and classifications of jurisdiction, the underlying 
principle is constant: A government trying to act beyond its legal au-
thority is, and should be, as effective as a shark trying to fly to the 
Moon. Thus, when any question is presented concerning what a gov-
ernment can or should do, the first question must always be: “What 
are the boundaries of the government’s permission in this type of 
situation?” 
 The basic question in this discussion is the scope of state govern-
ments’ ability to require out-of-state sellers to act as those govern-
ments’ involuntary tax collection agents. The answer is that there is 
presently no certain answer. The ultimate answer will depend, in 
significant part, on how the problem is ultimately framed, that is, as 
a question of personal jurisdiction, or as a Commerce Clause ques-
tion, or as a question of government jurisdiction. 
 If the question is addressed principally in due process (personal 
jurisdiction) terms, geographic borders will largely be ignored and 
the only questions will be fact questions. The preceding discussion 
concerning judicial specific jurisdiction demonstrates that jurisdic-
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tional limitations are based on the particular defendant’s acts in re-
lation to the forum. But those limitations are few and the courts are 
far from agreement on the minimum acts necessary to subject a per-
son to a distant government. Some cases indicate that merely con-
necting a Web site to the Internet is sufficient to support geographic 
jurisdiction in any forum reached by the Internet. Other cases indi-
cate that a person may have to take undefined affirmative steps to 
avoid particular geographic jurisdictions. Still others hold that the 
person must knowingly take some act with the intent of causing 
some result in a particular geographic location. What any specific 
court might decide in any specific case is, of course, inherently un-
predictable.  
 Thus, a prudent businessperson would act in a manner calculated 
to satisfy the most restrictive potential rule. If that prudent busi-
nessperson takes into account both court decisions and state tax ad-
ministrators’ published positions, he or she has three possible op-
tions: The first is to attempt to collect sales or use taxes on all sales 
to persons in the United States. At the present time, that would 
likely be an extremely costly, if not impossible, task. The second pos-
sible option is not to make sales to persons in the United States. That 
is obviously not a very good business decision if the person wishes to 
stay in business; a very substantial majority of potential Internet 
customers are in the United States.  
 The third possible option is not selling from a location within the 
United States; even if it is decided that states can enforce their use-
tax collection rules throughout the United States, they will still be 
limited to the United States. There are places in the world that do 
not have consumption or transaction taxes and welcome business en-
terprises, especially “clean” ones like electronic sales. All things con-
sidered, it would seem that the most prudent business decision would 
be to move business operations out of the United States. For state 
tax collectors that is akin to killing the goose that laid the golden 
egg.773 It is, however, the most rational response to the positions 
those administrators are currently taking. 
 If it is decided that this is a Commerce Clause issue, as Quill ap-
pears to say, the resolution will depend on what Congress decides to 
do, if anything. The present state of affairs is less than satisfactory 
for all interest groups. If Congress does not act, the obscure and mal-
leable definition of Commerce Clause “nexus” invites actions by state 
tax administrators similar to those discussed earlier, that is, taking 
                                                                                                                  
 773. Not only would they “lose” previously uncollected use taxes, they would lose taxes 
that have actually been previously collected, like income, property, and sales taxes. Also, 
those losses would be multiplied by the cascading effect of persons changing their business 
location to avoid taxation. Those potential losses are much greater than the potential use-
tax collections that might be gained. 
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all possible logical steps, and even a few illogical ones, to compress 
the scope of the Quill holding and to minimize what is required to es-
tablish nexus. That would have the same result as treating the ques-
tion as a personal jurisdiction one; the most logical response of pru-
dent businesspersons would be to move their Web sites out of the 
country. If Congress does act, it will also have to address the nexus 
question or the result will be the same. The current proposals for 
creating uniform state sales and use-tax rules with centralized ad-
ministration may substantially alleviate some of the problems asso-
ciated with minimal nexus requirements, but it seems highly 
unlikely that states will voluntarily limit their taxing powers and 
nearly as unlikely that Congress will impose such a solution. 
 If it is decided that this is a problem of fundamental state power, 
that is, a prescriptive jurisdiction issue, the results will probably be 
better, but what that might be remains uncertain. One thing, how-
ever, seems fairly certain: The scope of a state’s prescriptive jurisdic-
tion is not so broad as that of a state court’s specific jurisdiction. The 
most consistent reading of Supreme Court cases is that prescriptive 
jurisdiction requires that the potential subject be acting in much the 
same manner as a resident, that there be a measurable, continuing 
business presence in the state. As electronic commerce grows and be-
comes more versatile, it is possible that the Supreme Court would 
narrow or eliminate a tangible physical presence requirement. But it 
seems very unlikely that the Court would eliminate the requirement 
for systematic and continuing participation in a particular geo-
graphic market. 
 Of the three potential answers, the one least likely to encourage 
persons to move their electronic commerce sites out of the United 
States is prescriptive jurisdiction. If for no other reason, that is be-
cause other countries in the world will most likely adopt similar 
rules. Prescriptive jurisdiction rules are not unique to the United 
States and have been tested in many controversies over the years. 
Thus a person would find it difficult to escape the reach of such rules, 
in or out of the United States. 
Additional Considerations 
 There is no doubt that the issue(s) related to state taxation of 
Internet-mediated transactions will be resolved. There is, however, 
substantial uncertainty about how and when. It is rather naive to be-
lieve that the resolution will be wholly rational—politics is involved, 
which automatically eliminates complete rationality. Power is also 
involved, which means many persons and groups will be more intent 
on preserving and expanding their power than on reaching a rational 
solution. When power and wealth are at stake, long-term and univer-
sal interests are ignored for short-term and personal interests. That 
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much is clear in the political rhetoric surrounding State taxation of 
Internet-mediated sales. State tax officials are intent on not surren-
dering any power they think they now have, and on expanding that 
power as far (geographically, politically, and legally) as they possibly 
can; reasonable interpretation of court decisions and business opera-
tions is not nearly so important. 
 One thing that many of the players in the current drama seem not 
to understand is that the “playing field” to which they are so fond of 
referring is not just their own city, county, state, or nation—it is the 
entire world. It is incredible that those persons are not aware of their 
setting. They speak of the “global information infrastructure” and 
“Cyberspace” and Internet, but they ignore the reality behind those 
labels. It is possible for a city or county government to decide what 
rules it will adopt, but enforcing those rules will be impossible unless 
they are consistent with the relevant state rules. Similarly, state 
governments can decide what rules to adopt (via court or legislation), 
but enforcing those rules will be impossible unless they are consis-
tent with national rules. Similarly again, the national government 
can decide what rules to adopt, which will also prove ineffective 
unless they are consistent with international law. Only one example 
should suffice. The European Union is considering legislation that 
would require the collection of VAT taxes on electronic sales to EU 
persons. 774 VAT taxes in the EU vary from 12% to more than 20%, 
substantially more than state sales taxes. If the United States de-
cides that states can enforce their sales and use-tax rules against 
out-of-state sellers, it will not be in a position to say that EU-member 
countries have no authority to enforce their VAT taxes on similar 
transactions. Of course, other countries in other parts of the world 
can and will follow suit. It is said that within the United States there 
are over 7000 jurisdictions that impose some type of consumption 
tax. How many thousands more will be added when an Internet 
seller must account to the entire world? 
 The playing field is also not limited to tax regulations. If a gov-
ernment has the legal power to impose its tax collection regulations 
on out-of-area persons, it can also impose other types of regulations, 
for example, language used (such as French in France-sited Web 
sites), content (such as doctrinally acceptable publications in Iran-
accessible Web sites, or politically acceptable statements in PRC-
accessible Web sites), aesthetics (such as no nudes in Cleveland-
                                                                                                                  
 774. See Edmund L. Andrews, Europe Plans to Collect Tax on Some Internet Transac-
tions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, NYT File; EC Working Paper, su-
pra note 652, at 7 (discussing many of the same problems: difficulty in determining pur-
chaser’s location, inconsistent rules, enforcement limitations, taxpayer deception, e-cash, 
etc.); THE UK’S TAXATION AGENDA, supra note 40 (mirroring the European Commission’s 
opinion). 
776  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:649 
 
accessible Web sites), pornography (as defined wherever, in sites ac-
cessible from wherever), permissible products (such as no birth-
control devices on Vatican-accessible Web sites), and so on. The same 
governmental power lies behind all adopted regulations. Until they 
wake up to practical reality, government officials struggling to assert 
and expand their power are bound to fail, ultimately if not immedi-
ately. 
 The practical reality is that businesses selling goods or services 
will stay in operation only so long as they are making a profit. Busi-
nesses will, to the extent possible, establish themselves in locations 
that enhance their profit potential, which usually includes lower 
taxes and fewer regulations. Internet-based businesses do require 
some physical space in some real-world location. But those require-
ments are minimal, an office or two. If the business does not hire a 
computer-operating company to “host” its Web site, then it will also 
need a room big enough to hold the necessary computers (which are 
getting smaller daily), and a high-quality connection to the elec-
tronic-communications network. Almost everyone, and certainly 
every government tax official, has heard of international “tax ha-
vens.” It takes no imagination whatever to envision international 
“Internet havens.”775 There are many places in the world that are ca-
pable of, and would substantially benefit from, becoming an Internet 
haven. Perhaps states will gain the power to force out-of-state sellers 
to collect use taxes, but it may well be a hollow victory when the dis-
cover they find their own businesses moving to more receptive loca-
tions. In exchange for a few more dollars in use-tax revenue, they 
stand to lose many more dollars in income tax revenues, and sales 
tax revenues, and technological development, and other areas as 
well. 
 State and local officials, and federal officials as well, who are not 
willing to consider the larger context will soon find that they have 
lost much more than a minuscule percentage of potential use tax 
revenues. Rational, functional regulation of Internet-mediated trans-
actions and events can only be done on a global basis. 
                                                                                                                  
 775. See Andrea Wilson, E-Commerce Goes to Bermuda, E-COMMERCE TIMES, Feb. 8, 
2000, available at http://www.sidsnet.org/archives/other-discussion/9905/0002.html (Ms. 
Wilson is co-founder and Senior V.P. of First Atlantic Commerce, Ltd., which provides se r-
vices to companies interested in a Bermuda address). 
 It takes only slightly more imagination to envision an Internet haven that does not re-
quire a physical location within any country. A not-so-large ship with generators and satel-
lite dishes could satisfy the physical requirements. The inherent space limitations and liv-
ing conditions may limit the number of operations that would go to that extent to avoid 
regulation, but the possibility remains. 
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APPENDIX A: INFORMAL DEFINITIONS OF INTERNET-RELATED WORDS 
AND WORD USAGES 
ACCESS:   (used as a verb) The act of connecting one’s computer to the 
Web as a whole or to individual Web sites. 
BROWSER:   (a) A computer user employing a “browser” program to 
explore and/or manipulate information available through the 
Web; (b) A computer program for use in individual computers 
that enables the user to access the Web and Web sites. 
DOMAIN NAME:   A form of Web address that is commonly used to ac-
cess a Web site. The Web includes a directory that matches do-
main names with technical addresses. A browser (person and 
program) generally uses the domain name, but the GII uses the 
IP address. A company’s or individual’s domain name frequently 
includes the site owner’s name or some variation on it. The as-
signment and ownership of domain names have created a num-
ber of controversies, all of which are beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle. 
DOWNLOAD:   The act or operation of copying a computer program 
from one computer to another via the GII. The actor requests or 
directs that digital information be transmitted from the remote 
computer to the actor’s computer. The program at the source 
computer is not altered or removed. The copy at the receiving 
computer may be stored temporarily or permanently. 
“Download” is generally used to indicate a purposeful copying in-
tended to allow the downloader to use the program in the future. 
Any information that can be converted to digital format can be 
transmitted through the GII and Internet via downloading or 
uploading. 
GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE  or GII:   The electronic 
communications system (telephone wires, optical cables, switch-
ing systems, and so on), including both the tangible (“hardware) 
and the intangible (“software”) components that enable elec-
tronic communication throughout, and beyond, the Earth. 
HOST or SERVER:   A computer which contains a Web-site program or 
related information. A browser-program enables the browser-
person to view the information contained in the host-contained 
Web site. Depending on the programming of the Web-site pro-
gram, a browser may be able to upload or download information, 
from e-mail to complete, digitalized movies and sophisticated 
programs. 
HTML:   The common computer programming language or protocol 
that enables different computers at different locations to com-
municate with each other. The development of HTML (“hyper-
text mark-up language”) is what made the World Wide Web pos-
sible and popular. 
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HYPERTEXT:   A part of a Web site (text or graphic) containing con-
cealed programming code that, when triggered, causes the local 
computer to display a different part of the current Web page or 
directs the remote computer to download a different Web page, 
which the local computer then displays. 
INFORMATION PACKET or PACKET:   Units of information packaged by 
the Internet protocol for transmission. The Internet protocol di-
vides each communication into a number of small parts, each 
with instructions concerning where the information is being 
sent. The packets are re-assembled into a complete communica-
tion by the destination computer. Each packet may journey by a 
different route, and the packets comprising a given communica-
tion may arrive in a different sequence than that in which they 
were sent. 
INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER or ISP:   A computer owner and/or op-
erator that mediates access to the Web. An individual browser 
first connects to an ISP, which in turn connects the browser 
through the communications system with the Web. The browsing 
individual’s computer becomes part of the Web, but without a 
Website program and address, that computer cannot be con-
tacted by other browsers. 
IP ADDRESS:   The technical address of a Web site: a series of num-
bers and periods, much like a telephone number, but more 
elaborate. The Web includes a directory that matches domain 
names with IP addresses. The GII employs IP addresses in es-
sentially the same manner it employs telephone numbers, that 
is, to establish a connection between communicating locations. 
ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDER or OSP:   A company which has com-
puters connected to the GII that contain information developed 
by that company and available to subscribers. These companies 
started before the Web and browser-programs developed, but 
they have since been absorbed into the Web. The most well-
known OSPs are Prodigy?  and AOL? . 
ROUTER:   A computer that is part of the GII and mediates the physi-
cal route that a given communication takes from one location to 
another; one of the “traffic signals” and flow controllers of the 
GII, and therefore the Web. The router functions independently 
of the browser, who is indifferent to the number or location of 
routers, except to the extent that the location or number might 
slow or delay communications. 
SURFER or SURFING:   A popular term for what a browser-person is, 
or is doing, while using the Web. It sometimes implies that the 
activity is somewhat random, with the browser following one 
link to another with no specific goal in mind. 
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UPLOAD:   The act or operation of copying a computer program from 
one computer to another via the GII, and the functional opposite 
of download. To upload, the actor requests or directs that digital 
information be transmitted from the actor’s computer to a re-
mote computer. 
VISIT:   To contact, as a browser, a remote server-computer and di-
rects that computer to download Web-site information. This term 
causes conceptual confusion because the “visiting” browser-
person does not “go” anywhere. In fact, the opposite occurs; the 
information from the server comes to the browser’s computer. It 
is possible for a person to manipulate (change) the information 
on a remote computer, but this is usually not done via the World 
Wide Web. 
WEB, THE (a/k/a WORLD WIDE WEB):   That portion of the communi-
cations infrastructure, plus the computers attached to it, that 
uses a standard programming language/protocol that can be 
manipulated by a browser program. It is not a location or system 
separate from other communications systems. The information 
contained in computers connected to the Web is the apparent 
substance of the Web. It utilizes the GII, but the latter name has 
not gained popular use. Most persons would not think there is 
any difference between the Web and the GII. 
WEB PAGE:   A portion of a Web site that is transmitted as a unit but 
may fill more than one computer screen; Web site programs nor-
mally transmit one page at a time. A Web site may contain more 
than one page; multiple pages are connected by hyperlinks that 
allow a browser to “move” from one page to another, or to differ-
ent locations on a single page. The page that is communicated 
first when a browser reaches a particular address is normally 
called that site’s “home page.” 
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APPENDIX B: RHETORIC FLOURISHES 
 The political/lobbying/sound-bite campaign mentioned in the main 
text often seems to be coming from a reality as separate as Cyber-
space or Carlos Castaneda’s. It is, however, a product of that popular 
pastime called “spin doctoring,” which is a euphemism for consciously 
calculated misinformation by omission, implication, innuendo, misdi-
rection, and (frequently) distortion. This sort of manipulation is fash-
ionable and is apparently considered ethical except when a U.S. 
President makes statements about personal affairs. The examples 
included here are not meant to be exhaustive, but they are represen-
tative. 
National League of Cities 
 The National League of Cities (NLC) says it represents over 
18,000 cities and towns of all sizes and its mission is to promote cit-
ies as “centers of opportunity, leadership, and governance.” In Au-
gust 1999, the NLC published a booklet it called High Stakes in Cy-
berspace: Ensuring Tax Fairness in the Electronic Marketplace.776 The 
booklet was apparently distributed to “local leaders” nationwide. 
Among other things, a chart says that (as of that date) municipal 
sales tax revenues “sacrificed from non-taxation of Internet pur-
chases” would be about $500 million by the end of 1999, $1000 mil-
lion by 2002, and $1226 million by 2003.777 The chart does not say if 
those figures are cumulative or annual; one suspects the former 
though the latter is implied. The projection data is from Forrester 
Research (see below). The entire booklet is a well-“spun” incitement 
to advocacy, but an advocacy camouflaged to appear spontaneous and 
“grass roots.” Interesting things include: 
 (1) It says that consumers “were expected” (apparently by For-
rester) to spend $13 billion in 1998.778 The booklet was published in 
1999, after real figures were available, but the actual numbers are 
not mentioned. The U.S. Commerce Department reported in March 
2000 that consumers spent $5.3 billion via Internet in the Christmas-
shopping quarter of 1999, about 0.64% of total consumer spending in 
the period.779 Conventional wisdom is that significantly more than 
half of consumers’ discretionary spending is done in the Christmas-
shopping quarter.  
                                                                                                                  
 776. http://www.nlc.org/ecomm.pdf (visited and downloaded Feb. 5, 2000). 
 777. Id. at 1. 
 778. Id. at 11. 
 779. See Doug Brown, States Discuss the Internet Tax Pact, INTER@CTIVE WEEK, Mar. 
8, 2000, http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/stories/news/0,4164,2457905,00.html (visited Mar. 
16, 1000. 
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 (2) It also says business-to-business commerce is projected to 
grow to $1.3 trillion by 2003.780 It does not say that almost all of 
those sales are not subject to sales or use taxes. 
 (3) Based on predictions by Jupiter Communications (in the 
same business as Forrester), it says “mouse clickers” will eclipse 
catalog buyers “within a decade.”781 It does not mention that the 
switch will have no effect on use-taxes collections since states also 
cannot force catalog sellers to collect use taxes. 
 (4) Its “sector by sector” business-to-business sales forecast 
(source: Forrester) projects the greatest ratio of Internet sales to total 
sales will be in computers and electronics (only some of those might 
be taxable); the other high-range categories are not taxed or covered 
by other means (for example, vehicle sales), the lower range catego-
ries are ones that may include a larger portion of taxable sales.782 De-
spite the huge total Internet-mediated sales predicted, the bottom 
line indicates that only 9.4% of total sales will be Internet-mediated. 
The total taxable sales would be an even lower percentage.  
 (5) The final pages are “sample Op-Ed” articles to which recipi-
ents are invited to add their personal “by line” and submit to local 
news papers.783  
 (6) In numerous places throughout the booklet, the NLC takes 
the position that only Congress can solve the problems and thus 
urges recipients to contact federal officials. Other groups, including 
the National Governors Association, on the other hand, are contend-
ing that congressional involvement in the solution would be a viola-
tion of the Constitution and States’ rights and undermine the federal 
character of the nation. 
National Governors Association 
 The National Governors Association (NGA), in a publication gen-
erally supporting simplification of the state-sales-tax quagmire, 
states: 
Myth: States’ ability to fund essential public services like education, 
law enforcement, and transportation infrastructure will not be af-
fected by creating a tax loophole for electronic commerce. 
FACT: More than 40% of state revenues come from sales taxes. 
States and local governments could lose more than $10 billion per 
year by 2003 in uncollected sales tax revenues on Internet and 
mail-order sales. Not only that, but more than 40% of state spend-
ing goes towards education, law enforcement, and transportation. 
If this problem is not addressed, America would have 200,000 
                                                                                                                  
 780. See id. 
 781. Id. 
 782. See id. at 12. 
 783. See id. at 13-16. 
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fewer teachers and police officers educating out children and keep-
ing our communities safe.784 
 One rather obvious comment: No one is proposing a “tax loophole” 
for electronic commerce. The taxpayers who are not paying the tax 
are the governors’ voting constituents, not the nonvoting out-of-state 
sellers. Yet somehow, a constitutional limitation on state action has 
apparently become a tax loophole. There is no indication who made 
the $10 billion-per-year loss prediction. 
 Interestingly, a few lines before the above quotation, the publica-
tion praised the governors (themselves) for cutting state taxes by 
over $20 billion in the preceding five years. A little math shows the 
governors could have lessened their politically motivated tax cuts by 
one-half and completely eliminated the projected “shortfall.” One 
might ask who received the benefit of the tax cuts, and not be sur-
prised if the beneficiaries were a more select group than the group 
that is not paying the use taxes they owe. 
Forrester Research and Other Prognosticators 
 State rhetoric generally uses specific figures, asserting that large 
volumes of sales will be made via Internet (not “might” be or are 
“predicted” to be). Most of those figures come from predictions made 
by Forrester Research, whose name makes it sound like a scientific, 
objective organization, and which makes an effort to appear that 
way. In addition to publishing its prognostications, Forrester Re-
search is in the business of assisting companies in opening and oper-
ating Internet-mediated businesses. Its Web site states, among other 
things: “Whether you’re developing your ebusiness strategy or re-
assessing your corporate web site, Forrester’s Advisory Services can 
offer you guidance.”785 High-numbers predictions about how many 
businesses, and how much business, will be generated via the Inter-
net enhance Forrester’s business opportunities; one should expect 
that Forrester’s predictions will be the highest that it can “justify,” 
however thinly. Perhaps state officials have not questioned the num-
bers, because high numbers make the states’ position appear to have 
a rational basis. It should be no surprise that Forrester has joined 
the fray on the side of the states, even if at the same time it is some-
what tarnishing its assumed image of objective research.786 Forres-
ter’s February 2000 release saying that online sales should be taxed 
                                                                                                                  
 784. NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASS’N, SALES TAXES AND THE INTERNET—MYTHS AND 
FACTS (1999), http://www.nga.org/Internet/Facts.asp (downloaded Dec. 5, 1999). 
 785. http://www.forrester.com/ER/Products/Advisory/0,1525,1,FF.html (visited Apr. 10, 
2000). It is unlikely that the guidance is gratis. 
 786. See Chet Dembeck, Forrester: Online Sales Should and Will Be Taxed, E-
COMMERCE TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/news/articles2000/ 
000217-6.shtml (downloaded Feb. 18, 2000). 
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claimed $535 million in sales tax was “lost” in 1999, which exceeds 
its mid-1998 projections of about $200 million by year-end 1999.787 
One article resulting from Forrester’s announcement notes: “Though 
it usually bills itself as an unbiased third-party research firm . . . .” 
Forrester publicly supports imposing sales (and maybe use) taxes on 
Internet-mediated sales. Forrester is quoted as saying: “New tech-
nology will enable companies to easily collect taxes across multiple 
locations.”788 Of course, those businesses will need advice and assis-
tance to implement those programs as part of their then-more-
complicated Web sites, as will the “trusted third parties” who would 
be intermediaries in the NGA’s proposal. 789 
 The second “research” source cited by State and local tax officials 
is Jupiter Communications, which bills itself as “the worldwide au-
thority on Internet commerce,” which “provides its business-to-
business and business-to-customer clients with comprehensive views 
of industry trends, accurate forecasts and today’s best practices, all 
backed by proprietary data.”790 As more and more businesses become 
interested in Internet-based operations, and as the potential benefits 
and costs of those operations increase, Jupiter will have a larger po-
tential client base. 
 On the other hand, studies sponsored by opposing factions, such 
as those published by Ernst & Young,791 tend to predict lower growth, 
particularly in the field of commerce that would produce use-tax 
revenues. The variance between predictions makes all of them sus-
pect. The author has been unable to make any detailed comparison of 
the bases used by the predictors, because while Ernst & Young’s free 
publications clearly state their bases and assumptions, the Forrester 
studies are priced far beyond the author’s budget. 
 The importance of having some information on the assumptions 
and details of these predictions is underscored by a report issued by 
the U.S. Commerce Department. 792 Appendix Five to that report dis-
cusses e-commerce sales of retail goods, the principal target of use 
tax collectors. In the endnotes is a table showing various organiza-
                                                                                                                  
 787. See Mary Hillebrand, Report: $525M in E-tail Sales Tax Not Collected in 1999, E-
COMMERCE TIMES, Feb. 25, 2000, http:www.ecommercetimes.com/news/articles2000/ 
00022-5.shtml (downloaded Feb. 27, 2000). 
 788. Id. 
 789. See NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASS’N, STREAMLINED SALES TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (1999), http://www.nga.org/ Internet/Proposal.asp (downloaded Dec. 4, 1999). 
 790. Jupiter Communications, Analysis, Insight, Success, http://jup.com/company/ com-
pany_profile.jsp (visited Apr. 10, 2000). 
 791. Robert J. Cline & Thomas S. Neubig, Ernst & Young, The Sky Is Not Falling: Why 
State and Local Revenues Were Not Impacted by the Internet in 1998 (Jun. 1999), available 
at http://www.ey.com (downloaded Sept. 21, 1999). 
 792. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SECRETARIAT ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE,  THE 
EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY (1999), http://www.ecommerce.gov (downloaded Sept. 1999). 
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tions’ predictions for those sales. 793 The Commerce Department 
thought it necessary to provide a list of the goods included in the 
three companies’ estimates. There is a significant difference between 
the goods categories included in the different estimates, making any 
comparison illogical. Interestingly, it is there noted that Forrester 
(whose predictions are used) “normally includes travel in its overall 
retail spending estimates.”794 In this particular set of predictions, 
that was not included. But International Data Corporation’s predic-
tions (also included) did include travel spending. IDC’s prediction for 
2000 of $37 billion contrasts sharply with Forrester’s $7.3 billion 
prediction. Travel services are generally not subject to sales tax. One 
wonders if the Forrester figures so often cited by tax authorities are 
from one of Forrester’s “normal” estimates, 80% or more of which 
could be untaxable travel services. 
Federal Legislation as Violating the Constitution 
 The National Governors’ Association’s Web site contains at least 
one release that takes the position that legislation introduced in 
Congress “violate[s] the Constitution by stripping the states of the 
power to decide what happens entirely within their own borders,” 
and that “[Congressman] Kasich’s and [Senator] McCain’s proposals 
are clearly unconstitutional.”795 One will look a long time to find a 
provision in the Constitution that says Congress cannot pass legisla-
tion that has some effect within the states. That is why the article 
quotes from a Supreme Court decision (McCulloch v. Maryland796) in 
support of the statement that taxing is a fundamental power of 
states. Perhaps the Web site’s author should read the entire cited 
opinion, and quite a few others by the Supreme Court, all of which 
say that the Federal Government can enforce rules that limit states’ 
“fundamental” powers. 797 The power to tax may be a fundamental 
feature of government, but the Constitution delegates to Congress 
power to regulate various things, including “[c]ommerce . . . among 
the states;”798 it also provides that laws adopted by the Federal Gov-
ernment (within the limits of the authority delegated) is the “su-
                                                                                                                  
 793. Id. at app. 5 A5-18 n.10 (Retail Sales of Tangible Goods: Analysis and Case Stud-
ies). 
 794. Id.  
 795. NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASS’N,  HOW ARE WASHINGTON POLITICIANS TRYING TO 
VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION?, at http://www.nga.org/Internet/Federal.asp (visited Apr. 10, 
2000). 
 796. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).  
 797. See, e.g., id. at 326-27 (explaining that governments have fundamental powers, 
and when the state and the federal government powers collide, the state must surrender to 
the federal government). 
 798. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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preme law of the land.”799 Which means that the Constitution author-
izes the legislation the governors say would violate the Constitution. 
Perhaps the substance of the bills under attack is not wise, but un-
fortunately (perhaps), the Constitution does not allow only wise legis-
lation. Ironically, it is a Supreme Court decision that says the states 
cannot do what they want in this arena. 
On “Discrimination” Against “Main Street” Business 
 A common theme of state officials and parties who support them 
is that “exempting” Internet-mediated sales from sales taxes “dis-
criminates” against “Main Street” business. 800 There are a number of 
spin items in those statements. One of the more important (because 
it is almost subliminal) is that the complaints are aired in a manner 
calculated to invoke a mental picture of a small town’s main street 
lined with brick-facade buildings and retail stores that have been run 
by generations of the town’s leading families. That is not where the 
states’ sales tax revenues are produced; such retailers probably pro-
duce a very small percentage of those revenues. The bulk of the reve-
nue comes from stores like Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and mall-based fran-
chise and department stores, most of whom are setting up their own 
online sites. The second fallacy in the argument is that the Internet 
sales are subject to different rules, which they obviously are not. 
Sales or use tax is owed on Internet-mediated sales. To the extent 
use taxes are not collected, it is because the state-resident purchas-
ers are not paying the legally owed taxes. 
Discriminating Against the Poor 
 A relatively new wrinkle is that the “exemption” of Internet-
mediated sales from sales tax discriminates against lower income 
families. That is supported by somewhat reliable statistics showing 
that persons with lower incomes tend to own fewer personal com-
puters. (One wonders how many thousands in research dollars were 
spent to reach that less-than-surprising conclusion.) Thus, the spin 
goes, lower income people cannot take advantage of the “exemp-
tion.”801 The statistics do not show the proportion of low-income per-
sons that can or do access the Internet through computers at work or 
at the local public library. The spin does not mention that politicians 
have pledged to lessen the “digital divide” by spending a lot of money 
                                                                                                                  
 799. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 165 (“The [federal] constitution . . . declares, that 
the constitution itself, . . . shall be the supreme law of the land . . . .”). 
 800. See, e.g., NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASS’N,  HOW ARE WASHINGTON POLITICIANS 
TRYING TO VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION?, at http://www.nga.org/Internet/Federal.asp (vis-
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discrimination. In other locations, other things are blamed, frequently the Quill decision. 
 801. See id. 
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to make computers more accessible to those who cannot afford their 
own. 
On the Continuation of the Mail-Order Fight 
 The National Governors’ Association Web site, in describing its 
sales tax simplification proposal, states that the issue results from 
the Supreme Court decisions in Bellas Hess and Quill.802 Those two 
decisions concerned out-of-state mail-order sales, and the NGA 
makes a clear link between those and Internet-mediated sales. As 
the text demonstrates, states have been trying to force out-of-state 
sellers to collect use taxes for sixty years, with some success. Yet 
they have consistently failed when out-of-state sellers have no sig-
nificant activities or properties in the state, that is, catalog sellers. 
The tax collectors’ arguments have not changed; they have simply 
substituted “Internet” for “mail-order.” What has changed is the 
number of dollars predicted to go uncollected. Those predictions have 
persuaded states to make higher profile efforts—and spend money—
to obtain a change in the applicable law. Perhaps they should spend 
the time and effort to educate the real taxpayers and enforce those 
taxpayer’s obligations. A few states have lines on their individual in-
come tax returns on which the taxpayer is supposed to enter the use 
tax due for purchases during the preceding year. One wonders how 
often any attempt is made to audit that portion of an individual’s re-
turn. 
On a “Level Playing Field” 
 Everyone involved in the political rhetoric states that “a level 
playing field” is all they want. Another nice mental picture is in-
voked, but—How many major league pitchers would really like to 
have a level playing field? It is another spin. What a level playing 
field would look like is as subjective as “what justice is.” Perhaps the 
remark is being made with tongue in cheek, but the Advisory Com-
mission “Business Caucus” called the states’ bluff on this “argu-
ment”: There is more than one way to level the field.  
 The Business Caucus proposal included a suggestion that the non-
Internet sale of products also sold in digital form (computer pro-
grams, books, video, audio, and so on) be exempt from sales taxes. 
Rather obviously, if both types of sales are exempt from tax they are 
just as equal as if they were both subject to tax. That, of course, is 
not the level that the tax authorities want. 
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